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STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND REGULATORY FAILURE
LYNDA L. BUTLER*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years scientists, legal scholars and other interested par-
ties have repeatedly expressed concern about the condition and
health of the nation's natural resources. Numerous studies have in-
dicated that those resources are experiencing serious environmen-
tal degradation and that government action is needed immediately
to stop and hopefully reverse the damage.1 Noting the inadequacy
of past efforts to end the decline, the studies typically call for a
greater commitment to environmental protection and recommend
that states assume a more active role in the management of their
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. B.S., College of William and Mary, 1973; J.D., University of Virginia, 1978.
This Article is a revised version of a report prepared for the Virginia Environmental En-
dowment. The report, entitled Legal Barriers to Comprehensive Natural Resources Man-
agement in Virginia, was funded by a grant from the Endowment. The author gratefully
acknowledges the Endowment's support. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assis-
tance of Della Harris and her word processing staff, and to thank Carlton Brown, Diane
Davis, Barbara Endres, Carol Holmes, Phillip Lingafelt, Peter Lucchesi, Robert Skinner and
Lynne Strobel for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., 1-7 BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE & BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL ESTUARY STUDY
(1970); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON VIRGINIA'S FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW DOMINION: CHOICES FOR
VIRGINIANS (final report 1984) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMM'N]; S. HARDAWAY & G. ANDER-
SON, SHORELINE EROSION IN VIRGINIA (1980) (published by Virginia Institute of Marine Sci-
ence, School of Marine Science, College of William and Mary, Gloucester Point, Va.); NA-
TIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA
(1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL WETLANDS REPORT]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION (OTA-O-206 Mar. 1984); PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL WATER CONFERENCE (J. Wilson ed. 1982); SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
THE POISONED WELL (E. Jorgensen ed. 1989) [hereinafter THE POISONED WELL]; U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, BALTIMORE DISTRICT, CHESAPEAKE BAY: ExISTING CONDITIONS RE-
PORT-SUMMARY (1973); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: INTRODUCTION TO
AN ECOSYSTEM (Jan. 1982); YEAR 2020 PANEL, CHESAPEAKE EXECuIWv COUNCIL, POPULATION
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED TO THE YEAR 2020: SUM-
MARY (1988) [hereinafter YEAR 2020 PANEL REPORT]; Pye & Patrick, Ground Water Contam-
ination in the United States, 221 SCIENCE 713 (1983).
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natural resources.2 To achieve these goals, the studies further rec-
ommend the adoption of standards and restrictions to govern use
of natural resources and the development of comprehensive man-
agement plans for certain critical resources.3 Although some states
have responded with aggressive environmental programs,4 many
have been reluctant to expand their roles in natural resource man-
agement. 5 This reluctance often manifests itself in a state's out-
right refusal to adopt an environmental program or in the adoption
of regulatory programs of limited scope and effectiveness.6 State
2. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 1; NATIONAL WETLANDS REPORT, supra note
1, at 1-7.
3. See, e.g., NATIONAL WETLANDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-6, 19-23, 35-47; YEAR 2020
PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-12. The drafters of the Model Land Development Code
also agree with this recommendation. See MODEL LAND DEv. CODE foreword & arts. 2, 3, 7, 8
(Proposed Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter MODEL LAND CODE].
4. The environmental programs of New Jersey, Florida and California immediately come
to mind. New Jersey has been described as having the country's toughest environmental
program. Note, New Jersey's Pinelands Plan and the "Takings" Question, 7 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 227, 227 (1982). For a description of this plan, see NEw JERSEY PINELANDS
COMM'N, COMPREHENSIVE MGMT. PLAN FOR THE PINELANDS NATIONAL RESERVE AND PINELANDS
AREA (1980). Florida adopted a comprehensive environmental land use control scheme as
early as 1972. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). California en-
acted a coastal zone act in 1972 and recently announced the nation's most stringent smog-
control plan. See California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1986 & Supp. 1989) (originally enacted as Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PuB.
RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650); Mathews, California Air-Quality Plan Unveiled, Wash. Post,
Dec. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1. For discussions of some of the more innovative state programs
on land use and environmental regulation, see MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, art. 7 com-
mentary at 284-91; F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QuIT REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-
TROL: SUMMARY REPORT 5-20 (1971); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS
LEGISLATION ch. VI(B) (1976 & Supp. 1982); 4 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
§ 26.01[4] (1988); see also THE POISONED WELL, supra note 1, pt. IV (suggesting new strate-
gies for using existing groundwater protection programs).
5. Virginia exemplifies this reluctance as well as any state. Virginia, for example, took 14
years to develop and obtain approval of its Coastal Resources Management Program. See
OFFICE OF OCEAN & COASTAL RESOURCE MGMT., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, & VA. COUNCIL ON THE ENV'T, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT AND THE VIRGINIA COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (July 1986) (approved
51 Fed. Reg. 35,543 (1986)) [hereinafter VA. CRMP]. Other examples of Virginia's regula-
tory inaction will be discussed later in this Article. See generally 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ch. 6 (S. Novick, D. Stever & M. Mellon eds. 1990) (discussing state environ-
mental laws and programs); W. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION ch. 13 (1989) (discuss-
ing state wetlands and coastal laws).
6. Once again, the Virginia experience provides excellent examples of both points. See
supra note 5.
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action, it seems, conflicts frequently with scientific knowledge and
understanding.'
The striking contrast between the recent calls for a more serious
commitment to management of natural resources, on the one hand,
and the traditional reluctance of state governments to assume a
more active regulatory role, on the other hand, provides the impe-
tus for this Article. Several factors external to the state regulatory
system could explain why states have failed to meet the challenge
of environmental regulation. One possible explanation is that many
state governments lack the financial resources required to imple-
ment comprehensive environmental programs. Though inadequate
financial resources clearly would prevent a state from adopting en-
vironmental programs, this explanation does not account for all
state inaction. In the past, even when significant federal funding
has been available, some states still have resisted the adoption and
implementation of resource management programs.8 A second ex-
planation is that the conflict between regulatory need and state
inaction is, at least for some environmental problems, a false one
because no effective state solution exists. Because state govern-
ments currently face environmental problems that cannot be
solved by individual state action, this explanation has some ap-
peal.' Perfect solutions, however, are not necessary to promote en-
vironmental protection, for scientific studies suggest that even
weak regulatory programs can provide surprising benefits. 10 Yet a
7. Cf. M. SAGOFF, ECOLOGY & LAW (1987) (explaining how federal law imposes somewhat
conflicting demands on ecologists). For an argument that the state administrative regulatory
process should use a political instead of a technocratic approach, see A. BONFIELD, STATE
ADMINiSTRATIvE RULE MAKING § 1.1.2, at 8-9 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
8. Virginia, for example, did not obtain approval of its Coastal Resources Management
Program until 1986. See supra note 5. Subsequently, Virginia obtained $1.9 million from the
federal government in 1988 alone. See 2 VA. NAT. RESOURCES NEWSL., Winter 1988, No. 1, at
2.
9. The environmental problems surrounding the Chesapeake Bay demonstrate how coop-
erative interstate action sometimes is necessary. Studies indicate, for example, that the
Bay's water quality is affected by farming practices in New York. See Butler, The Proceed-
ings of the Water Rights Symposium, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 788 (1983). In 1987, the
governments of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia and the United
States finally signed a compact to clean up the Chesapeake Bay. See generally CHESAPEAKE
EXEcUTIvE COUNCIL, THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT UNDER THE 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREE-
MsENT (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter 1987 BAY AGREEMENT].
10. The Virginia legislature, for instance, responded initially with a very limited regula-
tory program for the Chesapeake Bay. Essentially all that program did was ban the use of
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third explanation is that scientific knowledge and technology are
too undeveloped and incomplete to support comprehensive regula-
tion. Although science admittedly has not provided all the answers,
this explanation ignores the fact that some states have not even
acted on the wealth of scientific data that is already available to
them.11
If external factors such as financial impossibility, environmental
impracticability and imperfect information do not adequately ex-
plain the conflict between regulatory need and state inaction, what
then accounts for the pervasive reluctance of state governments to
engage in effective resource regulation? This Article considers that
question, focusing on possible factors internal to the state regula-
tory system. The nature and extent of these factors must be ex-
plored-and their legitimacy evaluated-if effective resource man-
agement is to occur. Without a better understanding of these
internal barriers to environmental regulation, many state regula-
tory efforts will continue to be inefficient and ineffective.
Understanding the regulatory failure of state governments in-
volves a two-step process. The first step is the identification of rea-
sons for the regulatory ineffectiveness of states. The second step
requires the evaluation of the legitimacy of those reasons. In con-
ducting the identification and evaluation process, this Article uses
as its model state the Commonwealth of Virginia, a jurisdiction
that, until recently, has been one of the most traditional and con-
servative of states.12 With its wide variety of natural resources,
Virginia represents a type of ecological crossroads. Beaches, moun-
tains, barrier islands, wetlands, estuarine systems, and inland and
phosphate. The ban produced surprisingly quick benefits, and ultimately a more compre-
hensive program was enacted. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-193.1 to -193.3 (1987) (cleaning
agents statute enacted in 1987); id. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (1989) (Chesapeake Bay Preserva-
tion Act enacted in 1988); 1987 BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 21 (noting that the
phosphate ban reduced certain phosphorus concentrations by about 50%).
11. Early studies on the health of the Chesapeake Bay, for example, were published in the
first part of the 1970s; yet Virginia did not enact comprehensive legislation until 1988. See
supra notes 1 & 10.
12. Some may view this as the assumption of a worst-case scenario. Even under such a
view, the choice of Virginia still would be productive because the use of a worst-case scena-
rio increases the likelihood of achieving a more complete picture of the effectiveness of state
environmental programs. More importantly, the few states that have effective environmen-




coastal waters all appear in one state.13 Due in part to the diversity
and splendor of its natural resources, Virginia has experienced sig-
nificant growth in its human and economic resources. 4 Though the
economic development generally is welcomed, it has been occurring
in an atmosphere of little to no environmental safeguards, with
some rather obvious consequences. Natural resources, once abun-
dant and healthy, are showing the strain of development. In recent
years this strain has finally reached a crisis level, forcing the state
to think seriously about environmental regulation.15 Finally, Vir-
ginia's conservative to moderate political climate appears to reflect
the mood of the country. With its reverence for private property
rights, its preference for fiscal responsibility and cautious govern-
ment, and its willingness to engage in incremental experimental-
ism, Virginia appears to be a political barometer for much of the
country. Virginia's ecological diversity, economic growth, political
climate and mounting environmental problems make it an ideal
state to examine in evaluating state environmental programs.
Using Virginia as a vehicle for identifying and evaluating inter-
nal barriers to effective regulation required an empirical investiga-
tion into its regulatory system. The investigation focused on the
attitudes, perceptions and views of state and local officials respon-
sible for environmental and land use regulation.0 Although per-
13. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW chs. 2, 3
(1988) (discussing the ecological and physical characteristics of Virginia's tidal zone).
14. For a discussion of the impact of man's presence on Virginia's tidal zone, see id. ch. 4.
15. For recommendations on how Virginia should respond, see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 23-28.
16. Twenty-six officials from state environmental agencies were interviewed. These offi-
cials represented twelve different administrative entities, including, among others, the At-
torney General's Office, the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries (now the Board of
Game and Inland Fisheries), the Council on the Environment, the Marine Resources Com-
mission, the State Air Pollution Control Board and the State Water Control Board. Depart-
ments involved in the interview process included Agriculture and Consumer Services, Air
Pollution Control, Conservation and Historic Resources (now Conservation and Recreation),
Economic Development, Game and Inland Fisheries, Transportation, Waste Management,
and Mines, Minerals, and Energy. Ten local government officials also were interviewed. An
attempt was made to select a representative sampling of Virginia's localities to ensure that
the divergent interests of all localities would be taken into account. All but three of the
interviews of state and local officials were conducted in person and generally lasted about
one hour. The other three officials were interviewed by mail. A few officials were interviewed
more than once. Finally, interviews or meetings were held with three interest groups or their
representatives.
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sonal interviews of officials were the primary method of investiga-
tion, 17 interviews and meetings with interest groups also occurred.
In addition, the investigation included studies of specific environ-
mental or land use issues. The primary purpose of the empirical
investigation was to identify the key barriers to effective regulation
that face officials responsible for environmental programs. Barriers
were identified regardless of whether they actually exist under the
law. A misconception about the existence of a barrier to environ-
mental regulation is just as much an obstacle to effective regula-
tion as an actual legal barrier. The two are distinguished, however,
in evaluating the legitimacy of the perceived barriers.
The results of the identification and evaluation process is some-
what surprising. They suggest that regulatory failure in the envi-
ronmental area pervades virtually every aspect of state regulatory
systems-from local governments to state administrators, legisla-
tors and courts. No level of government seems to have escaped the
regulatory mindset of little or no action that has prevented effec-
tive resource regulation. The internal factors contributing to this
mindset fall into four basic categories:18 (1) inadequacies in over-
riding constitutional principles, (2) barriers in state environmental
legislation, (3) deficiencies in state judicial principles and perspec-
tives, and (4) problems within the state administrative process and
structure. Though a number of reasons explain why these internal
barriers exist, political considerations appear to have had the most
widespread effect.
I. OVERRIDING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The investigation into the attitudes of officials from the model
state suggests that constitutional principles pose serious obstacles
17. The identity and comments of specific interviewees are confidential.
18. This Article focuses on internal barriers-that is, on barriers to effective regulation
existing within the legal system. The empirical investigation revealed two other types of
barriers external to the legal system. One type concerns more practical obstacles arising
because of limited resources. Those resources include natural and financial resources, as well
as more intangible forms like information. The second type involves attitudes and miscon-
ceptions existing among regulators, the regulated community and the citizenry at large.
Those attitudes and misconceptions deal with a variety of topics ranging from cultural bi-
ases to political and policy matters. When relevant, the resource and attitude barriers are
incorporated into the analysis of the legal barriers.
[Vol. 31:823
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to effective environmental regulation. Two key areas of concern ex-
ist. Perhaps the more serious one involves the just compensation
principle of federal and state constitutions. Each just compensa-
tion clause basically prohibits the taking of private property for
public use without payment of just compensation and thus con-
strains a state's regulatory power. The second area of concern in-
volves the effectiveness of environmental provisions found in many
state constitutions. Rather than limiting state action, these provi-
sions act as a source of state regulatory authority. Both areas of
concern are discussed below.
A. The Just Compensation Principle
The just compensation provisions of the federal and state consti-
tutions appear simple enough on their face. The federal version
provides that private property shall not be "taken for public use,
without just compensation."' 9 In addition to having a similar pro-
hibition, some state versions also protect property from being dam-
aged for public purposes without payment of just compensation. 0
Despite the provisions' apparent simplicity, model state officials
considered the provisions to be significant barriers to effective reg-
ulation. As several explained, the provisions were too vague to pro-
vide any meaningful guidance to regulators. Nor did the officials
believe that case law filled the substantive void. State and federal
courts have been among the first to admit that they have failed to
develop a formula to guide officials in determining whether a regu-
latory program infringes impermissibly on private property
rights.2 ' Without adequate guidance, officials understandably
viewed the just compensation principle as a barrier to effective reg-
19. US. CONST. amend. V.
20. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
21. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 554-55, 193 A.2d
232, 241 (1963); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 14-16, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972);
see also D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.25 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the absence of a set
formula among state courts). State takings law parallels federal law in many ways. See gen-
erally id. §§ 2.25-.34 (discussing state court takings doctrine). In Virginia, for example, the
courts generally apply the same factors and tests even though the Virginia takings clause
also protects private property from being damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion. See generally 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 218-29
(1974) (discussing Virginia takings law).
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ulation. Because of its vagueness, the principle thwarted efforts by
regulators to predict the validity of innovative and untested regu-
latory programs."
In the view of model state officials, recent Supreme Court cases
further compounded the problem of vagueness by expanding pro-
tection for private property rights under the federal compensation
clause. One of these cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,2 3 held that a permit condition requiring a grant of public ac-
cess across privately owned waterfront land was an impermissible
exercise of the state's police power under the federal takings
clause. According to the Court, the permit condition failed to bear
even a rational relationship to legitimate public purposes.24 In a
second case, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles,25 the Supreme Court concluded that a property
owner could recover compensation for property temporarily taken
in violation of the takings clause. Until First English, many legal
scholars, land use planners and lawmakers predicted that a state or
local government would not have to pay compensation for property
later found to be taken by a regulatory measure if the government
abandoned the measure.2e The Court in First English declared
those predictions to be erroneous.
Several officials from the model state had serious misgivings
about the recent cases-especially First English-which they be-
lieved would cause an increase in litigation and have a chilling ef-
fect on government regulation of land use. The vagueness of the
compensation principle and the apparent expansion of Nollan and
First English have made legislators and administrators in the
model state hesitant to adopt new regulatory programs. Local offi-
cials, in particular, feared the impact of the cases. Even if
22. Cf. D. MANDELKER, supra note 21, § 2.02 (noting the failure of most courts to adopt "a
clear taking theory"). See generally id. §§ 2.01-.34 (discussing the taking problem).
23. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
24. The Court stated that the permit condition had to meet a substantial relationship test
to withstand scrutiny under the takings clause. Id. at 834. Because the condition did not
bear even a rational relationship, it failed to meet the heightened test. Id. at 838.
25. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
26. See Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
491 (1981). See generally D. MANDELKER, J. GERARD & E. SULLIVAN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW




lawmakers were willing to overcome their reluctance and adopt
new programs, the recent case law still would affect their actions.
As one official explained, lawmakers who foresaw an increased risk
of litigation would be more likely to weaken the regulatory pro-
grams that they adopted by, for example, including broad grandfa-
ther clauses; yet the weaker the program, the less effective it
becomes.
Another problem identified by a few Virginia regulators concerns
the skewing of takings challenges in favor of private property
rights and against environmental programs. In the view of these
regulators, the skewing occurs because present land use patterns
inhibit attempts to improve resource management and regulation.
The patterns create false, but arguably reasonable, expectations in
private landowners that regulation of their land will not change
significantly to their detriment. Because environmental regulation
is relatively new, landowners have difficulty understanding the le-
gitimacy of increased restrictions on their property rights. They
view environmental regulation as an improper interference with
property rights, rather than as a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power.
Officials from the model state correctly perceived the compensa-
tion principle of the federal and state constitutions to be a barrier
to effective regulation. Neither the language of the compensation
clauses nor the case law interpreting the language provides much
guidance to state and local officials contemplating new regulatory
programs. While a few identifiable tests have emerged,27 they do
not provide an overall benchmark for determining whether govern-
ment regulation is valid without compensation. One such test, for
example, would find a taking whenever the government has physi-
cally occupied or appropriated private property without just com-
pensation.28 Because many regulatory situations do not involve a
27. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1183-1201 (1967) (dis-
cussing the tests); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38-60 (1964) (dis-
cussing the tests).
28. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See generally
Michelman, supra note 27, at 1184-90 (discussing and criticizing the physical invasion test);
Sax, supra note 27, at 46-48 (discussing and criticizing the invasion theory).
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physical invasion, this test is helpful only in a limited number of
situations. A second test would uphold uncompensated govern-
ment infringement of private property if the government has regu-
lated a noxious or harmful private use.29 This standard also has
limited utility, for it serves as a useful predictor of court challenges
only when the private use can, without much disagreement, be
classified as harmful.3 0 If the use did not originate as a harmful use
or if reasonable persons would differ over whether the use was ever
really harmful, then subsequent government regulation of the use
is more difficult to justify. A third test would find a taking when
government action has gone too far in diminishing the value of pri-
vate property by leaving the property owner with no economically
viable use.31 Because the economic impact of government regula-
tion varies according to the particular situation, the diminution in
value test, more than any other, fails to eliminate the ad hoc na-
ture of takings inquiries.32 Thus, none of the standards have much
predictive value.
Recent challenges to innovative land use measures adopted in
Virginia and other states demonstrate the low predictive value of
takings case law. Private property owners seem to challenge virtu-
ally every new measure as an invalid exercise of the police power
and as a taking of private property rights.33 Though many of the
29. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cutting down trees to prevent the spread
of disease to other trees); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (regulation of liquor).
30. See generally Michelman, supra note 27, at 1196-1201 (discussing and criticizing the
noxious use test). But see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 112-21 (1985) (supporting the nuisance control rationale of the takings
clause).
31. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922).
32. See generally Michelman, supra note 27, at 1190-93 (discussing and criticizing the
diminution in value test); Sax, supra note 27, at 50-60 (critiquing the diminution in value
test).
33. Private parties have, in recent years, filed numerous challenges to Virginia's land use
and environmental measures. One of the most recent involves a challenge to the regulations
of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board. Adopted pursuant to the Virginia Chesa-
peake Bay Preservation Act, those regulations were challenged immediately. See Committee
of Concerned Citizens for Property Rights v. Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Bd., Ch. No.
8069 (York County, Va. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 3, 1989); Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Des-
ignation and Management Regulations, 6 Va. Regs. Reg. 11, 11-24 (Oct. 9, 1989). For other
Virginia challenges, see Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1 v. City of Virginia Beach, No.
86-LA-2212 (Virginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989) (challenging Virginia Beach zoning
ordinances under the equal protection and due process clauses), consolidated on appeal and
[Vol. 31:823
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challenges have not been successful,34 the very existence of the
af'd, - Va. -, 389 S.E. 2d 312 (1990); Sandbridge Dev. Co. v. City of Virginia Beach, No.
86-LA-2224 (Virginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 1988) (challenging a Virginia Beach
downzoning ordinance as void for vagueness), consolidated on appeal and aff'd sub. nom.
City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1, - Va. - 389 S.E. 2d 312
(1990); G.W.G. Dev. Corp. v. City of Norfolk, No. L-88-487 (Norfolk, Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 15,
1988), reprinted in 13 VA. Cn CT. Op. 274 (W. Bryson ed. 1989) (challenging Norfolk zoning
amendments as arbitrary exercises of the police power and as unconstitutional takings);
Tidewater Builders Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 86-LA-1828 (Virginia Beach, Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 1988) (challenging Virginia Beach's water impact fee as facially unconstitu-
tional under the takings, due process and equal protection clauses), appeal filed, No. 900451
(Apr. 12, 1990); Aldre Properties, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, Ch. No. 78425 (Fairfax
County, Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 1985) (challenging a Fairfax County downzoning ordinance as
unconstitutional under the takings, due process and equal protection clauses); see also 1985-
1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 112 (evaluating a proposed transferable development rights pro-
gram under the takings, due process and equal protection clauses); Land Use in the Courts,
PEDMONT ENVTL. COUNc. NEWSREPORTER, June-July 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Land Use
Cases] (available from Piedmont Environmental Council, Warrenton, Va.) (discussing cur-
rent land use cases in the Piedmont region).
Other states have faced similar challenges to land use measures and environmental regu-
lations. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362
A.2d 948 (1975) (challenging denial of wetlands permit as unconstitutional takings); Depart-
ment of Envtl. Regulation v. Mackay, 544 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (challenging
denial of application for permission to fill as unconstitutional taking); Pope v. City of At-
lanta, 242 Ga. 331, 249 S.E.2d 16 (1978) (challenging river protection act and plan as uncon-
stitutional taking), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Meredith v. Talbot County, 80 Md.
App. 174, 560 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (challenging, as an unconstitutional tak-
ing, the refusal to approve a development project because of Chesapeake Bay legislation);
Millison v. Wilzack, 77 Md. App. 676, 551 A.2d 899 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (challenging
subdivision regulation as unconstitutional taking), cert. denied, 315 Md. 307, 554 A.2d 393
(1989); Blue Water Isles Co. v. Department of Natural Resources, 171 Mich. App. 526, 431
N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1988) (challenging the wetlands regulations that Michigan adopted to
implement Clean Water Act § 404 program), discussed in 10 NAT'L WETLANDs NEWSL.,
Sept./Oct. 1988, No. 5, at 14; Society for Envtl. Economic Dev. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 208 N.J. Super. 1, 504 A.2d 1180 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (challenging
fresh water flood area regulations as unconstitutional under takings, due process and equal
protection clauses); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 281 S.C. 201, 314 S.E.2d 327
(1984) (challenging denial of marshlands permit as improper exercise of police power and as
unconstitutional taking).
34. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362
A.2d 948 (1975) (finding no unconstitutional taking); Department of Envtl. Regulation v.
Mackay, 544 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no unconstitutional taking);
Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 249 S.E.2d 16 (1978) (upholding act and plan under
state constitution), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Meredith v. Talbot County, 80 Md.
App. 174, 560 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (rejecting takings and due process chal-
lenges because of developer's voluntary agreement with county); Millison v. Wilzack, 77 Md.
App. 676, 551 A.2d 899 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (barring an inverse condemnation action
under three-year statute of limitations), cert. denied, 315 Md. 307, 554 A.2d 393 (1989);
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:823
challenges is enough to call into question the validity of other land
use measures and to discourage state and local governments from
further land use regulation. 5 Even spurious challenges raise the
cost of environmental regulation.
Further evidence of the low predictive value of takings case law
can be found in the misconceptions and conflicting views voiced by
model state officials during the investigative process. Some regula-
tors believed that as long as state and local governments followed
statutory law, their actions would not effect a taking. Others ex-
pressed the view that a taking could not arise unless the govern-
ment denied a private landowner a necessary development permit.
Still others believed that takings law was a matter of semantics
and that successful challenges could be averted with appropriate
word usage.
Blue Water Isles Co. v. Department of Natural Resources, 171 Mich. App. 526, 431 N.W.2d
53 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of Michigan wetlands regulations), discussed
in 10 NAT'L WErLANDS NEWSL., Sept./Oct. 1988, No. 5, at 14; Society for Envtl. Economic
Dev. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 208 N.J. Super. 1, 504 A.2d 1180 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985) (upholding fresh water flood area regulations under takings, due process
and equal protection clauses); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 281 S.C. 201, 314
S.E.2d 327 (1984) (upholding permit denial as legitimate exercise of police power and find-
ing no unconstitutional taking); Tidewater Builders Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 86-
LA-1828 (Virginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 7, 1989) (upholding the impact fee as applied),
appeal filed, No. 900451 (Apr. 12, 1990); id. (Apr. 15, 1988) (upholding the facial validity of
the impact fee in an opinion on a summary judgment motion), appeal filed, No. 900451
(Apr. 12, 1990); Aldre Properties, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, Ch. No. 78425 (Fairfax
County, Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 1985) (upholding overall validity of downzoning ordinance). But
see Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1 v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 86-LA-2212 (Vir-
ginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989) (invalidating a downzoning ordinance, as applied,
under the equal protection and due process clauses), consolidated on appeal and afl'd, -
Va. -, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990); Sandbridge Dev. Co. v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 86-LA-
2224 (Virginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 1988) (striking down a Virginia Beach downzoning
ordinance as void for vagueness), consolidated on appeal and aff'd sub. nom. City of Vir-
ginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1, - Va. -, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990). See
generally Land Use Cases, supra note 33, at 3-4 (discussing a study that noted, since 1980,
a trend of the Virginia Supreme Court to uphold land use regulations even when it means
reversing a lower court decision).
35. Annual requests by Virginia localities for clarifications and expansions of enabling
legislation amply demonstrate this point. See, e.g., H.B. 1521, Va. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(1989) (stricken from docket) (a bill to allow certain counties to provide for variances and
special exceptions) (available from Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information Of-
fice); H.B. 1574, id. (passed-by indefinitely) (a bill to expand the purposes of zoning ordi-
nances); H.B. 1889, id. (stricken from docket) (a bill to expand the zoning powers of certain
counties); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-489, -490, -491.02 (1989) (enabling certain localities to gov-
ern hazardous air navigation).
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Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court do little to
enhance the clarity and predictability of takings case law. One of
these decisions, First English, clearly increases the risks and costs
of land use planning. After First English, state and local govern-
ments bear the risk of erroneous land use decisions regardless of
whether they effect a temporary or permanent taking." If a court
declares a land use measure to be a taking, the government must
pay compensation for the period during which the measure was ef-
fective. The government can no longer avoid paying compensation
by withdrawing the defective regulation. Nor can the courts re-
strict a private owner's remedy to invalidation of the ordinance for
the period prior to invalidation. Even a temporary taking merits
compensation.
While First English may have increased the government's risk of
litigation and the costs of an erroneous land use measure, the deci-
sion does not affect the probability that a court will find a taking.
One of the important factual limitations of First English is the
Court's assumption that a taking existed.3 8 The Court said it had
"no occasion to.decide whether . .. the county might avoid the
conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred."3 9 The only
issue before the Court was the question of whether a temporary
taking required compensation. First English thus does not lower
the threshold for finding a taking.
36. The Court defined a temporary regulatory taking as a regulatory taking that is "ulti-
mately invalidated by the courts." First English, 482 U.S. at 310.
37. Prior to First English, the California Supreme Court had decided that a landowner
could not bring an inverse condemnation action in state courts based upon the regulatory
taking theory. In the court's view, it could not require compensation until a regulation or
ordinance had been held to be excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of man-
damus and the government had nevertheless decided to proceed with enforcement of the
regulation or ordinance. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275-77, 598 P.2d 25,
29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376-78 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Based
upon this earlier decision, the trial court in First English decided that, when an ordinance
deprived a landowner of all use, the law limited the landowner's remedies to declaratory
relief or mandamus. First English, 482 U.S. at 309.
38. See First English, 482 U.S. at 312-13 & n.6. The Court also assumed that the ordi-
nance in question deprived the landowner of all use. See id. at 313. Given the public safety
concerns underlying the ordinance, the Court may not find a taking in similar situations if
given the chance.
39. Id. at 313.
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Nollan, the other recent takings case, arguably does change the
threshold by heightening the test for establishing a valid police
power regulation. Traditionally, the test involved a substantive due
process inquiry into whether a government regulation was reasona-
bly related to public health, welfare, safety or morals.40 In applying
this due process nexus test, modern courts tend to presume a po-
lice power regulation to be valid if "there is any rational basis for
the action of the legislature." '41 In Nollan, the United States Su-
preme Court used a different nexus test in evaluating the validity
of the challenged regulation under the takings clause. Under the
approach in Nollan, a "land-use regulation does not effect a taking
if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does
not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' ,,42 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained in a footnote that this
standard was indeed "different" from the due process nexus test. 3
Dissenting opinions by Justices Blackmun and Brennan disagreed
with the majority's distinction between the due process and tak-
ings nexus tests. According to the dissent, only one test of validity
traditionally has existed-the due process rational basis test."'
40. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88, 395-97 (1926);
Sellon v. City of Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229, 232-33 (Colo. 1987); County of Pine v.
State, 280 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Minn. 1979); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169
Va. 271, 281-82, 192 S.E. 881, 885, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937); Reesman v. State,
774 Wash. 2d 646, 649, 445 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1968). See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W.
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2 (1984) (discussing the police power,
the due process clause and the takings clause); 1 A. HOWARD, supra note 21, at 194-201
(discussing the evolution of the substantive due process test); D. MANDELKER, supra note 21,§§ 2.35-.37 (discussing land use controls under the substantive due process test).
41. Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32, 35 (1944); see Sellon v. City of
Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1987); Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enter-
prises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 237, 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973). See generally D. MANDELKER,
supra note 21, § 1.12, at 10-11 (discussing the presumption of constitutionality traditionally
given land use regulation and the recent trend away from this presumption).
42. 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1986)).
43. Id. n.3. Scalia noted that one prior decision "appearfs] to assume that the inquiries
are the same, but that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of our later cases."
Id. at 835 n.3.
44. Id. at 842-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 865-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). First
English adds to the controversy. In First English, Justice Stevens argued, in his dissent,
that the primary source of constitutional protection from arbitrary government action is the




Although the majority's distinction between the due process and
takings standards strongly suggests that it heightened the general
level of judicial scrutiny in takings cases, the facts of Nollan sug-
gest that a more limited interpretation of the decision's impact is
also plausible. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission re-
quired the owners of a beachfront lot to grant the public lateral
access across their lot as a condition to the issuance of a building
permit. Because public beaches bordered the lot on the north and
south, lateral access would allow the public to pass from one public
beach area to the other.45 In reviewing the Commission's permit
decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the condition of pub-
lic access resulted in a permanent physical occupation which could
not be justified even under a reasonable relationship test.4" Justice
Scalia explained that the permit condition failed to promote any of
the public purposes allegedly served by the condition. According to
the Commission, those purposes included preserving the public's
visual access to the beach, helping the public to overcome any psy-
chological barrier to using public beaches created by intensified
coastal development and minimizing beach congestion caused by
development.47 In the Court's view, the condition of lateral access
did not promote any of these purposes.4"
The existence of a physical invasion in Nollan arguably limits
the decision's impact. When government action results in physical
occupation of private property, the Court is much more willing to
find a taking.49 Even an insignificant invasion can result in a tak-
ing. Neither the economic impact nor the public benefit of the in-
vasion must be substantial or important.50
At least one Virginia court has interpreted Nollan as using an analysis different from the
usual takings approach and "more familiar to an equal protection argument." Thompson
Assocs. v. Board of Supervisors, Ch. No. 103227 (Fairfax County, Va. Cir. Ct. June 28, 1988),
reprinted in 12 VA. CI. CT. Op. 318, 323 (W. Bryson ed. 1988). But, in that court's opinion,
the test used in Nollan is "the lowest form of constitutional scrutiny." Id.
45. For a statement of the facts, see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-31.
46. Id. at 838-42.
47. Id. at 828-29.
48. Id. at 838-42. The Court had difficulty understanding "how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property" furthers any of
the avowed public purposes. Id. at 838.
49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
50. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
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Similarly, the impact of Nollan may be limited by the fact that
the permit condition required the "actual conveyance of prop-
erty." 51 As the majority explained, this fact creates a "heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation require-
ment, rather than the stated police power objective. '52 The appar-
ent suggestion is that only government action resulting in the ac-
tual conveyance of private property would be subject to Nollan's
heightened judicial scrutiny. Government action not requiring such
a conveyance seemingly would be subject to a lesser standard of
judicial scrutiny.
But even if Nollan and First English do not make the task of
establishing a taking substantively easier, they nevertheless in-
crease the likelihood of spurious lawsuits. When the two opinions
were released, private interest groups immediately proclaimed the
decisions to be landmark rulings and significant victories for pri-
vate rights.5 The majority in First English even conceded that its
decision "will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and
flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies." 4 Regardless
of whether these observations prove to be correct, it is nevertheless
clear that interest groups and government officials alike perceive
the decisions as expanding constitutional protection of property
rights. At the very least then, Nollan and First English will make
state and local officials reluctant to pursue even legitimate land use
plans. To deal with the increased risk of litigation, state and local
governments will have to decide whether to refuse to adopt new
land use measures or to weaken them.5
Even without the added weight of First English and Nollan,
takings case law still would favor private property rights in tradi-
tional jurisdictions. This skewing results in part from cultural fac-
tors that have shaped attitudes about property rights and land use
51. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Swallow, Court Again Rules for Developers, Wash. Post, June 27, 1987, at
A12, col. 1; Kamen, Land-Use Rights are Bolstered, Wash. Post, June 10, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
54. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
55. Model state officials interviewed during the investigative process generally supported
these observations. For the most part, those officials feared the impact of the recent takings
decisions, especially First English. The officials tended to give a broader interpretation to
the decisions than perhaps necessary. Further, some even believed that the decisions ren-
dered most zoning ordinances invalid.
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regulation. In many states, for example, citizens still view private
property rights in land with great deference. Private landowners
generally expect to have the freedom to do what they want with
their property and do not believe that the state normally has the
power to restrict use of privately owned land without payment of
just compensation. These expectations appear to have arisen in
part from the "pioneer tradition," or the early American bias
against the wilderness." This cultural bias reflected a fundamental
survival instinct; wilderness areas needed to be developed to en-
sure man's physical and moral survival.57 Although American cul-
ture has moved gradually away from this way of thinking, the bias
underlying the pioneer tradition has become engrained in the con-
cept of private property. 8 Furthermore, to the extent that society
now recognizes the need to protect natural resources, many private
parties have come to believe that nongovernmental action is suffi-
cient. At one time, this belief may have had some basis in fact, for
Virginia and other states appear to have had a tradition of a few
large landowners providing protection for natural.resources. 9 But,
56.' See R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 24, 239 (3d ed. 1982).
57. As Roderick Nash explained in his well-known book Wilderness and the American
Mind:
Two components figured in the American pioneer's bias against wilderness.
On the direct, physical level, it constituted a formidable threat to his very sur-
vival.... Safety and comfort, even necessities like food and shelter, depended
on overcoming the wild environment. . . . The pioneer, in short, lived too close
to wilderness for appreciation. Understandably, his attitude was hostile and his
dominant criteria utilitarian. The conquest of wilderness was his major
concern.
Wilderness not only frustrated the pioneers physically but also acquired sig-
nificance as a dark and sinister symbol. They shared the long Western tradi-
tion of imagining wild country as a moral vacuum, a cursed and chaotic waste-
land. As a consequence, frontiersmen acutely sensed that they battled wild
country not only for personal survival but in the name of nation, race, and
God.
Id. at 24.
58. An example of the impact of the pioneer tradition on the concept of private property
can be found in the traditional judicial rule requiring strict construction of zoning ordi-
nances because they are in derogation of private property rights. See D. MNUDELKER, supra
note 21, § 1.12, at 11.
59. This tradition may have resulted from the general system of landholding that devel-
oped during the colonial and early statehood periods. In Virginia, for example, that system
tended, at least initially, to concentrate landholdings in a relatively few people. Further-
more, for a long time the system required the performance of certain services or tenures as a
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though prior social practices may explain the expectation of non-
governmental protection, they no longer justify a laissez-faire ap-
proach to environmental regulation. Landowners have become too
numerous and environmental problems too complex for the tradi-
tion of nongovernmental protection to continue.
Legal and political factors also have contributed to the develop-
ment of an absolutist view of property rights. During the age of
liberty of contract, the courts generally protected private contracts
from interference by lawmakers. Gradually, as private parties in-
creasingly expressed their intent regarding land transactions in the
form of contractual provisions, they came to expect the same free-
dom for real property."e Local land use patterns further reinforced
this belief. Years of little or no regulation created false, but argua-
bly reasonable, expectations in private landowners that land use
regulations could not significantly change their rights without vio-
lating constitutional principles.6 In many localities the failure to
condition of ownership. Over time these tenure obligations were eliminated, but by then the
practice of using the land system to achieve social, political and economic goals had become
firmly entrenched. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LWNGSTON, supra note 13, ch. 8 (discuss-
ing the development of Virginia's land grant system). New York's early system of landhold-
ing also resulted in a few landowners controlling large tracts of land. See generally M. HAR-
HIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 208-15 (1970) (discussing
headright grants in New York). Lax enforcement of tenure obligations and extravagant land
grants hindered the settlement and development of New York. Id. at 213-14.
In addition to the general system of landholding, a system of special-purpose grants de-
veloped during the colonial era. The special-purpose granting system involved the practice
of transferring land in return for the fulfillment of certain special purposes. These purposes
included military service, frontier protection, the establishment of churches and schools,
and the development of industry. See generally id. at 255-72 (discussing special-purpose
grants). Although resource protection did not motivate these grants, it was an incidental
benefit of at least some of the grants. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LmNGSTON, supra note
13, § 8.1, at 262-68 (discussing the use of special grants in Virginia to promote various land
policies).
The sociological dynamics of rural communities also may have contributed to this tradi-
tion. Cf. T. RUDEL, SITUATIONS AND STRATEGIES IN AMERICAN LAND-USE PLANNING 53-56
(1989) (discussing the development of nongovernmental land use controls in a rural
community).
60. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275-79, 412-14, 532-36 (2d
ed. 1985) (discussing the development of contracts and land law); M. HORwrrz, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-210 (1977) (discussing the development of
contracts law).
61. Private landowners' challenges to the royalty program of the Virginia Marine Re-
sources Commission demonstrate this point. See infra note 65. For a case now before the
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regulate has resulted in a political climate that discourages in-
creased regulation.
The development of traditional property law also has affected
how private parties view land. After the states abolished the tenure
system, individual landowners held their property outright and no
longer owed any affirmative obligations to the original owner sim-
ply because of that party's prior interest.6 2 Together with the free-
dom of contract movement, this change in the property system
helped to foster the view that land was a commodity to be used
freely or sold in the marketplace.63 Supporters of environmental
regulation have a different perspective of land, viewing it as a fi-
nite resource instead of a commodity.6 4
The private rights orientation of the common law creates several
serious regulatory problems. Among other problems, the absolutist
view of private property rights has led to the perception that any
governmental deprivation or impairment of those rights is invalid.
This perception in turn encourages landowners to challenge regula-
tory programs even when they deal with state-owned lands or pro-
mote significant public interests. In several states, for example, pri-
vate waterfront landowners have challenged efforts to regulate
state-owned subaqueous beds. Because the regulatory programs for
state beds restrict the exercise of private use rights in the beds,
holders of the rights have argued that the restrictions are invalid
under the due process and takings clauses.6 5 Private landowners
United States Supreme Court in which a private party basically makes the same point in
the federal context, see infra note 336.
62. See generally M. HARMS, supra note 59, at 367-93 (discussing adjustments to the land
system during the revolutionary period).
63. See F. BossELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 4, at 23-24. This traditional view is con-
sistent with the pioneer tradition discussed earlier. See supra notes 56-58 and accompany-
ing text.
64. See generally F. BossEMmAN & D. CALLms, supra note 4, at 21-25 (discussing the
traditional and modem view of land).
65. See, e.g., In re Broad & Gales Creek Community Ass'n, 300 N.C. 267, 276-79, 266
S.E.2d 645, 652-54 (1980); In re Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 24-29, 337 S.E.2d 99, 104-06
(1985). In recent years, private landowners in Virginia have resisted enforcement of the
state's subaqueous lands program. Section 62.1-3 of the Virginia Code declares it "unlawful
... for anyone to build, dump, or otherwise trespass ... or encroach upon or take or use
any materials [from state-owned beds of the] bays and ocean, rivers, streams [and] creeks"
unless the use is authorized by statute or permit. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Supp. 1989).
Among other uses, § 62.1-3 authorizes the erection of dams and the placement of private
piers for noncommercial purposes by riparian owners. Id. Nonexempt uses require authori-
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similarly have challenged programs designed to promote important
public safety concerns. Efforts to restrict development in environ-
mentally fragile areas, for instance, have met strong opposition
even when the areas naturally undergo volatile changes and are
subjected repeatedly to life-threatening physical forces."
Although the absolutist view of private property rights may have
worked well in the 1800s when resources were plentiful and envi-
ronmental degradation was minimal, this view is not effective in
dealing with environmental problems today. Perhaps the primary
reason for the view's ineffectiveness is that it does not recognize
the market failure occurring in the environmental area. A market
failure generally arises when an imperfection in the marketplace
prevents parties from reaching an efficient result.6 7 When such an
imperfection exists, parties do not voluntarily reach the results
they would have reached in a perfect world.
In the environmental area, a market failure arises in large part
because of the presence of "externalities" and because of the inac-
curate and incomplete information relied upon by private users.
An externality is a "cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of
one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties
zation from the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC). Pursuant to its § 62.1-3
regulatory power, the VMRC has imposed rents, royalties and other charges on waterfront
landowners granted permits to encroach on or otherwise use state-owned beds for commer-
cial purposes. The need for the regulatory program is more compelling than ever. In the past
decade, the number of encroachment applications has risen from roughly 700 to about 2,200.
See 3 VA. NAT. REsOURCEs NEWSL., Winter 1989, No. 6, at 6. Recent challenges, however,
may slow the program. Because some of the uses affected by the royalty program are recog-
nized as common law property rights belonging to waterfront landowners, those landowners
have challenged the royalty program. See generally Report of the Governor's Study Com-
mission on Virginia's Royalty Assessment Program (1988) [hereinafter Royalty Report] (on
file with the author) (discussing the challenges to the royalty program).
Private expectations admittedly are weaker when state-owned resources are involved. But
as the challenges to the royalty program demonstrate, private property owners nevertheless
adhere to the absolutist view even when their rights are in public resources.
66. See, e.g., Society for Envtl. Economic Dev. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
208 N.J. Super. 1, 504 A.2d 1180 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); see also D. MANDELKER, supra
note 21, § 12.08 (discussing the takings issue surrounding floodplains programs). Resistance
to government regulation of barrier islands demonstrates this point. See generally Note,
Development of Barrier Islands in Virginia, 6 VA. J. NAT. REsouRCEs L. 375 (1987) (discuss-
ing the battle over development of barrier islands).
67. See generally R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONoMics 45-49 (1988) (discussing
market failure).
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without their consent."6 When harmful externalities exist, as in
the land use context, private parties who are aware of the external-
ities that their uses generate have no incentive to pay for the ex-
ternal costs, or for that matter to minimize the costs through self-
restraint, because third parties already bear the costs involuntarily.
In making resource decisions, the private parties thus ignore the
external costs of their uses. 9 In the environmental area, the fact
that private parties may not even be aware of the full external
costs of their uses further compounds the problem of externalities.
Private parties often lack a fundamental understanding of the im-
pact of their individual uses on the environment and of the rela-
tionship of those uses to other parties' uses. This imperfect infor-
mation may explain their continued adherence to the absolutist
view, which seems to assume that private uses have few, if any,
spillover effects on third parties. In any event, because of their im-
perfect information, private landowners may further discount the
costs and the overall expected loss of their uses. Moreover, private
parties cannot easily value the intangible benefits of environmental
regulation or objectively compare them to the more tangible bene-
fits of private development and use. Once market value becomes
the focal point of comparison, environmental regulation becomes a
losing proposition. In the minds of many private parties, the tangi-
ble benefits of development will outweigh the intangible, nonmone-
tary benefits of environmental regulation.
Through land use regulation, government has the opportunity to
correct some of the imperfections of the marketplace in the envi-
ronmental area. By forcing landowners to consider the full costs of
their uses, government can help to ensure that a market failure is
averted and an efficient result is achieved. To the extent that pri-
vate land uses have identifiable external costs, government should
be allowed to force private parties to internalize those costs
through appropriate regulation. 0 If government is allowed to step
68. Id. at 45.
69. This, in turn, explains why the market fails when external costs are involved. See id.
at 45-46.
70. Although the quantitative problem of measurement still remains, government can at
least provide a rough approximation of external environmental costs. Government, for ex-
ample, can measure these costs by focusing on prevention costs-that is, on the costs of
minimizing or preventing the environmental injury. Just because an accurate measurement
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in and at least partially correct the market failure, the likelihood
of an efficient result occurring will increase. In evaluating takings
challenges, then, the courts need to recognize the existence of the
market failure and the desirability of corrective government action.
Correcting the market failure will require a change in cultural
attitudes and perceptions about private property rights. To
achieve such a change, the public needs to become better educated
about the environmental consequences of private uses and about
the legal relationship existing between private property rights and
the government's police power. Achieving such a change also will
require recognition of a moral or civil responsibility that property
owners owe to society in general. 1 Until private landowners begin
to accept the notion of a land ethic as part of their property rights,
challenges to land use regulations will continue to increase. Hope-
fully through education, property owners will recognize the need to
view private property rights as correlative rather than absolute and
will eventually come to accept their ethical responsibilities, as re-
source users, to the environment and to present and future
generations.
B. Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions
In addition to the takings clauses, state constitutional provisions
on the environment also have served as a source of concern for
environmental regulators. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
the environmental protection movement was particularly strong,72
federal and state governments began to consider whether to recog-
nize environmental quality as a constitutional value. Although fed-
eral consideration never amounted to more than legislative debate,
state consideration produced concrete results. By the early 1970s,
of external costs is not possible, it does not necessarily follow that government should not be
able to force private parties to internalize those costs.
71. For a discussion of a common law doctrine that incorporates this notion, see L. BUT-
LER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, ch. 5. See generally Symposium: Stewardship of Land
and Natural Resources, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 301-668 (discussing recognition of the steward-
ship concept from a philosophical and a resource perspective).
72. In 1970, for example, Americans held their first Earth Day. The momentum of that
national festival contributed to the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency,
to the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, and to the adoption of tougher water legislation.
Cohn, Earth Takes Center Stage, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
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environmental quality had become a constitutional value in a num-
ber of states. 3
Today, most states have added some sort of environmental pro-
vision to their constitution.7 4 The provisions vary widely from state
to state, with some provisions being very broad and others being
more specific and detailed. Though the variations make precise
categorization difficult, four general categories of environmental
provisions have emerged. 5 One category consists of the broadly
worded provision that either declares state policy to include envi-
ronmental protection 6 or recognizes a right to environmental qual-
ity.77 This type is often coupled with an instruction to the legisla-
ture to implement appropriate legislation.7 8 Brevity and vagueness
are two characteristics of the first type of provision. A second cate-
gory of environmental provision is the integrated, fairly compre-
hensive version. This type usually includes some details on specific
resources or public interests, as well as a general declaration of pol-
73. For a discussion of the federal and state responses to the environmental protection
movement, see Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193
(1972), and Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State Constitutions to Protect the
Environment, 3 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 473 (1974).
74. See ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 24, & amend. 227; ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-18; Amz.
CONsT. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 9; ARK. CONsT. amend. 35; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25, art. X, §§ 2-4, art.
XA; COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, §§ 5-8, art. XVIII, § 6; FLA. CONsT. art. II, § 7, art. IV, § 9, art.
X, § 11; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 6, II(a)(1); HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11; IDAHO
CONsT. art. XV, §§ 1-7; ILL. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 1, 2; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17, art. IX, §§ 1-9;
MASS. CONsT. amend. arts. XLIX, LI; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52, art. IX, § 35, art. X, § 5;
Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 37(b)-(c), (e), 47, 48, art. IV, §§ 35, 36, 40(a), 43(a), 47(a); MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 3, art. IX, §§ 1-4; NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 4-6; NEV. CONsT. art. IX, § 3; N.M.
CONsT. art. XV, §§ 1, 2, art. XVI, §§ 1-3, art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-5; N.C.
CONST. art. XIV, § 5; OHIO CONsT. art. II, § 36; OKLA. CONST. art. XXVI, §§ 1-4; Oa. CONST.
arts. XI-D, -E, -H, -I(1); PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27, art. VIII, 8§ 15, 16; R.L CONST. art. I, § 17;
S.C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 4; TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 59; UTAH CONsT. art. XVII, § 1, art. XVIII,
§ 1; VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3; WIS. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 31, art. VIII, §§
1-5. See generally 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTMON, supra note 5, § 6.01[2][b] (dis-
cussing state constitutional provisions); N. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL
PROPERTY § 3.07 (1988) (discussing state constitutions and the environment).
75. Some provisions fall into more than one category. Article I, § 27, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, for example, recognizes both a right to environmental quality and a public
trust in certain natural resources. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27.
76. See, e.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. XIV, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
77. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; RI CONST. art. I, § 17.
78. See, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4;
VA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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icy. 79 A third category includes provisions that are narrowly tai-
lored to focus on one particular resource or public use. This type of
provision usually ratifies traditional law, recognizing well-estab-
lished public rights like fishing and navigation."0 Finally, the
fourth category is the public trust version. This type recognizes a
public trust either in the environment or in certain natural
resources.
81
The elevation of environmental quality to constitutional stature
could have far-reaching consequences. Because the federal Consti-
tution has no equivalent environmental provision, state constitu-
tions offer great potential in the area of environmental law.' State
courts will not have to concern themselves with parallel federal law
in interpreting environmental provisions in their constitutions. To
many, state constitutional law offers a more acceptable approach
to recognizing the fundamental importance of environmental val-
ues. Historically, state and local governments have exercised regu-
latory power over land use matters. As the scope of federal envi-
ronmental statutes has expanded, the states' land use powers have
eroded somewhat.8 3 While the link between federal land use regu-
lation and the environment cannot be ignored, the presence of en-
vironmental provisions in state constitutions provides the opportu-
nity for greater state involvement in land use and environmental
matters. s4 The environmental provisions thus reinforce the role of
the state in the regulatory process, acting as reminders of the im-
79. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-18; HAw. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11.
80. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (right to navigate); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25 (right to
fish); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (right to fish); S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (right to navigate); VA.
CoNST. art. XI, § 3 (right to use natural oyster beds); WIs. CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (right to
navigate). See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, chs. 5-6 (discussing the
traditional common law bases for public rights).
81. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
82. See Howard, supra note 73, at 196-98. But ef. 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMERNTAL PROTECTION,
supra note 5, § 6.01[2][b], at 6-9 (describing environmental provisions in state constitutions
as having "very little observable impact").
83. See generally 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 5, ch. 6 (discussing
state environmental programs and their relationship with federal laws).
84. See id. § 6.01 (discussing the emerging importance of state environmental law). For
further discussion of the link between land use and the environment, see infra notes 138,
226, 387-88, 402, 407 and accompanying text.
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portance of grassroots democracy in the development of environ-
mental policy.85
Despite the obvious importance of state constitutional law to the
environmental area, the incorporation of environmental provisions
into state constitutions has not brought about the anticipated re-
sults."' Nor have the results been uniform, for judicial and admin-
istrative enforcement has varied significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In many states, courts and administrators have been
reluctant to interpret the provisions as self-executing, and *there-
fore legally binding, absent legislative action. Reasons typically ad-
vanced include the absence of detailed guidelines in the provisions,
the need for judicial restraint, separation of powers and judicial
incompetence to resolve environmental matters without legislative
direction.8 7 In other jurisdictions, however, courts have demon-
strated a willingness to interpret the environmental provisions as a
mandate to strike down, or at least review closely, state action con-
flicting with the provisions.88
The reluctance of many courts to interpret the environmental
provisions forcefully is somewhat surprising, given the history of
the provisions and the pattern of judicial activism that at least
some of the courts have displayed in other areas of the law. From
an environmental perspective, the judicial reluctance seriously un-
dermines resource protection programs. If legislation does not re-
quire an administrator to consider the environmental policies of
the constitutional provisions, then the administrator in a judicial
restraint jurisdiction could take action having serious environmen-
tal consequences. Without judicial intervention, the environmental
policies would have little or no effect on the administrator. The
ineffectiveness of the policies in a judicial restraint jurisdiction is
85. See H. ROLSTON mI, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 246-62 (1988) (discussing the need for
democratic decisionmaking in developing environmental policy).
86. For a discussion of some of those anticipated results, see Howard, supra note 73.
87. See Tobin, supra note 73, at 478-85; Note, A Promise Unfulfilled: Environmental
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Self-Execution Question, 5 VA. J. NAT. RE-
sOURCES L. 351, 354-68 (1986).
88. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976); Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth,
426 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1967); Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So.
2d 209 (Fla. 1971); Florida Power Corp. v. Gulf Ridge Council, 385 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980). The provisions also can be used to legitimate government action. For further
discussion of this point, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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demonstrated easily by focusing on the model state experience. A
comparative analysis of more liberal approaches, then, will suggest
some alternative and environmentally more effective ways to inter-
pret the constitutional provisions.
1. The Virginia experience
In 1970, the people of Virginia voted to add an environmental
provision to their state constitution. 9 Found in article XI of the
Virginia Constitution, the provision declares, in section 1, that
it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop,
and utilize its natural resources, its public lands, and its histori-
cal sites and buildings [and] to protect its atmosphere, lands,
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the
Commonwealth.9
Section 2 then authorizes the General Assembly to implement ap-
propriate legislation to further those policy goals.9 The legislative
history of the provision indicates that the drafters thought the pro-
vision established a trust over public lands and waters. In an ex-
change between several legislators, the floor sponsor of the provi-
sion in the Virginia Senate noted that section 1 "is certainly
holding public lands and waters in trust. '' 92
Despite the apparently clear intent of the drafters, the Virginia
Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the environmental provi-
sion. In the recent decision Robb v. Shockoe Slip Foundation, the
court concluded that section 1 of article XI was nothing more than
a nonbinding policy statement that government officials could con-
sider, if they so chose, in carrying out their responsibilities. 3 The
controversy in Shockoe Slip focused on the failure of state officials
to consider the environmental policies of article XI, section 1,
89. See Howard, supra note 73, at 205-07 (discussing the history of the provision).
90. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
91. Id. § 2.
92. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION 377 (extra session 1969, regular session 1970); see also id. at 372-78 (set-
ting forth the debate); Howard, supra note 73, at 219 (discussing the debate).
93. 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985). Other state courts have reached a similar decision
in considering their own environmental provision. See Note, supra note 87, at 356-63.
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before deciding to demolish state-owned buildings. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the demolition, arguing that the buildings had his-
toric significance and that article XI, section 1, therefore applied,
requiring consideration of its policies. In rejecting the plaintiff's ar-
guments, the court explained that the section raised too many un-
answered questions to be self-executing.9 4 According to the court, a
"constitutional provision is self-executing when it expressly so de-
clares," when it is "declaratory of common law" or when it "specif-
ically prohibit[s] particular conduct. '95 Because article XI, section
1, did not expressly declare itself to be self-executing and because
the section was neither prohibitory in tone nor declaratory of the
common law,96 it could only be self-executing if it provided suffi-
cient rules for implementing its policy goals. Section 1 did not pro-
vide those rules, but rather "beg[ged] statutory definition."9 As
further support, the court pointed to section 2 of article XI, which
in the court's view recognized the need for future legislative
action.""
Numerous model state officials described section 1 of article XI
as a vague and ineffective regulatory tool. Because of its vagueness,
agency officials did not feel secure in relying on the provision as a
source of regulatory authority. As they explained, the provision
does not direct any state or local agency to take responsibility for
implementing its policies. Nor does it provide sufficient details to
guide agencies that follow its policies. Without such guidance,
many regulators thought that the provision could only properly be
considered by a policy formulation agency, such as the state's
Council on the Environment-that is, by a body with no real regu-
latory authority or accountability. Further, even the provision's
policy goals are confusing and somewhat contradictory. As one offi-
cial pointed out, the goals include both conservation and utiliza-
tion of natural resources-two goals often in conflict with one an-
94. Shockoe Slip, 228 Va. at 682, 324 S.E.2d at 676-77.
95. Id. at 681, 324 S.E.2d at 676.
96. Id. at 682, 324 S.E.2d at 676.
97. Id., 324 S.E.2d at 677.
98. Id. at 682-83, 324 S.E.2d at 677.
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other.99 Without additional guidance, agencies would not have any
objective means for resolving conflicts between the two goals.
Most of the government officials commenting on article XI thus
agreed with the Shockoe Slip decision and believed that section 1
of article XI should not be self-executing. In their view, a contrary
decision would have caused significant uncertainty and imposed
tremendous costs on state agencies. Such a decision would have
required each agency to develop its own standards and methods of
compliance. This development process could result in a wide range
of criteria and would involve a significant time and resource com-
mitment. In all likelihoods delays in the development and enforce-
ment of other programs would result. If, on the one hand, the
agencies tried to minimize this commitment by simply relying on
existing environmental laws to ensure compliance with article XI,
the provision would only be as effective as those laws. It would not
have any meaning independent of present legislation. If, on the
other hand, agencies tried to develop new criteria, they would be
torn between fulfillment of the two policy goals of article XI with-
out having any objective way to resolve conflicts. Model state offi-
cials thus generally believed that a self-execution determination
would have been meaningless without more specific legislative
guidance.
A few officials, however, lamented the adverse effects of Shockoe
Slip. According to those officials, the decision made article XI
meaningless and reversed, or at least distorted, the relationship be-
tween the state legislature and thG state constitution. Until the
General Assembly decides to act, the provision has little indepen-
dent significance. Yet the provision appears in the Virginia Consti-
tution, a document that defines the fundamentals of state govern-
99. Some officials did not see any conflict between the goals of environmental preserva-
tion and economic development. Although the two goals are not mutually exclusive, neither
are they totally consistent. In recent years, high-ranking state officials have recognized the
complicated relationship between the two. See, e.g., Campbell, Baliles Sees Link Between
Economy, Environment, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 26, 1989, at B-3, col. 1 (discussing
the views of former Governor Baliles on the collaborative and competitive relationship be-
tween the two). For a discussion of ways to accommodate the two goals, see L. BUTLER & IVL
LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 4.4.
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ment by, for example, empowering the General Assembly. 00 On a
more practical level, one regulator also noted that the decision
magnifies problems caused by weak or ineffective environmental
regulation.
Article XI of the Virginia Constitution is vague and confusing.
The provision sets forth some general policies to govern use of Vir-
ginia's natural and historic resources without providing guidance
for implementing those policies. The vagueness of article XI, how-
ever, is not as serious a barrier to regulation as many model state
officials believe. As one state official noted, the uncertainty of arti-
cle XI does not necessarily mean that Virginia's regulation of natu-
ral resources is ineffective. Nor does it mean that regulators cannot
rely on the policies of article XI. Virginia already has a statutory
and administrative framework that begins to bridge the gap be-
tween regulation and article XI.
The Virginia Environmental Quality Act, enacted in 1972 soon
after sections 1 and 2 of article XI became effective, provides part
of this statutory and administrative framework. 10' The present ver-
sion of the statute does not contain any section setting forth the
policies of the Act. 10 2 A review of the Act's legislative history, how-
ever, reveals that earlier versions began by explaining that the leg-
islation was passed "[i]n furtherance of Article XI of the Constitu-
tion of Virginia and in recognition of the vital need of citizens of
the Commonwealth to live in a healthful and pleasant environ-
ment." '0 The earlier versions then reaffirmed the objectives of ar-
ticle XI, declaring it the policy of the Commonwealth "to promote
the wise use of its air, water, land and other natural resources and
to protect them from pollution, impairment or destruction so as to
improve the quality of its environment."' 0 4 In addition, statutory
policy included an obligation on the part of the state government
100. See Howard, supra note 73, at 196. See generally Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 Wri. & MARY L. REv. 169 (1983) (discussing the role and function of state
constitutions).
101. Act of Apr. 10, 1972, ch. 774, 1972 Va. Acts 1133 (present version codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1200 to -1221 (1989)). The enacted legislation was far less comprehensive
than the proposed bill. Compare id. with S.B. 365, Va. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1972)
(available from Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information Office).
102. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1200 to -1221 (1989).
103. See Act of Apr. 10, 1972, ch. 774, § 10-177, 1972 Va. Acts 1133, 1134.
104. Id.
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"to initiate, implement, improve, and coordinate environmental
plans, programs, and functions of the State in order to promote the
general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth and fulfill the
State's responsibility as trustee of the environment for the present
and future generations." 10 5 In furtherance of these policies, earlier
versions directed that, "to the fullest extent practicable, the laws,
regulations, and policies of the Commonwealth shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies" of the Virginia
Environmental Quality Act. 06 Further, state officials were to coor-
dinate their efforts to effectuate the Act's policies.107
Though the current version of the Act has modified or elimi-
nated these provisions, it continues the basic statutory purposes
and obligations through the provisions governing the Council on
the Environment (COE). 0 8 The primary purpose of the COE is to
"promote the wise use of the Commonwealth's air, water, land and
other natural resources and the protection of natural resources
from pollution, impairment or destruction.' ' 0 9 In fulfilling this
purpose, the administrator of the COE must coordinate "adminis-
trative practices" among state environmental agencies" and de-
velop "uniform management and administrative systems" to "as-
sure coherent environmental policies.""' The COE also is
responsible for reviewing environmental impact statements sub-
mitted by state agencies, commissions and other governmental
units." 2 The Council thus must take a broad view of Virginia's en-
vironmental problems, policies and regulatory efforts.
Although the COE does not have responsibility for any particu-
lar regulatory program, its policymaking efforts can result in legis-
lation that expands or modifies the duties of state agencies having
105. Id.
106. Id. § 10-178, 1972 Va. Acts 1133, 1134.
107. Id.
108. The COE was created by the original Virginia Environmental Quality Act. See id.
§§ 10-179 to -185, 1972 Va. Acts 1133, 1134-36.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1201 (1989).
110. Id. § 10.1-1204(2). Another section of the environmental quality statute defines
"state environmental regulatory agencies" as including the Department of Air Pollution
Control, the Department of Conservation and Recreation, the Department of Health, the
Marine Resources Commission and the State Water Control Board. Id. § 10.1-1206(C).
111. Id. § 10.1-1204(1).
112. See id. §§ 10.1-1208, -1209.
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authority over specific environmental programs. One of the COE's
duties is to make recommendations to the governor "concerning
the policies necessary to influence the environmental choices" sub-
stantially affecting the Commonwealth to ensure an effective bal-
ance between "environmental protection and economic well-be-
ing."113 Further, even when the COE's legislative proposals are not
enacted, its activities nevertheless have an impact on environmen-
tal regulation and on the agencies responsible for that regulation.
The COE's duties include advising the governor and General As-
sembly and, on request, other employees and public bodies of the
Commonwealth "on matters relating to environmental quality and
the effectiveness of actions and programs designed to enhance that
quality.11 14 In addition, the administrator of the COE must de-
velop ways to coordinate various management and regulatory
programs.11 5
The COE currently plays a crucial role in the development of
Virginia's environmental policies and programs. That role is due in
large part to the high priorities that recent administrations have
given the environment. For effective regulation to continue, the
COE's role needs to be solidified and strengthened. Virginia must
have at least one agency that takes a broad view of environmental
matters and has both the ability and the responsibility to look at
the big picture in an objective manner. The COE can remain objec-
tive only by continuing to be a policymaking agency with no re-
sponsibility for particular regulatory programs. Thus, to solidify
the COE's position, the General Assembly should continue to limit
the COE's responsibilities to "nonregulatory" functions." 6 In addi-
113. Id. § 10.1-1207(1)(b).
114. Id. § 10.1-1207(2).
115. See id. § 10.1-1204(1), (2); see also id. § 10.1-1205(1) (requiring the administrator of
the COE to "[c]oordinate all state communications with federal agencies relating to environ-
mental problems").
116. The legislature also could solidify the position of the COE by making it an invalua-
ble, if not indispensable, part of the regulatory process. To accomplish this goal, the legisla-
ture might consider expanding the information-gathering responsibilities and capabilities of
the COE. The COE, for example, could serve as a depository of past environmental studies
and data as well as an initiator of new studies. Further, to provide access to the deposited
information, the COE could implement a retrieval system. If the COE had easily accessible
and relevant information on file, environmental agencies eventually would realize that they
could cut costs and avoid duplication of.effort and resources by using the information. Im-
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tion, the legislature needs to ensure that the COE's role in environ-
mental matters becomes a permanent one that is not dependent on
the philosophies of a particular administration. Although such de-
pendency may be legitimate for many other government programs,
the policymaking and oversight tasks assigned to the COE reflect
constitutional values.
Although the Virginia Environmental Quality Act admittedly
provides only an incomplete framework for implementing article
XI, the Act's very existence suggests that Virginia officials have
overstated the case for judicial restraint. Virginia regulators have
attributed the need for judicial restraint to the vagueness of the
article XI provisions. Yet their analysis does not even adequately
account for existing statutory law. Nor have they seriously consid-
ered the legitimacy of alternatives to strict judicial restraint. As
the next section demonstrates, the path of judicial self-restraint
chosen by the model state ignores an important tool of environ-
mental regulation: the environmental provisions of state
constitutions.
2. Alternatives to strict judicial restraint
For a court to enforce an environmental provision without any
legislative direction, it must decide that the provision imposes an
ongoing duty to promote the environmental interests reflected in
the provision. Those opposing this idea typically argue that the
task of defining a state's constitutional duty of environmental pro-
tection raises nonjusticiable political questions within the exclusive
domain of the legislative or executive branches. 117 The political
question doctrine recognizes that some questions of government lie
plementing these suggestions, however, would require an increase in the financial and
human resources of the COE.
In recent years, the state government admittedly has begun to improve the position of the
COE. For example, it has expanded the COE's ability to provide technical assistance. See 2
VA. NAT. REsouRcEs NEWSL., Spring 1988, No. 3, at 4. Among other services, the COE will
provide information about environmental and land use matters to local officials and admin-
istrators. Part of this assistance will be achieved through the establishment of a library
containing plans and ordinances. See 2 VA. NAT. REsOURCEs NEwSL., Fall 1988, No. 5, at 7.
117. See Krier, The Environment, the Constitution, and the Coupling Fallacy, 32 LAw
QUADRANGLE NoTEs, No. 3, at 35, 36-37 (University of Michigan Law School 1988). See gen-
erally Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982) (discussing the
legitimacy and appropriate scope of judicial review).
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outside the proper scope of judicial review. Traditionally, the
courts have applied the doctrine to obscure issues that can be an-
swered only by unenforceable judgments or by complex solutions
beyond the capabilities of the courts and to issues that would re-
quire the decisionmaker to choose between political philosophies.
By invoking the political question doctrine, courts give the legisla-
tive and executive branches an opportunity to resolve these types
of issues.118
Interpretation of environmental provisions in state constitutions
arguably does not involve any of the traditional categories of polit-
ical questions. The policy question of whether to confer constitu-
tional status on the value of environmental preservation has al-
ready been resolved through the adoption of the provisions.
Although a generally worded provision like article XI, section 1,
may not provide much guidance to those interpreting it, courts can
use accepted methods of constitutional and common law interpre-
tation1 19 to provide substantive content in an objective manner.
That the provision admittedly raises many unanswered questions
does not necessarily mean that courts cannot provide solutions.
Positivist legal principles are available for the courts' use. While
courts may not be capable of developing a comprehensive solution,
they can give some limited guidance.
At the very least, the courts could use environmental provisions
in state constitutions to resolve doubts created by ambiguous stat-
utes and regulations in favor of the environmental values reflected
in the provisions. 120 Alternatively, the courts could construe the
provisions as imposing a general duty on regulators to consider the
policies embodied in the provisions in carrying out the regulators'
118. See Krier, supra note 117, at 37; see also 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 1420-22 (1986) (discussing the concept of "political question"). See generally
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J.
517 (1966) (discussing competing theories of judicial review and how they relate to the polit-
ical question doctrine).
119. Accepted methods would include an examination of legislative history and adherence
to the principle of stare decisis. The courts, for example, could use the common law public
trust doctrine to interpret article XI. For a discussion of this option, see infra notes 285-306
and accompanying text.
120. Some courts already use their environmental constitutional provision in this manner.
See, e.g., State v. Eluska, 724 P.2d 514, 515 n.6 (Alaska 1986); City of Miramar v. Bain, 429
So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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administrative responsibilities. To ensure compliance with this ob-
ligation, courts could follow a "rule of reasonableness"; regulators
would satisfy their general duty if reasonable minds agreed that
the regulators diligently considered the environmental policies of
the state constitution prior to taking final agency action that im-
plicated the policies.' 21 Evidence of such diligence could include
efforts to minimize conflicts between the proposed action and the
environmental provisions. The actual specifics of the consideration
process, however, would be left to the regulators. If a less demand-
ing standard were preferred, courts could apply the traditional ad-
ministrative law standard of review for policymaking. Under that
standard, courts would ask whether agency action was arbitrary
and capricious in failing to consider the environmental policies of
the appropriate state constitution. 2 s
In a 1984 decision, for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that the environmental provision found in the Louisiana
Constitution "imposes a duty of environmental protection on all
state agencies and officials" and "mandates. the legislature to enact
laws to implement" this policy.12 3 The Louisiana Constitution has
a generally worded provision stating:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the envi-
ronment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of
the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this
policy. 24
121. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156-
57 (La. 1984) (similarly defining a constitutional duty to consider environmental protection).
For a discussion of an alternative test adopted by one Pennsylvania court, see 1 LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 5, § 6.01[2][b], at 6-10 to -11, and Note, supra note
87, at 362-63. See generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 9.2.12 (discussing standards for
judicial review of rules); 2 C. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATrivE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.4 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (discussing reasonableness review).
122. See 2 C. KocH, JR., supra note 121, § 9.17; Howard, supra note 73, at 216-17. See
generally 2 C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121, § 9.6 (discussing arbitrariness). For a new perspec-
tive on judicial review of the exercise of administrative discretion, see id. § 9.22 (Supp.
1987).
123. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (La.
1984).
124. LA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
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The 1984 decision, Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmen-
tal Control Commission, involved a dispute over state issuance of a
permit to construct and operate a hazardous waste disposal facil-
ity. In remanding the permit decision, the Louisiana court ex-
plained that a state agency "is duty bound to demonstrate that it
has properly exercised the discretion vested in it by the constitu-
tion."'12 5 To meet the constitutional duty of environmental protec-
tion, the agency must, prior to approving action that would affect
the environment, "determine that adverse environmental impacts
have been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently
with the public welfare."' 126 In the dispute before it, the court could
not tell from the record whether the agency issuing the permit had
made such a determination. The court noted the record's silence
on such matters as consideration of alternate projects, alternate
sites and mitigation measures. The record also failed to reveal any
attempt by the agency to "quantify environmental costs and weigh
them against social and economic benefits."'127 Without evidence of
such inquiries, the agency could not establish that it had even rec-
ognized its constitutional duty, much less given sufficient weight to
environmental concerns.
Yet a court's conclusion that the enforceability of an environ-
mental provision in a state constitution raises nonjusticiable politi-
cal questions does not necessarily mean that the questions lack so-
lutions or that the provision is without any real substance or
impact. A constitutional right or value can have meaning indepen-
dent of the courts. As one commentator explained, "[A] constitu-
tion is surely more than a set of propositions about the structure
and limits of government and about concrete rights in the peo-
ple.' 1 28 In addition to defining the limits and structure of govern-
ment and the rights of the people, a constitution also serves a sym-
bolic or legitimating function. If a value has constitutional stature,
125. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1160. In contrast to the Virginia constitutional provi-
sion, the Louisiana provision commands legislative action. For a discussion of the legisla-
ture's role in implementation and the effect of that role on the self-execution issue, see
Tobin, supra note 73, at 481-82.
126. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157.
127. Id. at 1160.
128. Krier, supra note 117, at 38.
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it should affect the decisions of conscientious regulators and gradu-
ally influence public opinion in its favor. 12 9
Additionally, even without a judicially enforceable duty, envi-
ronmental provisions in state constitutions still provide a basis for
defining the public interest in environmental protection. To the
extent that plaintiffs challenge environmental regulations under
due process and takings clauses, courts can consider the public in-
terest defined in an environmental provision to resolve the chal-
lenges. 130 Because the interest is constitutional in origin, it gener-
ally should command as much respect as the private property
rights protected under the due process and takings clauses. The
constitutional stature of the public interest thus should increase
the likelihood that a government regulation will be upheld.
Furthermore, as part of the executive branch, state agencies
should have some power to resolve political questions raised by en-
vironmental provisions of their constitutions. Even the political
question doctrine does not restrict resolution of political questions
to the legislative branch; the doctrine only precludes judicial re-
view of those questions.'' To the extent that sufficient legislative
authority exists, then, the political question doctrine should not
constrain state agencies.
In the case of Virginia's article XI, for example, sufficient legisla-
tive authority appears to exist to permit active promotion of article
XI values by state agencies. Through the statutory and administra-
tive framework established by the Virginia Environmental Quality
Act, state environmental agencies generally can help to implement
the policies of article XI, section 1.132 The recommendations and
guidelines developed by the COE provide external, positivist crite-
ria for state agencies to apply; subjective or internal standards
need not be used. Because the COE develops its guidelines and
129. Id.
130. The character of the government action is one factor the courts consider in takings
challenges. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The public
interest or purpose also is important in determining the validity of police power action
under the due process clause. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-
95 (1926).
131. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AmERICAN CONSTITUTION 1420-22 (1986) (discussing the con-
cept of "political question").
132. Like the courts, state agencies could use article XI, § 1, to resolve doubts in favor of
article XI values. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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recommendations in the context of article XI and under the direc-
tion of the Virginia Environmental Quality Act, reliance on those
guidelines and recommendations should not raise substantial
doubts about the validity of the criteria or the emergence of an all-
powerful, unaccountable superagency. Indeed, by relying on the
COE's guidelines and policy statements, other state agencies would
avoid an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort and would
help to establish uniform environmental policies and management
systems. Although the COE cannot develop detailed guidelines for
each environmental agency, it can at least provide some basic con-
tent for article XI policies.
The ideal solution to the problem of vague environmental provi-
sions admittedly would be for the appropriate state legislature to
clarify the meaning of the provisions through statutory enact-
ments. 3 " If the enactments required consideration of the environ-
mental values reflected in the state constitution, the legislation
also would need to define basic procedural and substantive stan-
dards to govern the consideration process. By providing a legisla-
tive solution, the state legislature could achieve a degree of uni-
formity that would not necessarily exist under judicial and agency
initiatives. Additionally, to the extent that the environmental pro-
visions authorize legislative action, well-drafted legislation should
not face serious challenge.""
Absent such legislative action, though, some may legitimately
doubt whether traditional jurisdictions ever will interpret the envi-
ronmental provisions of their constitution under any approach
other than strict judicial restraint. Even if the provisions were de-
tailed, which is not necessarily desirable in state constitutions,'3 "
conservative courts still would tend to restrict the effect of the pro-
visions. At the very least though, regulators need to realize that
133. An alternative solution would be to provide more detail in state constitutions. For an
example of more detailed environmental provisions in a state constitution, see ALASKA
CONsT. art. VHLI. But cf. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. Rav. 928, 958-72 (1968) (discussing some of the disadvantages of detailed
constitutional provisions); Note, supra note 87, at 366-67 (arguing against detailed constitu-
tional provisions).
134. Many environmental provisions in state constitutions call for legislative action. See
Tobin, supra note 73, at 481-82.
135. See supra note 133.
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legitimate alternatives to strict judicial restraint exist. Further,
they need to realize that environmental provisions of state consti-
tutions act as a barrier to effective resource regulation, but not
necessarily for the reasons identified by conservative judges and
regulators.
The vagueness of the provisions admittedly supports the deci-
sion to treat the provisions as nonbinding. But that support is not
as strong as many believe, for external criteria and methods are
available for providing substantive content to the environmental
provisions. Reasonable alternatives to the Shockoe Slip approach
do exist, although supporters of strict judicial restraint generally
have failed to give the alternatives serious consideration.
Lawmakers thus need to realize that they have a choice to make
and that the choice involves a range of alternatives. The choice is
not an either/or proposition; varying degrees of judicial activism
exist. Lawmakers in Virginia and many other jurisdictions have
opted for the least active level of judicial intervention. Yet even in
a judicial restraint jurisdiction, acceptable alternatives ex-
ist-alternatives that would be much more responsive to the con-
stitutional policy of environmental protection. Environmental pro-
visions in state constitutions thus remain a legal barrier only in
part because of their vagueness. Also contributing to the problem
is the unnecessarily restrictive view of the judiciary's role in envi-
ronmental decisionmaking.
II. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
A second type of problem within the legal system concerns legis-
lative efforts to regulate natural resources. As responses by an
overwhelming number of model state officials suggest, these efforts
can pose serious barriers to effective environmental regulation. On
a general level, the potential legislative barriers relate to two basic
topics: (1) the overall approach of the legislature to natural re-
source regulation and (2) present legislative authority to regulate.
Because the content of state legislation varies significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the discussion of these legislative barri-
ers centers around the model state. To the extent that the legisla-
tion of other states differs, the discussion of the model state should





The first serious barrier raised by state environmental legislation
concerns the basic legislative approach to environmental regula-
tion. As the Virginia experience suggests, this approach tradition-
ally has been too piecemeal and fragmented to be effective. The
Virginia legislature for years has focused on specific environmental
or resource problems, typically passing legislation narrowly tai-
lored to deal with the problems as they became crises. A good ex-
ample of this crisis-oriented perspective is the legislature's frag-
mented and inconsistent approach to the land use and resource
needs of localities. 3 6 In many instances, the Virginia General As-
sembly has considered the needs on a one-on-one basis, as particu-
lar localities have requested expanded regulatory authority to deal
with specific problems. Further, in responding to the requests, the
legislature generally has restricted the availability of increased reg-
ulatory powers to localities with the most pressing problems. By
taking this approach, the state legislature has ignored the existence
of similar, but less acute, problems in other localities.1 37
Perhaps because of this problem-oriented approach, the legisla-
tures of Virginia and many other states historically have defined
the scope of resource and environmental legislation in artificial
terms. State legislatures traditionally have separated land use is-
sues from environmental matters, ignoring the relationship be-
tween the two. They have handled natural resources in a similar
manner, developing separate legislative solutions for the different
136. Another good example of the crisis-oriented approach of the Virginia legislature is its
reaction to efforts to reform the state's water laws. Interest in reforming Virginia's common
law water allocation system tends to peak during times of drought. See Butler, Allocating
Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between
Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PiTr. L. RE v. 95, 101 n.12 (1985). Other states in the
eastern United States have demonstrated a similar mentality. See generally id. at 96-103
(discussing the traditional water law systems of eastern states).
137. The General Assembly's reaction to proposed zoning legislation demonstrates this
point. During the 1989 regular session, the General Assembly passed legislation enabling
localities with a population of 500,000 or more to assess impact fees for transportation pur-
poses. Other fast-growing localities did not receive this power. See Act of Mar. 22, 1989, ch.
485, 1989 Va. Acts 710 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to -498.10 (1989)) (effective
July 1, 1990); see also S.B. 192, Va. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989) (stricken from docket)
(proposing a broader approach to road impact fees) (available from Virginia General Assem-
bly, Legislative Information Office).
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types of resources. Their apparent thinking is that when the physi-
cal characteristics of resources are discernibly different, problems
involving the resources must be unrelated.13 s
Officials from the model state found the problem-oriented ap-
proach to be inadequate for a number of reasons. First, they
thought that the tendency to focus on specific problems has re-
sulted in the absence of long-range planning and incomplete regu-
latory programs. Many officials believe that effective resource regu-
lation requires a more comprehensive and coordinated approach.
Second, they noted that the ad hoc approach of the legislature has
produced inconsistent management decisions'39 and has led to a
fragmented, inefficient and unclear administrative structure. Con-
fusion over jurisdiction and regulatory purpose apparently exists
among at least some of the Virginia agencies responsible for envi-
ronmental regulation and resource management. 4 o
The concerns expressed about the traditional legislative ap-
proach to environmental regulation are significant. As noted above,
the crisis-oriented approach taken by traditional jurisdictions has
resulted in fragmented and inconsistent regulation of natural re-
sources.' 4 ' In addition, the traditional legislative approach has
failed to consider fully the scientific implications of the problems
that it addresses and the solutions that it adopts. On topics rang-
ing from tidal boundaries' 42 to water allocation systems'4 3 and crit-
138. The common law approach to water rights reflects this thinking. That approach clas-
sifies each type of water resource according to its place in the hydrologic, or water circula-
tion, cycle and develops separate legal doctrine for each major classification. See Butler,
supra note 136, at 105 & n.20. See generally Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East:
A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 548-53 (1983) (discussing the common
law approach). Many states in the eastern United States still follow the common law ap-
proach to a significant extent. See generally Ausness, supra (discussing reform efforts in the
eastern United States).
139. Inconsistent decisions, for example, have occurred in the administration of Virginia's
regulatory program for subaqueous beds. See Royalty Report, supra note 65, at 12-14 (dis-
cussing the inconsistent approach to royalty assessments).
140. For further discussion of perceived problems within the administrative structure, see
infra Section IV.
141. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. For a thorough critique of the effects
of fragmentation on state regulation of water, see Gellis, Water Supply in the Northeast: A
Study in Regulatory Failure, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429 (1985).
142. See L. BUTLER & M. LMVNGSTON, supra note 13, § 1.2 (discussing scientific and legal
approaches to defining tidal boundaries).
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ical environmental areas,"" lawmakers have tended to ignore un-
derlying scientific principles and to search instead for solutions
that promote expectations about private property rights. At the
very least, those scientific principles indicate that the traditional
divisions among the different types of resources are artificial. The
scientific community has long accepted the notion that ecosystems
are highly complex and that different resources within an ecosys-
tem are interrelated. Effective regulation of the resources thus re-
quires a comprehensive approach.
Some improvements in the legislature's regulatory perspective
admittedly have occurred in recent years. One of the best examples
of an improved legislative perspective can be seen in the efforts of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia and
the federal government to preserve the Chesapeake Bay. These ef-
forts reflect a clear departure from the ad hoc approach typical of
past state environmental legislation. 45 The accomplishments of
these jurisdictions include the execution of a 1987 agreement to
meet specific goals and timetables for restoring the Chesapeake
143. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 233-36 (1973) (dis-
cussing the need for an integrated approach to allocating water rights); Butler, supra note
136, at 105 & n.20. See generally Butler, Defining a Water Ethic Through Comprehensive
Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 439, 468-79 (discussing
the role of environmental values in water allocation systems).
144. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 2.4 (discussing the ten-
sions between scientific and lay perspectives on defining critical ecological zones); id. § 3.4
(discussing the need to consider natural forces affecting coastal areas in defining property
rights); M. SAGOFF, supra note 7 (discussing the conflicting demands imposed on ecologists).
The recent debate over the regulation of striped bass, also known as rockfish, highlights the
differences between the traditional and scientific approaches to resource regulation. See
generally Goldsborough, Broad Issues Surface During Rockfish Debate, 14 CBF NEws,
June 1989, No. 2, at 14 (published by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation) (discussing the
traditional and scientific approaches to rockfish regulation).
145. Another example of an improved legislative perspective can be found in the Virginia
legislature's recent reorganization of agencies dealing with environmental and resource
problems. In 1986, the Virginia General Assembly placed most of these agencies under the
direction of the newly created Secretary of Natural Resources. See Act of Apr. 7, 1986, ch.
492, 1986 Va. Acts 927 (presently codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-51.7 to -51.9 (1987 &
Supp. 1989)). A few agencies with regulatory responsibilities over natural resources are not
under the authority of the-Secretary of Natural Resources. The Department of Forestry, for
example, is under the authority of the Secretary of Economic Development. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.1-51.40 (Supp. 1989). Further organizational changes occurred in 1989. See, e.g., id.
§§ 10.1-2200 to -2214 (1989) (creating a Department of Historic Resources).
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Bay. 146 In addition, several of the jurisdictions have adopted com-
prehensive legislation to protect the Bay's watershed. Maryland,
for example, enacted the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection
Program in 1984;147 Among other features, the Program designates
an area 1000 feet landward from the tidal waters of the Chesa-
peake Bay and its tributaries, as well as the lands under those wa-
ters, as the initial target of critical area planning.148 In addition,
the Program directs the promulgation of criteria to minimize the
environmental impact of development in the target area.149
Virginia adopted similar legislation in 1988.150 Entitled the Ches-
apeake Bay Preservation Act, the Virginia statute creates a Chesa-
peake Bay Local Assistance Board 5" and directs that Board to de-
velop criteria to assist localities in regulating land use and
protecting water quality.152 The statute further requires localities
in Tidewater Virginia to comply with the criteria by incorporating
water quality measures into their comprehensive plans, zoning laws
and subdivision ordinances. 15 3 Local governments lying outside the
Tidewater area are authorized, but not required, to do the same. 154
Efforts like these to adopt a more comprehensive approach and to
incorporate scientific principles into legal standards must continue
in order for effective environmental regulation to occur.
These types of improved regulatory efforts are not without their
problems, though. Tremendous variation exists, for example,
among the states' Chesapeake Bay programs. The plans differ not
146. See 1987 BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 9. For a discussion of the jurisdictions' pro-
gress in meeting the goals and timetables, see id.
147. See MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801 to -1816 (1990).
148. Id. § 8-1807(a).
149. Id. § 8-1808(b), (d). Demanding criteria have now been developed. See MD. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 14, §§ 14.15.01 to 14.15.11 (1988); see also MARYLAND CHESAPEAKE BAY CRITICAL
AREA COMM'N, A GUIDE TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY CRITICAL AREA CRITERIA (May 1986). For a
discussion of the Maryland regulations and statute, see Note, The Chesapeake Bay Preser-
vation Act: The Problem with State Land Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 W. &
MARY L. REV. 735, 753-55 (1990).
150. Act of Apr. 9, 1988, ch. 608, 1988 Va. Acts 784, 792-96 (presently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (1989)).
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2102 (1989).
152. Id. § 10.1-2107.
153. Id. § 10.1-2109.
154. Id. § 10.1-2110.
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only in scope and intensity, but also in emphasis.1 55 Overall, Mary-
land appears to have made the strongest commitment to Bay pres-
ervation. Its laws define a larger protected zone and impose more
comprehensive requirements on development.156 In addition, the
Maryland Program requires the state's executive branch to make a
financial commitment to local governments to enable them to com-
ply with the statute.157 In contrast, Virginia has had difficulty even
developing regulations to implement its Chesapeake Bay Preserva-
tion Act. In September of 1989, the state finally adopted regula-
tions that environmentalists and private rights advocates alike
have criticized.158
Also problematic is the way a state sometimes undermines im-
provements in its regulatory efforts through subsequent action. Re-
cent Virginia legislation demonstrates this point. In 1986, Virginia
finally secured federal approval of its Coastal Resources Manage-
ment Program (CRMP).159 Although the plan does not envision
new legislative programs, it does link existing regulatory programs
dealing with critical resources.1 60 One of the existing programs can
be found in the state's Coastal Primary Sand Dune Protection
Act. 6 ' Approximately one year after the federal government ap-
proved Virginia's CRMP, the state amended the coastal dune stat-
ute to allow more construction of protective bulkheads by beach-
front property owners. Because of the amendment, federal
approval of Virginia's CRMP is now in jeopardy.1 62
155. See Campbell, Three States' Bay Plans Differ in Scope, Emphasis, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Aug. 21, 1989, at B-1, col. 1. See generally 1987 BAY AGREEMENT, supra
note 9, at 18-27 (discussing different state and federal agency initiatives).
156. See Note, supra note 149, at 753 (comparing the Maryland and Virginia programs).
157. See MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1808(a)(2), (3) (1990).
158. See Appeal Made to Strengthen Virginia Preservation Act, 14 CBF NEws, Sept.
1989, No. 3, at I (published by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation); Daily Progress, Aug. 11,
1989, at All, col. 3; Zaneski, Bay Growth Rules Slammed as Half a Loaf, Virginian-Pilot
(Norfolk), June 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1; O'Donovan, New Rules on Bay Have Wider Sweep,
Virginia Gazette, June 28, 1989, at 6A, col. 3; Latan6 III, Some See Suits on Bay Law's
Horizon, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 7, 1989, at C-1, col. 1; supra note 33.
159. See VA. CRMP, supra note 5.
160. See id. pt. I(A), (B).
161. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.21 to -13.28 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
162. See infra note 319. If the federal government rescinds Virginia's CRMP status, the
state could lose millions in federal funds. Since approval of its program, Virginia has quali-
fied for more than $6 million in funds. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 13, 1989, at B-2,
col. 5.
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The problem-oriented approach of a traditional legislature also
can result in an inefficient and fragmented division of responsibil-
ity among environmental and resource management agencies. The
Virginia experience provides ample evidence of this consequence.
Consistent with its problem-oriented approach, the Virginia legis-
lature has delegated regulatory responsibility for specific problems
affecting a particular resource without regard for the relation of
that resource to other resources. The Virginia Marine Resources
Commission, for example, has responsibility for management of
subaqueous lands,163 while the State Water Control Board regu-
lates the quality of waters above those lands."" At least some state
officials believe that this division of responsibility leaves both
agencies with insufficient jurisdiction to deal with complex situa-
tions. Apparently neither agency can handle effectively problems
that affect the resource under its regulatory power but that arise
from the resource regulated by the other agency. Furthermore, the
regulators are not the only ones to bear the burdens of the ineffi-
cient and vague division of responsibility. Under the present divi-
sion, members of the regulated community have discovered that
they must deal with a number of agencies to obtain approval for
proposed uses. Adoption of the Virginia CRMP has helped, be-
cause it requires networking among environmental agencies,"6 5 but
this effort is only a beginning.
Some have argued that significant improvements in the legisla-
tive approach to environmental regulation cannot occur because of
the nature of the democratic process. As one model state official
explained, the Virginia legislature has tended, until recently, to fo-
cus on environmental protection only when one of its members has
had a background in environmental matters or when a special in-
terest group has brought an environmental issue to the legislature's
attention. To the extent that a special interest group provides the
impetus for legislative action, the resulting enactments tend to cre-
ate weak environmental programs with broad exemptions and lim-
163. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-3 to -4 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
164. See id. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:13.
165. See VA. CRMP, supra note 5, pt. I(A), (B); see also Exec. Order No. 13 (86), at 4,
reprinted in VA. CRMP, supra note 5, pt. II (requiring consistency with the CRMP); Letter
from Frederick S. Fisher to Keith J. Buttleman 11-12 (May 30, 1986), reprinted in VA.
CRMP, supra note 5, pt. II (discussing networking and conflict resolution).
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ited scope. Further, even though the state legislature now focuses
on environmental matters with more regularity, the legislature is
still too diverse, in the view of some skeptics, to reach an effective
statewide consensus on environmental issues. A legislator's re-
sponse to an environmental problem generally depends on the
politics of the situation and not on the severity of the problem or
the importance of a solution to environmental preservation."6 8
Also, given the large number of issues that a state legislature must
consider in a very limited period of time, the democratic process
understandably takes a long time. In the view of some critics, then,
the legislative approach to environmental regulation generally can-
not be improved with any degree of certainty; the political agenda
of the legislators exerts too much control over the substance of en-
vironmental legislation for permanent improvements to occur.
These arguments restrict unnecessarily the role of government in
environmental regulation. Coupled with decisions like Shockoe
Slip,167 the arguments necessarily imply that the only branch of
government suitable for environmental regulation is the executive
branch. State agencies, however, must act within their statutory
authority, and to the extent that they have not been given express
or implied authority, the agencies are powerless to act.16 8 Further-
more, in many states the question of environmental regulation is
not solely a matter of the current political agenda. As explained
earlier, numerous state constitutions now proclaim environmental
preservation to be a fundamental value. In those states, the politi-
cal process has already made its policy choice in favor of environ-
mental protection. Political influences that clearly undermine this
choice arguably do not reflect the type of democratic decisionmak-
ing needed to implement environmental policies adopted by the
majority through the constitutional amendment process.
166. As an example, one Virginia official interviewed during the study pointed to the leg-
islature's handling of the hydraulic clam dredging issue. See also Goldsborough, supra note
144 (discussing the effects of politics on fisheries management). The response of agency offi-
cials also may depend on the politics of the situation. See L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON,
supra note 13, § 4.4, at 93-94 (discussing the reaction of the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission to the gill net controversy). For further discussion of the political influence
problem in the context of local and state agency decisionmaking, see infra Section IV.
167. For a discussion of this decision, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
168. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROcEDuRE AcT § 5-116(c)(8)(i) (1981); 1 C. KOCH, JR.,
supra note 121, § 1.22, at 39 (1985).
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Given the constitutional stature of environmental protection in
many states and the serious decline in the health of the nation's
natural resources, a more aggressive and comprehensive legislative
approach clearly is warranted.1 9 All branches of state government
must accept the challenges of stewardship reflected in constitu-
tional provisions like article XI, section 1, of the Virginia Constitu-
tion. Comprehensive environmental legislation would help to over-
come the political pressures affecting environmental regulation."'
The legislatures of Virginia and other states admittedly have been
prone to special interest groups and have tended to deal with envi-
ronmental matters only when prompted by individual interests.
But once a comprehensive regulatory framework is established,
changes in the political philosophies of legislators will become less
important. Only strong majoritarian changes will matter. Special
interest groups surely will continue to use the state legislature as a
battleground to attack established programs and to resist new
ones. The likelihood of those attacks succeeding, however, should
diminish once efforts to educate legislators about the scientific im-
plications of development are improved. A better flow of informa-
tion should help legislators to realize the full costs of unregulated
use.
A stronger, more integrated regulatory framework also can help
to minimize the adverse iffects of politics and to overcome ineffi-
ciencies in the present legislative approach. To achieve such a
framework, the legislature will need to continue to improve coordi-
nation and communication among state environmental agencies."'
169. More comprehensive environmental legislation already exists in some states. See
generally 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 5, ch. 6 (discussing state envi-
ronmental laws and programs). To the extent that environmental matters reflect national or
even global problems, one state's efforts may not be adequate. Cf. Note, supra note 149
(discussing the need for regional regulation of interstate resources).
170. Through comprehensive legislation, improper or inappropriate political influences on
environmental regulation can be overcome by grassroots democratic decisionmaking, thus
meeting the need recognized by many for collective choice in the development of environ-
mental policy. Cf. H. ROLSTON III, supra note 85, at 246-62 (discussing this need).
171. The adoption of a coastal resources management program, for example, helps to im-
prove coordination and communication. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. An-
other way to improve coordination and consistency would be to implement state consistency
reviews of regulatory plans to ensure compatibility with state policies and standards. Cf.
CHESAPEAKE BAY LAND USE ROUNDTABLE, LAND USE INITIATIVES FOR TIDEWATER VIRGINIA 13
(Nov. 1987) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE REPORT] (making such a suggestion).
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As the Virginia experience demonstrates, those agencies sometimes
do not appear to be fully informed about the regulatory efforts of
other agencies. Nor do they always appear to understand where
they fit into the state's overall scheme of environmental regulation.
Policymaking agencies like Virginia's Council on the Environment
are in a perfect position to improve coordination among state envi-
ronmental agencies. State legislation already has given those agen-
cies oversight responsibilities and typically has directed the agen-
cies to coordinate administrative practices and develop uniform
management systems.172 Once the financial and human resources of
those agencies are improved, they should become more effective at
fulfilling their duties.17 3 Improved coordination, in turn, will result
in better communication and a more effective flow of
information.'74
B. Legislative Authority to Regulate
The second significant barrier raised by state environmental leg-
islation involves present legislative authority to regulate. As the
Virginia experience indicates, current environmental legislation
can raise three basic concerns: (1) the inadequacy of delegations of
172. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's COE). Al-
though the identity of the policymaker varies from state to state, many jurisdictions appear
to place policymaking responsibility with the agency or department having significant regu-
latory authority over natural resources. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1-101, -204,
-301 to -304 (1989). Like Virginia, the federal government has an agency with policymaking
and oversight responsibilities. Under federal law, the Council on Environmental Quality ad-
vises the executive branch on environmental matters and coordinates federal compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act. See 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra note 5, § 9.03.
173. Legislatures tend to allocate very limited resources to policymaking agencies having
no actual regulatory authority. See, e.g., 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note
5, § 9.03[1]. Virginia recently has made some improvements in the financial and human
resources of its COE. See supra note 116.
174. If Virginia is any indication, state governments desperately need to improve the flow
of information among government officials. When information-gathering activities are pur-
sued, the resulting data base or study tends to be filed away and forgotten. Establishing a
central registration system could alleviate this problem. Under such a system, the state
could take essential bibliographic information from studies, register it at a central place and
then make it available to interested parties. Alternatively, the state could adopt a central
filing and retrieval system. Under this alternative, the state would fie studies in a central
place and provide access through a central catalogue. For recent efforts to improve the flow
of information, see supra note 116.
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authority to state environmental agencies; (2) the ineffectiveness of
legislation authorizing regulation by local governments; and (3) the
incomplete and ineffective scope of state environmental legislation.
1. Delegations of authority to state environmental agencies
The Virginia experience suggests that the inadequacy of legisla-
tion authorizing natural resource regulation by state agencies can
be one of the most critical barriers to effective environmental regu-
lation. All model state officials commenting on the matter agreed
that the regulatory authority of state environmental agencies was
unclear and incomplete. Officials, for example, noted that legisla-
tion authorizing agency regulation tended to provide confusing ju-
risdictional standards. Statutory provisions often failed to define
key terms and sometimes referred to several different agencies
without clarifying the relationship among the agencies. In addition,
an agency's regulatory powers were not always well-defined, and
jurisdictional provisions either were difficult to interpret or re-
flected artificial bases for allocating regulatory authority. Further
uncertainty resulted from conflicts between statutory provisions
defining policy and those setting forth regulatory details for the
appropriate agency.
Several model state officials also believed that the legislature un-
necessarily restricted the regulatory authority of agencies. Some
statutory guidelines, for instance, did not reflect scientifically rele-
vant information and therefore could not effectively deal with ac-
tual regulatory situations. Statutory guidelines also tended to re-
strict the discretion of regulatory agencies to respond to actual
environmental or resource problems. Furthermore, even when
agencies had express regulatory authority, statutory provisions
sometimes significantly limited the agencies' enforcement powers.
The concerns expressed about the delegation of regulatory
authority to state environmental agencies are significant. The dele-
gations tend to be incomplete and uncertain. A good example of
such a delegation is section 62.1-3 of the Virginia Code, which sets
forth the regulatory authority of the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission (VMRC) over parties using state-owned submerged
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lands.17 5 With some exceptions, section 62.1-3 authorizes the
VMRC to issue permits for reasonable uses of state-owned beds.1 6
In deciding whether to issue a permit, the VMRC must consider
the provisions of article XI, section 1, of the Virginia Constitution,
as well as such factors as the effect of a proposed project on other
permissible uses of state beds and waters, and on living resources,
wetlands, water quality and nearby properties. 177 Under section
62.1-3, however, the VMRC does not have the power to regulate
the use of waters above the beds. 17 8 It can only regulate nonexempt
uses of state-owned beds. Because uses of state waters can ad-
versely affect submerged beds, this limitation on the VMRC's sec-
tion 62.1-3 regulatory power can result in incomplete and ineffec-
tive regulatory solutions.
The language of section 62.1-3 suggests three distinct sources of
regulatory power: a proprietary basis, a police power basis and a
trust or stewardship basis. The proprietary basis arises from the
language in section 62.1-3 limiting the VMRC's permit authority to
"beds of the bays and ocean, rivers, streams, creeks, which are the
175. Another example of an inadequate delegation involves Virginia's recently created
Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board (Board). Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation
Act directs the Board to develop criteria to protect water quality in Tidewater Virginia. VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-2107 (1989). Pursuant to its statutory charge, the Board considered
whether to adopt proposed septic tank restrictions. After considerable public opposition to
the restrictions, the Board decided against adoption, apparently concluding that the restric-
tions raised issues within the domain of the health department. See Campbell, Senate
Group Reviews Rules on Bay Quality, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 18, 1989, at B-i, col.
1; Latan6 III, Building Industry Wins 2nd Look at Plan to Save Chesapeake Bay, Rich-
mond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1989, at A-1, col. 4. This example demonstrates the diffi-
culty of changing traditional perspectives on environmental regulation. Even when a juris-
diction has made a serious commitment to comprehensive regulation, traditional
perspectives may affect how the commitment is implemented.
The problem of vague legislative delegations also exists in the federal government. See 1
C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121, § 1.22, at 41 (1985).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Supp. 1989). Some exceptions include the erection of dams,
the construction of navigation and flood-control projects by appropriate federal agencies,
and the placement of private piers for noncommercial purposes by riparian owners. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. Nor does any other state agency have direct responsibility for protecting cer-
tain public uses of state waters. See VA. MARINE REsOURCES COMM'N, EvALUATION OF Roy-
ALTY AsSESSMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED ENCROACHMENT IN, ON OR OVER STATE-OWNED SUB-
MERGED LANDs 4 (Agency Service Agreement Project, Apr. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 VMRC
REPORT].
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property of the Commonwealth.' 17 This language clarifies that the
VMRC's regulatory authority under section 62.1-3 extends only to
state-owned beds. The police power basis results from language de-
claring unauthorized uses of state-owned beds to be unlawful.8 0
The language indicates that, absent express statutory authoriza-
tion, the VMRC has the power to decide which private uses of
state-owned beds should be allowed. Such a power to choose be-
tween potentially conflicting uses is one of the accepted goals of
the police power."" Finally, the trust or stewardship basis exists
because of the section's reference to article XI, section 1, of the
Virginia Constitution. That provision declares that "it shall be the
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its
natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and
buildings" and "to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from
pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment,
and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth."'8 2 Both
the language and the history of article XI, section 1, suggest that
the provision incorporates the concept of stewardship, or the no-
tion that the government should preserve and protect natural re-
sources for present and future generations.8 3 By directing the
VMRC to consider article XI, section 1, in making its permit deci-
sions, section 62.1-3 offers the stewardship concept as a possible
ground for denial of a permit.
Despite the broad jurisdictional bases suggested by the language
of section 62.1-3,18' the VMRC apparently has adopted a more lim-
ited interpretation of its regulatory powers under the section. As
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Supp. 1989).
180. See id.
181. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 154-55, 161-
62, 172 (1971).
182. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
183. Some legal scholars have interpreted article XI, § 1, as doing even more-declaring a
public trust over public lands and waters. See Howard, supra note 73, at 219; see also supra
note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the public trust interpretation). Even though the
Virginia courts have not accepted the public trust argument, see Robb v. Shockoe Slip
Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985), the legislature has, in the past, indicated its
acceptance of the stewardship interpretation. See Act of Apr. 10, 1972, ch. 774, § 10-177,
1972 Va. Acts 1133, 1134. For further discussion of the stewardship and public trust con-
cepts, see infra notes 270-75, 285-306 and accompanying text.
184. The legislative history of § 62.1-3 supports the broad interpretation of the section's
jurisdictional bases. See Royalty Report, supra note 65, at 6-8.
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one agency document indicates, 185 the VMRC's construction fo-
cuses on the proprietary language of section 62.1-3. Specifically,
the documentary evidence suggests that the VMRC interprets the
language linking section 62.1-3 jurisdiction to state-owned beds as
defining the primary, if not sole, jurisdictional basis of the section.
Some VMRC officials apparently believe that the ownership lan-
guage limits the VMRC's powers to proprietary responsibilities
and excludes purely regulatory functions allowed under the police
power. 186 The restrictive view taken by these officials demonstrates
the degree of confusion that can result from even a relatively un-
complicated delegation of regulatory authority. Such confusion not
only makes it more difficult for agencies to carry out their statu-
tory responsibilities; it also increases the risk that agency action
will be challenged. Effective environmental regulation requires
clearer and more complete delegations of authority.
In addition to the vagueness problem, statutory delegations to
environmental agencies unnecessarily restrict agency powers. Reg-
ulatory details provided by legislatures traditionally have ignored
scientific knowledge about the underlying regulatory problem.1s7
This failure restricts an agency's ability to deal effectively with a
problem. Regulatory guidelines that ignore prevailing scientific
knowledge do not allow the agency to cope with the physical facts
contributing to the environmental problem. In addition, delega-
tions of regulatory authority sometimes limit the power of the
agency to act.' Although this type of limitation may be appropri-
185. See 1985 VMRC REPORT, supra note 178, at 3.
186. This observation is based, in part, on confidential communications. Proprietary re-
sponsibilities would include the powers and obligations normally associated with land own-
ership. Purely regulatory functions would involve governmental efforts to regulate owners
and users of land irrespective of government's ownership of the affected land.
187. As an example, one Virginia official noted that under state law the oyster season
does not correspond to the biological season. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-82 (1985) (defining
oyster season); cf. also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 50:3-8, -11 (West Supp. 1989) (taking a similar
approach). For other Virginia examples, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
188. As an example, one model state official pointed to VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-23 (Supp.
1989), which prevents the VMRC from adopting regulations that conflict with statutory law.
Apparently, the official interpreted § 28.1-23 as including direct and indirect conflicts.
Under this interpretation, a conflict would arise whenever regulations are not authorized by
or otherwise consistent with express statutory provisions. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-200
(Law. Co-op. 1987) (restricting regulatory authority under comprehensive coastal legislation
to critical areas in the coastal zone "[niotwithstanding any other provisions" in the statute).
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ate under certain defined circumstances, it can result in serious
regulatory problems if worded too broadly. Such a restriction
would prevent an agency from dealing with problems that are re-
lated to the subject of the statute but that are not covered by spe-
cific statutory provisions. Instead of dealing with such problems as
they arise, the agency must wait at least until the next legislative
session for appropriate legislation. By that time, however, a prob-
lem could have reached the crisis level. Finally, even when regula-
tion is allowed, the enforcement powers of the regulatory agency
may be too limited.189 More agency discretion and power are
needed before effective regulation can occur.
When delegations are both vague and unnecessarily restrictive,
regulators face a particularly troubling situation. Legislative use of
vague delegations makes practical sense. Besides lacking the neces-
sary expertise to provide more details, legislators also have little
time to devote to developing specific guidelines for each legislative
program. 190 Vague statutory delegations also remove difficult polit-
ical questions from the legislative arena. As one commentator ex-
plained, "[V]ague statutes permit. . .[the legislature] to duck po-
litical responsibility. By writing broad statutes and leaving the
hard details to agencies, . . . [the legislature] avoids political con-
troversy."' 9' But, though legislative use of vague delegations may
have merit in some situations,'92 the use of delegations that are
restrictive as well as vague does not. By coupling vague delegations
with restrictive and inflexible regulatory powers, state legislatures
have made an empty political choice, for then no government body
has both the power and the responsibility to define the "hard de-
tails" missing in the regulatory programs. If a state legislature
chooses to use vague delegations, then it must give the responsible
agency sufficient flexibility to develop appropriate regulatory de-
tails. Without such flexibility, effective environmental regulation
will be difficult, if not impossible.
189. Model state officials gave numerous examples of this problem. Many of the examples
focused on the inability of state agencies to impose sanctions through the administrative
process. For further discussion of this problem, see infra note 338 and accompanying text.
190. 1 C. KoCH, JR., supra note 121, § 1.22, at 41 (1985).
191. Id.
192. See generally Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985) (discussing the delegation debate).
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2. The regulatory authority of local governments
The Virginia experience also suggests that legislation authorizing
regulation by local governments has serious inadequacies. Numer-
ous model state officials identified the uncertain and restrictive na-
ture of that legislation as a significant barrier to effective environ-
mental regulation. Because the enabling legislation for local
governments defines their regulatory authority in vague terms,
many local officials either believe that their regulatory authority is
too limited or are uncertain about its scope.
Although the uncertain and restrictive nature of enabling legisla-
tion would by itself pose a serious barrier, these inadequacies are
further magnified by a judicial rule of construction still applicable
in the majority of jurisdictions. Known as Dillon's Rule, the judi-
cial doctrine provides that local governments can only exercise
those powers conferred expressly or by necessary implication. 93
Judge Dillon developed the rule limiting the powers of local gov-
ernments because he doubted their competence to promote the
public good. Besides viewing municipalities as poor managers, Dil-
lon believed that they posed twin risks. Not only were local gov-
ernments inherently susceptible to domination by private eco-
nomic power; they also posed a serious threat of encroachment to
private interests. Concerned about abuse by both democratic rule
and private economic power, Dillon advocated strict state control
of local governments, enforced through judicial supervision, as a
solution to the risks posed by local governments.'
As the Virginia experience demonstrates, Dillon's Rule signifi-
cantly limits the regulatory efforts of localities. Because of the rule,
many Virginia localities feel compelled to resolve the uncertainties
of their enabling legislation against the exercise of regulatory
193. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. City of Hazard, 304 Ky. 370, 372, 200 S.W.2d 917, 918
(1947); Hylton Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 440, 258 S.E.2d 577,
581 (1979); Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 572-75, 232
S.E.2d 30, 39-41 (1977); see also 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.09, at 1007
n.7 (3d ed. 1988) (listing court decisions following Dillon's Rule). See generally 1 J. DmLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 89 (4th ed. 1890) (discussing the
powers of municipal corporations). Commentators indicate that Dillon's Rule is still the ma-
jority approach. See 2 E. McQUILLN, supra, § 10.09; 0. REYNOLDS, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW
§ 49 (1982).
194. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 1057, 1109-13 (1980).
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power and thus hesitate to engage in land use regulation. Those
that take the risk and adopt land use measures to deal with serious
resource problems typically find themselves facing litigation. Thus,
when coupled with uncertain and restrictive enabling legislation,
continued adherence to Dillon's Rule prevents localities from
adopting innovative and effective regulatory measures.19 5
Other jurisdictions have experienced similar frustration with
Dillon's Rule.19 6 The Supreme Court of Utah, for example, recently
decried the paralysis felt at the local government level because of
Dillon's Rule.197 The court noted that the rule "causes local offi-
cials to doubt their power, and it stops local governmental pro-
grams from developing fully."198 Because of these concerns, the
court decided to abandon Dillon's Rule of strict construction.
Other state courts have not been as understanding, actually con-
tributing to the problems of localities through unpredictable inter-
pretations of enabling legislation. As one observer of the Missouri
judiciary explained, local governments not only have a difficult
time defining their express powers; they also face the added prob-
lem of predicting whether a power was granted at all.'99 Strict con-
struction of municipal powers under Dillon's Rule thus cripples the
effectiveness of local governments throughout the country.
The concerns expressed about the inadequacy of local enabling
legislation thus are significant. Even when enabling legislation is
195. Furthermore, even when innovative techniques are authorized by statute, the ena-
bling legislation tends to be limited in scope. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491(a), -491.2
(1989) (effectively authorizing one proffering system for Northern Virginia and the Eastern
Shore and another more limited version for the rest of the state); see also M. MASHAW,
VIRGINIA COUNTY SUPERVISORS' MANUAL Table 3.1, at 29 (4th ed. rev. 1982) (identifying the
forms of government used by Virginia counties as of 1981). See generally id. ch. 3 (discuss-
ing the organizational forms of county government in Virginia). For a comprehensive study
of the Virginia judiciary's reaction to local land use decisions, see L. BEVIER & D. BRION,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LocAL LAND USE DECISIONS IN VIRGINIA (Institute of Government, Uni-
versity of Virginia, 1981).
196. See generally Frug, supra note 194, at 1113-17 (discussing some of the academic
challenges to Dillon's Rule).
197. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980).
198. Id. at 1119.
199. See Note, The Dillon Rule-A Limit on Local Government Powers, 41 Mo. L. REV.
546, 553-54 (1976); see also id. at 552-68 (discussing the application of Dillon's Rule in
Missouri); Note, One Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH.
L. REV. 155, 159-72 (1989) (discussing Washington's continued commitment to Dilon's Rule
despite constitutional home rule).
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fairly clear, doubts about its scope can arise. In jurisdictions fol-
lowing Dillon's Rule, local governments typically resolve those
doubts against the exercise of regulatory authority. When the ena-
bling legislation is not clear, an even greater number of doubts
arise. Unless the locality is willing to risk litigation, the locality
will resolve doubts against the exercise of power. 00 Attempts to
settle the doubts in any other way can take a considerable amount
of time. Issues involving the regulatory powers of local govern-
ments generally require resolution by the legislature or the judici-
ary, both of which have lengthy dispute resolution processes. 0 1
Dillon's Rule thus magnifies the problems caused by uncertain or
incomplete enabling legislation.
To the extent that local governments are critical to effective re-
source management,2 02 lawmakers must reexamine and either
abandon or liberalize Dillon's Rule. The doctrine may have been
200. One commentator advises that "[i]f there is reasonable doubt as to whether or not
authority has been granted, the question is likely to be construed against" the local govern-
ment. M. MASHAW, "supra note 195, at 10; see also 1 J. DILLON, supra note 193, § 89, at 145
("Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the [municipal] corporation, and the power is denied."} (footnote omitted); 0. REYN-
OLDS, supra note 193, § 52, at 149-50 ("Under this rule of interpretation, it is often said that
doubts or ambiguities in statutes or home-rule documents should be resolved against the
existence of any municipal power.") (footnote omitted). For examples of the types of litiga-
tion that localities can expect to face, see cases cited supra in notes 33-34.
201. One Virginia locality's efforts to adopt a legally valid program for the transfer of
development rights demonstrates the need to seek a legislative or judicial solution. That
locality sought advice from the state attorney general about the validity of the program. The
resulting opinion made it clear that express legislative authority was needed and that only a
court could resolve the validity of the program as applied in a specific set of circumstances.
See 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 112. See generally Spring, Transferable Development
Rights (TDR) and Density Transfer Programs: Loudoun County's Vision for Filling the
Development Envelope and Preserving Open-Space, REAL PROPERTY SECTION NEWSL., May
1989, at 11 (Virginia State Bar) (discussing the county's continuing efforts to adopt a TDR
program). Advisory opinions from the judiciary do not appear to be more effective. See
generally Kennedy, Advisory Opinions: Cautions About Non-Judicial Undertakings, 23 U.
RicH. L. R.v. 173 (1989) (discussing advisory opinions and expressing concern about an un-
restricted advisory opinion process).
202. The Model Land Development Code, while increasing state participation in land use
regulation, continues to recognize the importance of local governments to land use matters.
MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, § 1-101(1), § 7-101 commentary. Some commentators dis-
pute the usefulness of local government involvement in land use regulation. See, e.g., De-
logu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time has Passed, 36 ME. L. REv. 261, 261-
65 (1984). For further discussion of the role of local governments in environmental regula-
tion, see infra Section IVC.
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consistent with prior attitudes about property rights and police
power regulation that developed years ago when resources were
abundant. The rule, however, does not function well in a world of
increased development and dwindling supplies of natural re-
sources. The effect of the rule is to force localities to wait for clear
and express legislative direction before dealing with pressing re-
source problems. The legislative process, however, is too time-con-
suming to respond to the wide array of resource problems that con-
stantly arise within a state.
In addition to handicapping environmental regulation by local
governments, Dillon's Rule is not as effective a constraint on abu-
sive local government practices as first envisioned. Instead of
checking overly aggressive local governments, the rule prevents re-
sponsible localities from dealing with legitimate resource concerns.
Overly aggressive local governments would be more likely than
nonaggressive governments to resolve doubts about enabling legis-
lation in favor of government action. The attitudes prevalent
among officials of an aggressive local government would cause the
officials to overestimate the legitimacy of their actions and to have
false optimism about the risk of litigation.2 03 Nonaggressive local
governments, on the other hand, would tend to avoid the risk of
litigation, erring on the side of inaction when doubts surround the
nature or extent of their regulatory authority.2 04 Today abusive lo-
cal governments are more effectively controlled by the political
process.20 5
Changes to Dillon's Rule could occur directly or indirectly. If the
consensus of the legislature is that Dillon's Rule should not be
saved, then a constitutional amendment could abolish the rule and
confer on local governments all powers not denied them by the
state constitution, by their charter or by laws enacted by the state
legislature. 6 The legislature then could define by statute those
203. See generally R. COOTR & T. ULEN, supra note 67, at 61-63, 485-87 (defining risk-
seeking behavior and the effects of false optimism).
204. See generally id. at 58-60 (defining risk-averse behavior).
205. See generally Frug, supra note 194, at 1120-49 (discussing the possibility of granting
cities real power).
206. See COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REvISION, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 229
(1969) (recommending such an amendment). See generally id. at 228-31 (discussing a way
to overturn Dillon's Rule).
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powers denied to localities.0 7 Several states have taken this ap-
proach. Iowa, for example, has added a constitutional provision
stating that the "rule or proposition of law that a municipal corpo-
ration possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in ex-
press words is not a part of the law of this state."208 Alternatively,
if a constitutional amendment has not been added, a state's judici-
ary could abolish Dillon's Rule, which, after all, is a creation of the
courts, and substitute a more liberal rule of construction. At least
one state court has taken this approach, declaring the rule to be
"antithetical to effective and efficient local and state govern-
ment."20 9 If the judiciary prefers not to face the question of abol-
ishing or even liberalizing Dillon's Rule and upsetting years of le-
gal tradition, then the state legislature could either abolish the rule
through statutory amendment or leave it intact and indirectly
avoid its effect through clearer and more detailed enabling legisla-
tion.210 Even under a restrictive interpretation of Dillon's Rule, lo-
cal governments can exercise powers expressly given to them. In
recent years, for example, some state legislatures have begun the
practice of including model ordinances in environmental legisla-
207. For an example of such a statute, see id. at 229 n.35. If Dillon's Rule is abolished, the
legislature would need to decide whether to treat all localities the same. One Virginia official
argued that only those localities that have shown they are comfortable with natural resource
regulation should benefit from the abolition of Dillon's Rule.
208. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 38A; see ILL. CONsT. art. 7, § 6(m) (directing the courts to
construe the home rule powers liberally). For a list of state constitutions modifying Dilon's
Rule, see Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1370 n.403 (1985); Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table:
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Govern-
ment Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. REv. 957, 985 n.147 (1987).
209. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980). Other state courts have also
addressed the question of whether to broaden their judicial interpretation of enabling legis-
lation. See, e.g., Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1978) (concluding
that the legislative intent of the constitutional convention was to overrule Dillon's Rule of
narrow interpretation); Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982)
(recognizing that the 1972 Constitution of Montana expanded the powers of local govern-
ments and thus necessitated a broader construction of municipal power).
210. To the extent that Dillon's Rule is based on the constitutional concept of delegated
powers, the last two alternatives may be problematic. See generally D. MANDELKER, supra
note 21, § 6.02 (discussing the delegation problem in the context of land use controls). But
cf. Frug, supra note 194 (arguing that municipal powerlessness is properly explained as a
slowly evolving political choice).
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tion. 11 By continuing this practice of providing model ordinances,
state legislatures can clarify and, where appropriate, increase the
regulatory powers of localities without relinquishing any tradi-
tional control over local governments.
Abolishing or modifying Dillon's Rule to give localities more
flexibility in dealing with resource problems, however, will not cure
all the problems surrounding local enabling legislation. Putting
aside the adverse consequences of Dillon's Rule, the fact remains
that local enabling legislation is, at times, restrictive and vague.
For example, although an individual locality may have some power
to regulate and protect water supplies within its jurisdiction,212 it
traditionally cannot protect the supplies from harmful activities
occurring outside of its jurisdiction.21 3 Because water resources are
not distributed according to political boundaries, changes to Dil-
lon's Rule still would not enable an individual locality to deal ef-
fectively with serious and widespread pollution problems.2" In
211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (Supp. 1989) (model wetlands zoning ordinance); id.
§ 62.1-13.25 (model coastal primary sand dune zoning ordinance); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.21 (West Supp. 1990) (requiring the board of water and soil resources to adopt a model
ordinance and rules to guide local governments). Numerous model state officials expressed
satisfaction with Virginia's wetlands and coastal dune legislation. Besides the effective stat-
utory guidelines, the officials also liked the review and appeal process incorporated in the
acts. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.3, -13.10 to -13.15, -13.24, -13.27 (1987). At least one
official attributed the acts' ability to withstand court challenges to this process.
212. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-37.3:4 (1989) (authorizing water supply emergency
ordinances); id. § 15.1-332.1 (requiring consent by situs jurisdiction to water impoundment
projects); id. § 62.1-44.98 (1987) (authorizing the creation of advisory committees in locali-
ties declared to be in a groundwater management area).
213. Virginia localities, for example, generally do not have extraterritorial powers. Vir-
ginia law sometimes allows localities to form regional water and sewer authorities. See id.
§§ 15.1-1239 to -1270 (1989). Many localities, however, have not taken advantage of this
legislation. Their hesitance may be due, at least in part, to a sense of distrust among locali-
ties and the fear that their interests would be sacrificed for the interests of other localities
in the authority. But cf. Yanggen & Amrhein, Groundwater Quality Regulation: Existing
Governmental Authority and Recommended Roles, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 57-58 (1989)
(discussing extraterritorial land use controls that Wisconsin localities may adopt to protect
against groundwater contamination).
214. Because all types of water resources are part of one hydrologic cycle, activities that
pollute a water supply in one locality eventually will affect water resources in neighboring
localities. See generally Butler, supra note 143, at 468-79 (discussing the role of environ-
mental values in water allocation systems). Given this fact, many proponents of water law
reform advocate a centralized regulatory system. Although many of their arguments are per-
suasive, an effective system does not need to concentrate all regulatory power in one central
state agency. See generally id. at 446-47 (discussing the issue of a centralized system). To
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some instances, localities may be able to piece together regulatory
authority from several different legislative acts,2 15 but without re-
lated legislation even that option is not available. The restrictive
nature of local enabling legislation generally does not allow innova-
tive regulatory measures and sometimes even prevents willing par-
ties from engaging in effective resource management. Thus, even if
Dillon's Rule were abolished, a clearer and more comprehensive
approach to local enabling legislation still would be necessary.
3. The scope of state environmental legislation
Finally, the Virginia experience suggests that the incomplete and
ineffective scope of environmental legislation can present serious
regulatory problems. Among other problems, model state officials
noted that Virginia's environmental statutes simply have too many,
exemptions to be effective. Examples identified by Virginia officials
include the exemptions to the state's Erosion and Sediment Con-
trol Law,216 subaqueous lands permitting process 217 and Coastal
Primary Sand Dune Protection Act.21 8 Because exempt uses can
affect environmental quality as much as nonexempt uses, 19 the ex-
istence of numerous or broad exemptions can seriously impair the
regulatory effect of environmental programs.
the extent that localities retain regulatory authority over water resources, the problem of
restrictive and vague enabling legislation will require consideration.
215. For an example of how this can be done, see Spring, supra note 201, at 13-14 (dis-
cussing how the Virginia Open-Space Land Act can be used in conjunction with zoning leg-
islation to create a density transfer program). See also 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 112,
114-15 (discussing how the Open-Space Land Act validates certain police power interests
that would be served by a proposed Transfer of Development Rights plan, but concluding
that express enabling legislation is needed for the plan).
216. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-560 (1989) (exempting certain activities from the defi-
nition of "land-disturbing activity"); see also VIRGINIA SoI. & WATER CONSERVATION
COMM'N, GENERAL CRITERIA FOR CONTROLLING EROSION AND SEDIMENT FROM LAND Dis-
TURBING Acrivrrxs (1980), reprinted in VA. SoI. & WATER CONSERVATION COMM'N, VIRGINIA
EROSION & SEDIMENT CONTROL HANDBOOK ch. 3, at IlI-A (2d ed. 1980) (providing for
variances).
217. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Supp. 1989) (exempting various uses from the permit
requirements).
218. See id. § 62.1-13.25 (§ 3 of suggested zoning ordinance, which exempts various uses
from the permit requirement).
219. Many of the activities exempted from the subaqueous lands permitting process, for
example, can have significant environmental consequences. See 1985 VMRC REPORT, supra
note 178, at 12-13 (discussing the need to eliminate most, if not all, statutory exemptions).
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Serious omissions in coverage also make Virginia's environmen-
tal legislation incomplete and ineffective. As with the exemptions,
model state officials considered these omissions to be significant
barriers to effective environmental regulation: As one official ex-
plained, the gaps in coverage help to encourage an uncooperative
atmosphere among agencies and thus result in uncoordinated regu-
lation and turf-guarding. Because the scope of natural resource leg-
islation is restricted and incomplete, environmental agencies tend
to take a narrow view of their responsibilities and to ignore the
regulatory programs of other agencies unless a statute directs
otherwise.
Virginia officials identified numerous examples of gaps in the
coverage of environmental legislation. Many of these examples fo-
cused on vital or irreplaceable resources such as air, water and his-
torical sites, or on environmentally sensitive resources such as wet-
lands and coastal dunes. Concerning water resources, for example,
one official observed that Virginia does not have an effective ad-
ministrative process for distributing and managing water resources
or for settling disputes among users or right holders.220 As in many
eastern states, common law doctrines still control the allocation of
interests in most of Virginia's water resources. 221 As a consequence,
conflicting users must resort to the judicial system to resolve their
disputes.222 With respect to air resources, another official noted
220. Accord Butler, supra note 136, at 100-01 nn.11-12. See generally W. Cox & L.
SHABMAN, DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR IMPROVED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS RELATED
TO INTERJURISDICTIONAL WATER TRANSFER (Virginia Water Resources Research Center, Bull.
145, Sept. 1985) (discussing Virginia's current institutional framework and proposing an im-
proved structure). Some officials acknowledged that the General Assembly has, in the con-
text of groundwater, taken the first step towards the establishment of a dispute resolution
and management system. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107 (1987). Legislation
enacted after the officials were interviewed continues that reform process. See, e.g., Surface
Water Management Areas Act of 1989, ch. 721, 1989 Va. Acts 1697 (presently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (Supp. 1989)).
221. See Butler, Defining Public Consumptive Rights in Virginia's Rivers, Streams, and
Lakes: Is Legislative Reform Needed?, 11 VA. B.A.J., Winter 1985, No. 1, at 14, 14-17 (dis-
cussing Virginia's common law approach). See generally Butler, supra note 136 (discussing
the common law riparian doctrine still applicable in many eastern states).
222. The uncertainty of the common law water allocation system is one of the primary
arguments made in support of reform efforts. That uncertainty arises from some of the com-
mon law standards and from the ad hoc nature of the judiciary's dispute resolution system.
See generally Butler, supra note 136, at 125-37 (discussing some of the reasons for the
common law's uncertainty).
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that Virginia law omitted an important type of air from regulation:
indoor air.223 Others commented on the inadequate scope of his-
toric resource legislation 224 and water quality legislation,225 as well
as on the overall failure of state environmental laws to consider the
relationship between land use and the environment. 26
Critical area legislation was a popular topic of concern. Model
state officials stressed repeatedly the urgency of the situation, not-
ing that many environmentally sensitive resources either are not
protected by legislation or are covered by statutes that are not
well-tailored to the unique characteristics of those resources. Vir-
ginia's Wetlands Act provides a good example of the first situation.
The Act protects wetlands in tidal areas, but omits nontidal wet-
lands from its coverage. 22 Although nontidal wetlands also are vi-
tal and environmentally sensitive resources,228 recent attempts to
include them within the scope of the Wetlands Act have failed. 29
223. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1300 (1989) (defining "air pollution" only in the context of
the "outdoor atmosphere").
224. One interviewee, for example, noted that the legislation protecting historic resources
did not apply to privately owned resources unless the landowner consented. The interviewee
also criticized the definition of historic district as unclear and incomplete. Cf. id. §§ 10.1-
2200 to -2216 (setting forth historic resource legislation).
225. A recent report, for instance, observed that Virginia's statutory law does not effec-
tively protect state waters from pollution and sedimentation caused by "land development
activities and continuing urban uses." ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 171, at 20.
226. For an example of this type of failure, see supra note 225. By now the link between
land use and the environment is well-documented. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVING-
STON, supra note 13, § 3.2 (discussing the relationship between land use and the geological
characteristics of the Chesapeake Bay and other coastal resources of Virginia), § 3.3 (dis-
cussing the relationship between land use and the chemical characteristics of the Chesa-
peake Bay); N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, ch. 2 (discussing the relationship between develop-
ment and basic ecosystems); THE POISONED WELL, supra note 1, chs. 24, 31 (discussing the
relationship between land use and groundwater quality).
227. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20 (1987 & Supp. 1989). Prior to 1982, the Act
also omitted nonvegetated tidal wetlands. See L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13,
§ 2.2, at 31 n.53.
228. See 14 CBF NEws, Mar. 1989, No. 1, at 4 (published by the Chesapeake Bay Foun-
dation). The National Wetlands Policy Forum recently issued a report calling for significant
changes in America's wetlands protection and management policies. See NATIONAL WET-
LANDS REPORT, supra note 1; Kean, Protecting America's Wetlands: An Action Agenda, 5
U.S. WATER NEws, Feb. 1989, No. 8, at 7.
229. See, e.g., H.B. 1037, Va. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989) (no action) (available from
Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information Office). The 1989 General Assembly,
however, did establish the Nontidal Wetlands Roundtable to study the need for nontidal
wetlands protection. The Roundtable recently recommended pursuing protection of nontidal
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Virginia's barrier islands provide a good example of the second sit-
uation. Because barrier islands typically have vegetated wetlands
and dunes, 30 the state's wetlands and coastal dune statutes would
seem adequate to protect the islands. Neither act, however, is suffi-
ciently tailored to the unique characteristics of barrier islands to
provide adequate protection. In contrast to other areas having wet-
lands and dunes, barrier islands typically have two additional eco-
logical zones that appear with the wetlands and dunes in a rela-
tively confined area. s Further, unlike other coastal lands, barrier
islands frequently experience significant and drastic changes in
their physical and ecological characteristics.232 Thus, even if the
state's wetlands and dune statutes normally were effective, they
would not fit the volatile and unique situation present on barrier
islands.
Finally, model state officials thought that Virginia's environmen-
tal legislation generally was too disorganized to be effective. As
several of them noted, environmental statutes are scattered
throughout the Virginia Code and appear in various titles without
any apparent organizational scheme. This lack of organization un-
derstandably encourages each agency to focus on its own separate
statutory provisions without giving much thought to related pro-
grams. According to the officials, only one state agency has a man-
date broad enough to encourage integration and coordination of
wetlands indirectly through the Clean Water Act § 401 certification program. See VIRGINIA
NONTIDAL WETLANDS ROUNDTABLE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 54, at 6-7 (1990); ALLIANCE FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, CHESAPEAKE
RIVERS REPORT, Dec. 1989, at 2 [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE: RIVERS REPORT] (available at 202
N. Ninth St., Suite 900, Richmond, Va. 23219). See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, WETLANDS AND 401 CERTIFICATION (A-104F, Apr. 1989) (discussing the potential of
the state water quality certification process for protecting wetlands).
230. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 2.4, at 42-43 (discussing
the ecological zones of a barrier island); Note, supra note 66, at 378-80 (discussing the phys-
iography of barrier islands).
231. See L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 2.4, at 42-43.
232. See Note, supra note 66, at 378-80. Virginia localities having barrier islands within
their jurisdiction have recognized the volatile nature of barrier islands as well as their im-
portance to the mainland. See, e.g., Accomack County, Va., Amendment to Zoning Ordi-
nance preamble, art. 6A (Apr. 15, 1987).
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environmental laws. Yet that agency, the Council on the Environ-
ment, has no specific regulatory authority. 3 3
Similar problems in scope exist in other jurisdictions. As in Vir-
ginia, the resource management and environmental laws of other
states tend to contain far too many exemptions and omissions.
Water permit legislation in eastern states, for example, typically
contains numerous exemptions that undermine the effectiveness of
the legislation.3 4 Furthermore, many jurisdictions fail to provide
adequate protection for wetlands, sometimes omitting nontidal
wetlands from their legislation and usually allowing some harmful
activities to remain unregulated.23 5 Other omissions in scope also
are pervasive. 3 6 Virginia thus is not alone in facing the problem of
inadequate environmental coverage.
The exemptions and omissions often found in environmental leg-
islation result in large part from the political process. These ex-
emptions and gaps in coverage typically result from attempts to
make environmental legislation politically more acceptable.2 7 To
the extent that omissions and exemptions reflect compromises
needed to secure passage, curing the problem of incomplete and
233. For a general description of the COE's responsibilities, see supra notes 108-15 and
accompanying text.
234. See Ausness, supra note 138, at 577-79.
235. See, e.g., AL. CODE § 9-7-13(a) (1987) (declaring certain uses to be permissible
within the coastal area); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-40 (West Supp. 1990) (declaring cer-
tain activities to be permitted in wetlands and watercourses); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.913(4),
.927 (West 1986) (exempting certain activities from wetlands permit requirement); GA. CODE
ANN. § 12-5-281 (Supp. 1989) (regulating coastal marshlands in estuarine areas only); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-101(j), (n) (1990) (regulating tidal wetlands only); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-27-5(a) (regulating tidal wetlands only), 49-27-7 (exempting various activities and
types of wetlands from the wetlands program) (Supp. 1989); see also W. WANT, supra note
5, ch. 5 (discussing exemptions under federal wetlands regulatory programs). See generally
id. ch. 13 (describing state wetlands and coastal laws).
236. Indoor air, for example, is usually omitted from state air pollution laws. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 12-9-3(4) (1988). See generally Kirsch, Behind Closed Doors: Indoor Air Pollu-
tion and Government Policy, 6 HARv. ENvL. L. REv. 339 (1982) (examining the problem of
indoor air pollution and the need for expanded government regulation).
237. The consent requirement incorporated into various water improvement statutes
probably resulted from such a compromise. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-37, -332.1, -875,
-1250.1 (1989) (giving localities the right to approve or disapprove of certain water projects).
The more limited scope of the original version of Virginia's Wetlands Act also may have
resulted from such attempts. Cf. L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 2.2, at 31
n.53 (discussing the original legislation). For another example, see infra notes 258-59 and
accompanying text.
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ineffective legislation will be very difficult. Such an attempt not
only would have to deal with the substantive matters omitted from
the present legislation; it also would have to identify and address
the attitudes of those opposing expanded environmental
regulation. 38
Despite the added problem of political opposition, efforts never-
theless must be taken to develop a more comprehensive, coordi-
nated management program for natural resources. At a minimum,
effective environmental regulation requires state legislatures to fill
-the more serious holes in coverage. The realities of the political
system admittedly may necessitate weaker legislation than envi-
ronmentalists would advocate. But to reflect the interests of all
state citizens, environmental legislation must attempt to incorpo-
rate and balance a variety of concerns, including economic, envi-
ronmental and scenic values; a democratic consensus is necessary if
environmental regulation is to be societally and therefore ethically
acceptable." 9
Development of more comprehensive and better coordinated en-
vironmental laws should help to alleviate the problem of turf-
guarding that now exists among many environmental agencies. As
Virginia's experience indicates, an uncoordinated and incomplete
regulatory structure tends to produce an uncooperative atmo-
sphere among environmental agencies. 40 Instead of taking a holis-
tic view, agencies in such a regulatory structure tend to focus only
on their responsibilities and, as a result, become overly protective
of their own programs. Improved coordination should create more
positive feelings among agencies.
Many state governments have already taken some steps in this
direction. Virginia and other coastal states, for example, have
adopted federally approved programs to improve regulation of
238. For a discussion of some of those attitudes, see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying
text.
239. See generally Butler, supra note 143 (discussing the need to incorporate efficiency,
fairness and environmental concerns into water reform legislation); H. ROLSTON I, supra
note 85, at 242-62 (discussing the need for democratic decisionmaking in developing envi-
ronmental policy).
240. During the investigative process, Virginia officials manifested this problem in a num-
ber of ways, including expressions of disdain, distrust and outright hostility towards other
governmental entities.
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coastal resources.2  Although the content of the programs varies
from state to state, federal law requires all approved programs to
"describe the organizational structure that will be used to imple-
ment and administer the management program." 42 In addition,
approved programs must provide for plan coordination243 and des-
ignate a single state agency with appropriate legal, fiscal and ad-
ministrative capabilities to receive and administer program
grants. 44 Similar progress has occurred in other limited resource
management contexts.24 5
States could improve coordination through more effective use of
policymaking and oversight agencies like Virginia's Council on the
Environment. Because of their broad mandate, these agencies must
take a comprehensive perspective in developing and evaluating en-
vironmental policy. Even when such an agency does not have regu-
latory authority for any specific environmental program, the
agency still could easily expand its role in coordinating state envi-
246ronmental programs.
241. The federal Coastal Zone Management Act was enacted in 1972 to "preserve, pro-
tect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal
zone for this and succeeding generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1988). Under the Act, states
are encouraged to adopt coastal resource management programs that meet minimum federal
standards. Id. § 1454. See generally 4 P. ROHAN, supra note 4, ch. 26 (discussing coastal
zone management); W. WANT, supra note 5, ch. 13 (discussing state coastal laws); Sympo-
sium on Coastal Zone Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1985).
242. 15 C.F.R. § 923.46(c)(1) (1989).
243. Id. § 923.56.
244. Id. § 923.47(b). Virginia's Coastal Resources Management Program generally meets
the coordination and administration requirements through provisions that explain the ex-
pected relationship among existing environmental agencies and require networking or com-
munication among those agencies. See supra notes 160, 165 and accompanying text. Mary-
land's program is more ambitious, calling for new administrative structures and procedures.
See generally OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE OF MARYLAND COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 16-17, 37-70, 391-404 (1978). Among other innovations,
Maryland's program creates a project evaluation process for evaluating the consistency of
individual projects with the state program and a program review process for evaluating the
consistency of state laws with the program. See id. at 60-68. In addition, the program pro-
vides for formalization of goals, objectives and policies through an executive order and
memoranda of understanding reached between the program's lead agency and other govern-
ment units. Id. at 57-58.
245. For other examples of improved coordination in the environmental regulation area,
see infra notes 346-48, 366, 372 and accompanying text.
246. Under Virginia's Coastal Resources Management Program, for example, the COE
now is responsible for "administering the details of the program and acting as 'lead agency'
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One serious gap in coverage concerns environmentally sensitive
resources. Scientific studies have consistently indicated that criti-
cal environmental areas need more demanding regulation.247 De-
spite these studies, states have, for the most part, failed to develop
comprehensive regulatory programs for critical areas.24 When
states enact critical area legislation, it can be very limited in effect,
providing primarily for the identification of critical areas and the
development of possible land use criteria.2 49 Furthermore, although
all states have adopted environmental laws for specific types of
critical areas, these laws also can be restrictive. Besides being in-
complete in scope, specific critical areas legislation often fails to
reflect an integrated approach.250
The inadequacy of critical area legislation is due at least in part
to the reluctance of legislators to regulate land use in environmen-
tally sensitive areas. The reaction of the Virginia General Assem-
bly to its own critical area legislation best demonstrates this reluc-
tance. In 1972, the General Assembly enacted legislation directing
the Division of State Planning and Community Affairs to identify
and delineate the state's critical environmental areas and to de-
velop criteria to govern land use in those areas.25' Pursuant to its
for purposes of program management, monitoring and reporting and grant management."
VA. CRMP, supra note 5, pt. II, at 1-7; see also supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of the COE under current statutory law).
247. For some examples of those studies, see supra note 1.
248. See N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, § 5.05[1]. There are some exceptions. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 380.05 (West 1988); see also N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, § 5.0511] (discussing
the states that have developed comprehensive critical area legislation). The Model Land
Development Code provided the impetus for this legislation. See id.; see also MODEL LAND
CODE, supra note 3, §§ 7-201 to -208 (setting forth a regulatory scheme for areas of critical
concern). For articles discussing the critical area programs of Florida and the Model Land
Code, see Degrove, Critical Area Programs in Florida: Creative Balancing of Growth and
the Environment, 34 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 51 (1988), and Pelham, Regulating
Areas of Critical State Concern: Florida and the Model Code, 18 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1980). See
generally N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, §§ 5.01-.09 (discussing critical area controls).
249. Virginia's critical areas legislation exemplifies this point. See infra notes 251-53, 258-
59 and accompanying text; see also N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, § 5.02 (discussing the prob-
lem-oriented focus of environmental controls).
250. Wetlands laws, for example, often contain numerous exemptions and may omit the
freshwater variety. See supra notes 227-29, 235 and accompanying text.
251. See Act of Apr. 8, 1972, ch. 690, 1972 Va. Acts 934. The legislation defined "critical
environmental area" as "an area of natural, scenic and historic value including but not lim-
ited to wetlands, marsh lands, shore lands and flood plains of rivers, lakes and streams,
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statutory charge, the Division studied Virginia's critical environ-
mental areas. In addition to developing criteria to identify those
areas, the Division delineated 134 critical environmental areas
within the state and recommended the enactment of legislation to
protect those areas.2 52 The legislature not only rejected the recom-
mendations, but also repealed the legislation.253 As one Virginia of-
ficial explained, broad critical area legislation simply has no politi-
cal appeal; legislation focusing on specific types of critical areas is
much easier to accept politically.
Improving regulation of critical areas thus will require changing
established attitudes about land use regulation.254 In most states,
this process of change should start by focusing on the environmen-
tal provisions found in state constitutions. Legislators and regula-
tors in these states need to be reminded that the policy of environ-
mental protection is expressed in their constitutions. To the extent
that the policy has acquired constitutional stature, it should have
meaning independent of judicial or statutory law. At the very least,
legislators should expressly recognize this fact in more environ-
mental legislation. In states having environmental provisions in
their constitutions, environmental legislation often fails to identify
the constitutional provision as either a motivating force or a source
of authority.25 5 Express recognition would remind localities, agen-
wilderness and wildlife habitats, historic buildings and areas." Id. § 3(b), 1972 Va. Acts 934,
935; cf. MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, § 7-201(3) (defining areas of critical concern).
252. VIRGINIA DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING & COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE COUN-
CIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT'i LAND USE TASK FORCE TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL As-
SEMBLY OF 1973, S. Doc. No. 3 (1972) [hereinafter CRrrxcAL AREAS REPORT]. In its study, the
Division further defined a critical environmental area as "any portion of land, regardless of
size, which because of location, physical features, historical character, natural productive
capability, scenic significance, or unique flora or fauna, contributes to the economic, aes-
thetic, or cultural well-being of individuals or society, and which because of these peculiar
qualities is in limited supply." Id. at 1.
253. See Act of Mar. 31, 1979, ch. 671, 1979 Va. Acts 959, 960.
254. For a discussion of some of these attitudes, see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying
text.
255. See, e.g., Virginia Environmental Quality Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1200 to -1221
(1989); see also supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (comparing earlier versions of
the Environmental Quality Act with the present version). The Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Robb v. Shockoe Slip Foundation, 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985), further
undermines the importance of article XI, section 1. See supra notes 93-98 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the decision).
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cies and courts of the legal importance of environmental
preservation.
Assuming legislative attitudes can be changed, efforts to improve
regulation of critical areas should focus on adopting and imple-
menting clearer and more demanding environmental policies. Tra-
ditionally, many environmental laws either have inadequate policy
provisions or fail to contain any at all.2 58 When a policy provision
is included, it may be inadequate because it is only a general state-
ment that the agency may consider in its deliberations or because
the provision, though comprehensive, lacks an effective enforce-
ment mechanism. Even if an environmental agency were willing to
enforce such a policy provision, private parties affected by enforce-
ment would probably challenge the action as improper.25 7 To a
conservative regulatory agency, the threat of challenge may be
enough to convince the agency not to enforce its policy provisions.
Both types of environmental laws can be demonstrated easily.
The original version of Virginia's Environmental Quality Act, for
example, was nothing more than a general policy statement of the
need for environmental quality. To secure passage of the Act, pro-
ponents apparently had to eliminate the provisions for implemen-
tation and enforcement. 58 Today's version of the Act is even more
diluted; now the core policy provisions have been abridged or re-
pealed. 5 e In contrast, Virginia's subaqueous lands legislation fails
to contain any statement of policy, though the legislation does
identify factors that should guide agency deliberations. Among the
list of factors is a reference to the provisions of article XI, section
256. The present version of Virginia's Environmental Quality Act, for instance, contains
only one express policy statement, and that statement is very general and vague. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1201 (1989). Examples of more effective policy statements can be found in
Virginia's Wetlands Act and its Coastal Primary Sand Dune Protection Act. See id. §§ 62.1-
13.1, -13.21 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
257. Private landowners' challenges to Virginia's intensified submerged bed program
demonstrate this point. For a discussion of these challenges, see Royalty Report, supra note
65.
258. For a discussion of the original version, see supra notes 101-07 and accompanying
text. The original bill contained detailed provisions establishing a Department of Natural
Resources that would have had extensive duties and powers. See S.B. 365, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly, Reg. Sess. (1972) (available from Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information
Office).
259. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1200 to -1221 (1989).
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1, of the Virginia Constitution. s0 The effect of the provisions, or of
any other factor, is not detailed. At best, the environmental poli-
cies of the subaqueous lands regulatory program remain hidden.
Neither type of statute effectively advances environmental pres-
ervation. For regulation of critical areas to be effective, the content
and scope of critical area legislation must improve. General or
comprehensive critical area legislation, for instance, must do more
than simply commit to the policy of environmental protection; im-
plementation and enforcement are also necessary. At present, even
when environmental laws contain strong policy statements, the
policies often do not prevent private use and development. Despite
the existence of tough policies, the result of the regulatory process
appears to be the same in many cases; permits are issued and de-
velopment occurs even in environmentally fragile areas.261 Specific
critical area legislation also cannot maximize its effectiveness with-
out clearly expressed policy statements to guide regulators. At the
very least, the statutes should contain policy provisions that focus
on the particular resource being regulated and that reflect overrid-
ing environmental goals. Even if comprehensive critical area legis-
lation is not adopted, states can enhance the effectiveness of spe-
cific critical area legislation by developing a consolidated and
uniform set of goals, objectives and policies for state environmen-
tal programs.262 Until the gap between policy and practice is
closed, environmental protection will remain just a good idea.
Finally, some of the more traditional states could improve the
effectiveness of their environmental and natural resource laws by
reorganizing them. A quick comparison of the basic organizational
framework of the environmental laws of North Carolina and Vir-
ginia demonstrates the value of reorganization. In North Carolina,
the legislature has created four primary subdivisions of laws relat-
260. See id. § 62.1-3 (Supp. 1989).
261. The Cedar Island controversy provides an excellent example of this point. See gener-
ally Note, supra note 66 (discussing development of this and other barrier islands). The
development controversies that are now arising in South Carolina in the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Hugo may, in future years, provide another excellent example. See Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Sept. 25, 1989, at A-1, col. 4 (discussing how Hugo has revived the issue of coastal
protection).
262. Maryland already has recognized the need for such consolidation and uniformity.
See supra note 244.
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ing to the environment and natural resources: the conservation and
development laws of chapter 113, the pollution control and envi-
ronment laws of chapters 113A and 143, and the energy laws of
chapter 113B. 65 All four subdivisions reflect a comprehensive ap-
proach and a clear organizational structure. In Virginia, by con-
trast, statutory provisions affecting natural resources and the envi-
ronment appear in a wide range of Code titles, including titles 2.1,
3.1, 10.1, 15.1, 21, 28.1, 29.1, 32.1, 41.1, 45.1, 58.1 and 62.1. Al-
though some of these titles obviously deal with environmental mat-
ters, other titles focus primarily on nonenvironmental topics. 64
Furthermore, even in the obvious cases, it is difficult to tell how
each statute relates to other environmental provisions. This lack of
organization and coherence understandably encourages agencies to
take a narrow perspective and to view their regulatory programs in
isolation. When environmental laws are scattered throughout a
state code in an apparently unrelated manner, the laws portray an
incoherent, limited and weak-hearted regulatory effort. The narrow
perspective, in turn, encourages the agencies to guard their regula-
tory programs. A major reorganization of these environmental laws
would help to remove some barriers to effective natural resource
regulation. 65
263. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-1 to -415 (1987 & Supp. 1989); id. §§ 113A-1 to -214
(1989); id. §§ 113B-1 to -24 (1983 & Supp. 1989); id. §§ 143-211 to -215.114 (1987 & Supp.
1989). Some related acts dealing with the financial aspects of environmental regulation can
be found in other parts of the Code. See id. chs. 159B-159G (1987 & Supp. 1989), ch. 1591
(1989).
264. Titles obviously dealing with environmental matters include, among others, title 10.1
(which deals with conservation), title 28.1 (which focuses on fisheries) and title 62.1 (which
regulates water resources). Examples of titles dealing primarily with nonenvironmental top-
ics include title 15.1 (which focuses on local governments), title 32.1 (which concerns public
health) and title 58.1 (which involves taxation). The General Assembly recently improved
the organization of Virginia's environmental laws by consolidating many of them into title
10.1, the conservation title. See Act of Apr. 20, 1988, ch. 891, 1988 Va. Acts 1874.
265. One organizational approach used in some states is to categorize environmental legis-
lation, first, according to the type of resource being regulated (e.g., natural or historic), sec-
ond, according to the type of use affected by the legislation (e.g., mining, forestry, agricul-
ture, or fishing) and, third, according to the agency being given the regulatory authority
(e.g., Virginia Marine Resources Commission).
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III. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
A third type of problem within the legal system arises from judi-
cial treatment of land use and environmental issues. As the model
state study suggests, judicial efforts to deal with environmental
matters can create serious barriers to effective regulation. Two
principal factors appear to contribute to the problem of ineffective
judicial principles: the courts' restrictive approach to land use and
environmental regulation, and the lack of clarity and certainty in
their principles.
A. Restrictive Approach
Model state officials provided several good examples of the judi-
ciary's restrictive approach to environmental matters. One example
concerned the judiciary's interpretation of the land use powers of
local governments. As several officials noted, Virginia courts have
narrowly defined the regulatory powers of local governments as set
forth in their charters and enabling legislation. One official attrib-
uted this restrictive approach at least in part to the sloppiness of
local government officials and noted that the willingness of the
courts to uphold land use ordinances has increased as localities
have become more careful in drafting and implementing the ordi-
nances. Others attributed the restrictive approach primarily to the
judiciary's rigid adherence to Dillon's Rule. As explained earlier,
the rule limits a locality's powers to the powers conferred on it
expressly or by necessary implication.2 68 Because of the courts'
stringent interpretation of Dillon's Rule, local governments find
themselves increasingly unable to deal effectively with resource
problems. Rigid application of the rule, for example, prevents lo-
calities from using impact fees to force developers to pay for the
costs or impacts of their development on public resources and ser-
vices. Under traditional case law, localities generally cannot re-
quire developers to pay for improvements to public services and
266. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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facilities-not even if their development contributed to the need
for the improvements.6 7
Model state officials also identified the courts' interpretation of
article XI, section 1, of the Virginia Constitution as another exam-
ple of the judiciary's restrictive approach. As one official observed,
article XI, section 1, should be the ultimate barrier to the destruc-
tion of natural and historic resources. Yet when presented with the
opportunity to recognize and promote that barrier, the Virginia
Supreme Court chose to interpret the section restrictively, con-
cluding that it merely presented a policy statement and was not
self-executing.28 In explaining its decision, the court stressed that
the section failed to lay down rules for enforcing its provisions and
thus "beg[ged] statutory definition. '269 State agencies thus do not
have to consider the policies of article XI, section 1, in their regu-
267. See Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984) (holding that a
locality could not require the construction of a service road as a condition to a favorable
zoning ruling); Hylton Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577
(1979) (holding that under pre-1978 statutory law a county did not have any express or
implied authority to require a developer to improve state roads abutting its development as
a prerequisite to approval of its subdivision plans); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va.
128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975) (concluding that a county did not have the power to enact a
zoning ordinance requiring private landowners, as a condition precedent to development, to
dedicate a portion of their land to the county for the purpose of constructing roads and
sidewalks when the need for the public facilities was not substantially generated by the
proposed development). In the past, when a Virginia locality has tried to require a cash
payment from a developer instead of a mandatory dedication of facilities constructed by the
developer, lower courts have invalidated the fee requirement as an impermissible tax. See S.
ROBIN, ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW IN VIRGINIA 49-50 (1980). Recently, however, a circuit
court upheld a locality's power to assess a water impact fee. Tidewater Builders Ass'n v.
City of Virginia Beach, No. 86-LA-1828 (Virginia Beach, Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 1988) (validat-
ing the fee, as a matter of law, under the due process, equal protection and taxation clauses
and upholding the locality's authority to impose the water impact fee under Dillon's Rule),
appeal filed, No. 900451 (Apr. 12, 1990). See generally L. BEVIER & D. BRION, supra note
195, at 126-27 (discussing zoning and the orderly provision of public services). For a broader
discussion of the legal issues raised by laws conditioning project approval on contributions
by developers, see Connors & High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication
to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 69 (1987).
Virginia's statutory law now authorizes some localities to require payment of impact fees
for road improvements. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to -498.10 (1989) (effective July 1,
1990). In addition, statutory law allows developers to offer to make certain improvements to
the infrastructure. See id. §§ 15.1-491(a), -491.2. The voluntary offering of improvements is
known as proffering.
268. See Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985).
269. Id. at 682, 324 S.E.2d at 677. For further discussion of the decision, see supra notes
93-98 and accompanying text.
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latory process absent legislation to the contrary. Despite the con-
stitutional stature of the environmental protection value, the state
court has preferred to let the legislature decide how that value
should bind regulatory agencies.
The Virginia judiciary's interpretation of the public trust doc-
trine provided a third example of its restrictive approach to land
use and environmental matters.270 Developed in large part by the
United States Supreme Court, the public trust doctrine basically
provides that each state holds certain resources, principally naviga-
ble waters and submerged lands, in trust for its people.271 Although
many other state courts have eagerly accepted and even expanded
the federal version of the doctrine,1 2 the Virginia Supreme Court
has given inconsistent signals about the doctrine's viability under
Virginia law. 7 3 While some decisions of the Virginia Supreiae
Court are receptive to the doctrine,27 4 the court's most significant
interpretation of the doctrine reflects a basic dislike for the doc-
trine and a clear reluctance to accept it. 275 One official attributed
the unclear status of the doctrine under Virginia law largely to the
fact that development and resource exploitation have influenced
the thinking of lawmakers. Because of the state's past abundance
of resources and because of the need and continuing desirability of
economic growth, lawmakers have tended to overlook the public
trust doctrine as a tool for achieving environmental preservation.
The restrictive approach displayed by the Virginia judiciary also
exists in a number of other jurisdictions. Unless an issue falls
clearly within one of the traditional areas of judicial interven-
270. A fourth example concerned judicial enforcement of remedial provisions in environ-
mental laws. One Virginia official noted the difficulty of implementing environmental laws
and attributed it in part to the courts' reluctance to impose statutory remedies. For further
discussion of this point, see infra note 339 and accompanying text.
271. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LMNGSTON, supra note 13, ch. 5 (discussing the devel-
opment of the public trust doctrine).
272. For a discussion of one jurisdiction's more progressive approach, see id. § 5.2.C.
273. See generally id. § 5.2.B (discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine in
Virginia).
274. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904).
275. See Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932). This
opinion was rendered almost 40 years before the adoption of article XI, § 1, of the Virginia
Constitution. See L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 5.2, at 139-40. See generally
id. § 5.2.B (discussing the development of the public trust doctrine in Virginia).
1990]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tion,276 many courts follow a practice of judicial restraint. Because
the policy of environmental preservation does not fall within one
of those areas, the policy generally must receive legislative atten-
tion before these courts will promote the policy. Traditional state
courts generally hesitate to develop new common law principles or
even to expand established judicial doctrine to achieve environ-
mental preservation. Further, even when legislative direction ex-
ists, the courts still may exercise considerable restraint in inter-
preting statutory intent.
The court decisions of other jurisdictions provide numerous ex-
amples of the judiciary's restrictive perspective in the environmen-
tal area. Even when legislative intervention exists, for example,
many courts continue to adhere to traditional attitudes more ap-
propriate in a pre-reform era. Some of the decisions involving tak-
ings challenges to wetlands laws demonstrate this point. Despite
clear scientific evidence of the harm caused by the destruction of
wetlands,2 " some courts view wetlands laws primarily as restric-
tions on private property rights and not as safeguards against the
environmental harm caused by private land uses.2 78 Although legis-
lative reform admittedly cannot override the constitutional protec-
tion accorded property rights, judicial definition of the rights
should reflect advances in scientific understandings. Furthermore,
if a jurisdiction has incorporated the policy of environmental pro-
tection in its constitution, judicial definition of property rights
should include an accommodation of the public interests reflected
276. The Virginia Supreme Court, for example, is willing to resolve conflicts between two
private users of land through the nuisance doctrine. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. London, 114
Va. 334, 76 S.E. 306 (1912); Herring v. Wilton, 106 Va. 171, 55 S.E. 546 (1906). See gener-
ally Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions-Avoiding
the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (1976) (discussing the evolution of nuisance
law).
277. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS: AN INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT 19-47 (1978) (discussing wetlands' functions and uses); W.
WANT, supra note 5, § 2.01[3] (discussing the valuable functions performed by wetlands).
278. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (focusing on the loss of commer-
cial use by private landowners and the existence of a public benefit instead of the harm
caused by the landowners' alteration of wetlands); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 543-44, 193 A.2d 232, 235, 239-42 (1963)
(recognizing the value of wetlands but focusing on the loss of reasonable use and the exis-
tence of a public benefit). The point is not to argue for the "public harm" takings test, but
rather to stress the judiciary's adherence to traditional views.
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in the constitutional provisions on the environment. Despite the
existence of the constitutional provisions and the advances in sci-
entific knowledge, some courts still hesitate to promote the public
interest in environmental protection, preferring instead to defer al-
most unconditionally to private property rights.279
Many courts are equally, if not more, restrictive in their applica-
tion of common law doctrine to environmental issues. For example,
although most courts, are not as reluctant as Virginia's to recognize
or apply the public trust doctrine, some are similarly restrictive in
their interpretation of the doctrine.2 80 These courts typically recog-
nize the doctrine in certain traditional contexts, but generally re-
fuse to extend the doctrine to new situations. In a 1982 decision,
for instance, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to change the
common law concepts of public trust and navigability to meet the
public need for access to recreational waters. 81 Either an extension
of the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters or an expan-
sion of the navigability concept to include recreational boating
would have resulted in greater public access to inland lakes. The
court refused to modify the common law concepts, deciding instead
that the legislature, as "a majoritarian body," was the proper fo-
rum for change. 82
Such judicial restraint reflects a basic misunderstanding of the
nature of environmental preservation, especially its relationship to
land use. Although scientists have long recognized this relation-
ship, courts traditionally have separated the two, treating land use
regulation as nothing more than traditional zoning and environ-
mental regulation simply as an attempt to protect certain common
resources from their users.283 This approach tends to view environ-
mental regulation of privately owned lands as impermissible land
279. Cf. D. MANDELKER, supra note 21, § 1.12, at 11 (discussing a strict construction rule
traditionally applied by courts to avoid derogation of property rights). For further discus-
sion of the private rights orientation, see supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
280. Another example is the judiciary's treatment of common law principles governing
rights in water resources. Despite scientific advances and changing needs, many courts in
the eastern United States refuse to modify those principles. See Butler, supra note 136, at
105-56.
281. Bott v. Natural Resources Conm'n, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838 (1982).
282. Id. at 84-86, 327 N.W.2d at 852-53.
283. See supra notes 138, 226 and accompanying text; see also N. ROBINSON, supra note
74, § 5.02 (distinguishing between environmental controls and zoning).
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use regulation and as improper government infringement of private
property rights. The traditional judicial perspective to land use
and environmental regulation ignores the detrimental effect that
users of privately owned lands have on common resources, espe-
cially on living resources dependent on those lands. The traditional
approach thus tends to restrict environmental regulation to com-
mon or public resources.
Other factors also suggest the need to reevaluate the judiciary's
restrictive approach to environmental regulation. To the extent
that environmental quality is a constitutional value, judicial re-
straint courts should rethink their hesitance to promote that value
absent clear legislative direction. Even if a court is not willing to
promote the value aggressively, it nevertheless should recognize
the legitimating function of the constitutional provision. Once en-
vironmental protection achieves constitutional stature, the courts
have a clear basis for liberally interpreting environmental legisla-
tion. For example, when an environmental statute is susceptible to
two reasonable interpretations, one narrow and the other broad, a
court generally could rely on the constitutional policy of environ-
mental protection to choose the broader reading. Absent clear pre-
cedent, any other result would suggest improper judicial decision-
making; the court would be promoting its subjective preferences
over an objective expression of the majoritarian will.284 The consti-
tutional stature of environmental preservation would similarly sup-
port greater judicial activism in interpreting common law doctrine.
Instead of following traditional judicial principles, a court now
would have a basis for modifying or expanding common law
doctrine.
The public trust doctrine, in particular, could serve as an effec-
tive tool for judicial implementation of environmental policies in
state constitutions. Even the courts that have hesitated to embrace
the doctrine would accept the proposition that a state constitution
284. See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (defin-
ing and discussing different perspectives to legal analysis and judicial interpretation); R
EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 19-31 (discussing judicial review and constitutional interpreta-
tion); Michelnan, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1099-
1101 (1981) (discussing methods of constitutional interpretation and sources of external
criteria).
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can provide a basis for recognizing a public trust. 85 Some environ-
mental provisions in state constitutions explicitly refer to the exis-
tence of a public trust, while others do not.2 6 Unless an explicit
reference exists, judicial restraint courts would be inclined to reject
arguments that the environmental provisions recognize a public
trust.287 Such a position ignores an important aspect of the public
trust doctrine and of constitutional environmental provisions gen-
erally. Even under a conservative reading, the public trust concept
and the environmental provisions are closely linked through their
overriding philosophical commitment to the policy of steward-
ship-that is, to the notion that government should act as a stew-
ard of natural and historic resources for present and future genera-
tions. 288 For analytical purposes, the courts need to distinguish
between two related but different types of public interests: the
more traditional "property" interest, which gives the public a right
to use and occupy certain defined resources, typically publicly
owned,28 9 and the interest of stewardship, which recognizes as le-
gitimate public expectations of regulating even privately held re-
285. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 543-45, 164 S.E. 689,
695-96 (1932); see also 2 A. HOWARD, supra note 21, at 1153-54 (discussing how the Virginia
Constitution now provides such a basis).
286. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
287. In its recent decision in Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674
(1985), the Virginia Supreme Court appeared to agree with this position. By concluding that
Virginia's environmental provision was nonbinding, the court suggested that a trust rela-
tionship, with all its accompanying duties and obligations, did not exist. See id. at 682-83,
324 S.E.2d at 676-77. The court's position conflicts with the legislative history of article XI,
§ 1, which indicates that the drafters intended for the section to recognize a public trust
over state lands and waters. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
288. For a comprehensive discussion of the stewardship concept, see Symposium: Stew-
ardship of Land and Natural Resources, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 301.
289. The more traditional property interest arguably arises from two related but distinct
public rights theories: the public trust doctrine and the commons concept. See generally L.
BUTLER & M. LMNGSTON, supra note 13, chs. 5, 6 (discussing the development of both theo-
ries). Of the two, the commons concept is the theory with the clearer link to property law. In
contrast to the trust doctrine, the commons concept developed informally within the tradi-
tional property structure. See generally id. § 6.3 (comparing the two theories). But while
traditional public trust law technically may not label the public interest in using trust re-
sources as a property right, the public's use right has many of the characteristics of a prop-
erty interest. See generally id. §§ 5.1, 5.3 (discussing the theoretical origins of the public
trust doctrine).
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sources for environmental purposes.19° At the very least, environ-
mental provisions in state constitutions involve the second type of
public interest. Because that type of interest also is an inherent
part of the public trust doctrine, state courts can use the doctrine
as a source of guidelines even if the courts choose not to recognize
the first type of public interest under the environmental provisions
of their state constitution."' Judicial restraint courts have unnec-
essarily interpreted the public trust doctrine as involving only the
more traditional property interest.
For a number of reasons, the public trust doctrine provides a
useful tool for environmental regulation. As a nonstatic concept,
the doctrine can change substantively to reflect new social values
and public perceptions. 2  Those opposing flexible use of the doc-
trine typically maintain that judicial modification of legal princi-
ples to reflect changing times is improper.93 Although strict adher-
290. In some jurisdictions, the courts have already distinguished between the two types of
public interests and have recognized the stewardship basis of the public trust doctrine. See,
e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640-41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
The stewardship interest also appears to have arisen in large part from two public rights
theories-the public trust doctrine and the commons concept. See supra note 289. Of the
two, the trust doctrine appears to reflect a stronger philosophical commitment. See gener-
ally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, §§ 5.1.A, 5.3 (discussing the philosophical
basis of the trust doctrine); id. § 6.3 (comparing the perspectives of the public trust doctrine
and the commons concept).
291. For a discussion of some of those guidelines, see infra notes 302-06 and accompany-
ing text. See also Howard, supra note 73, at 218-24 (explaining how the trust doctrine could
be used to interpret article XI, § 1, of the Virginia Constitution); Johnson, Public Trust
Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980) (suggesting
guidelines for using the public trust doctrine to protect instream flow).
292. 2 A. HOWARD, supra note 21, at 1153, 1154 n.47; see Johnson, supra note 291, at 233-
34, 240-41; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471, 474, 556-57 (1970). Many courts have interpreted the
trust doctrine as a flexible concept. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
293. At the core of this opposition is a fundamental concern for the role of the judiciary
in a democratic political system. See Sax, supra note 292, at 558-61 (discussing this concern
and arguing that one function of the courts in the public trust area is democratization); see
also Bott v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 415 Mich. 45, 84-86, 327 N.W.2d 838, 852-53 (1982)
(discussing the benefits of legislative solutions over judicial responses). Strong advocates of
judicial restraint also are concerned about the effect of judicial changes on well-established
reliance and property interests. See id. at 77-78, 327 N.W.2d at 849 (discussing the need for
strict observance of stare decisis when "past decisions establish 'rules of property' that in-
duce extensive reliance"). For a discussion of some of the arguments typically made to sup-
900
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ence to this position may have merit where statutory principles are
concerned, it is troubling when applied to common law principles.
If a court originally had the power to develop a doctrine, then
surely it also must have the power to modify the doctrine as social
needs and values change. To rule otherwise would mean that, ab-
sent legislative action, society would be locked into rules of law
developed hundreds of years ago. Within certain constraints, 29 4 the
judiciary should have the power to reinterpret common law princi-
ples-especially when those principles were developed in part to
ratify social practices, as the public trust doctrine was.295
In addition to providing a flexible tool for environmental regula-
tion, the public trust doctrine also helps to shift decisions affecting
public trust resources to the legislature."' Because the doctrine
prevents the legislature from totally abdicating its public trust re-
sponsibilities,297 it forces the legislature to make choices regarding
allocation and use. The trust concept similarly compels adminis-
trative officials to consider the implications of government action
on public trust resources. 98 Under the common law version of the
port judicial restraint in the context of constitutional interpretation, see Note, supra note
87, at 368-79. See generally Wellington, supra note 117 (discussing the appropriate scope of
judicial review).
To deal with these concerns in a consistent manner, some courts have developed a test for
deciding if a change in law is warranted. In Michigan, for example, the courts ask whether a
proposed change is consistent with accepted social values, would treat fairly those who re-
lied on the old rule of law, and is appropriate for judicial implementation. Bott, 415 Mich.
at 72, 327 N.W.2d at 846-47.
294. In changing common law rules, for example, courts would have to observe basic con-
stitutional precepts reflected in the due process and takings clauses. See, e.g., Bott v. Natu-
ral Resources Comm'n, 415 Mich. 45, 80-84, 327 N.W.2d 838, 850-52 (1982) (considering
whether a proposed change in law would effect a taking in violation of constitutional princi-
ples). For a discussion of the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the takings
clause, see L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 20.2, at 752-53.
295. The United States Supreme Court, in particular, focused on social expectations in
developing the trust doctrine. For a discussion of some of the key public trust opinions of
the Court, see L. BUTLER & M. LMNGSTON, supra note 13, § 5.2.A.
296. See 2 A. HoWARD, supra note 21, at 1156. But once the legislature exercises its deci-
sionmaking power over trust resources, the public trust doctrine also may be used to vali-
date appropriate decisions. See id.
297. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
298. See 2 A. HowARD, supra note 21, at 1155-56. For an example of a case requiring
government agencies to consider the public trust in making resource allocation decisions, see
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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doctrine, the government cannot take action that substantially im-
pairs the public trust interest.299 Although this "substantial im-
pairment" standard historically has not been very difficult to
meet, °00 it at least makes the government accountable for its ac-
tions with respect to public trust resources.
Greater judicial reliance on the public trust doctrine admittedly
will mean that without legislative intervention the state courts will
have to define some basic standards to govern disputes involving
public trust resources.301 In the past, the judiciaries and legisla-
tures of some states have not eagerly embraced the doctrine. Thus,
if the doctrine is to be used as a judicial tool for implementing the
environmental policies of state constitutions and statutes, those ju-
diciaries will have to break new ground and develop some princi-
ples of trust management. To the extent that the courts believe in
judicial restraint, this prospect will be troubling.
State courts can ease their fears by realizing that, even within
the framework of judicial restraint, they still can rely on the public
trust doctrine to further environmental preservation. The United
States Supreme Court has established the concept of stewardship
through a public trust as one of the traditional areas of judicial
intervention.302 Furthermore, judicial interpretation of the doctrine
can proceed in a principled way.3 03 External criteria for developing
299. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435.
300. As a general matter, the courts only find a violation of the substantial impairment
standard when the government either affirmatively abdicates or totally fails to consider its
trust responsibilities. See, e.g., id. at 387 (finding a violation when government action totally
abdicated trust responsibilities); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983)
(finding a violation when government officials failed to recognize their trust responsibilities);
cf. Bottineau County Water Resource Dist. v. North Dakota Wildlife Soc'y, 424 N.W.2d 894,
903 (N.D. 1988) (noting that the trust doctrine is intended only to control and not prevent
development).
301. Of course, the best solution is for the legislature to take the initiative and define
some of these standards. Some state legislatures have already taken this step. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30.01-.99 (West 1989) (regulating use of navigable waters and submerged
beds); id. §§ 33.001-.37 (providing for public inland lake protection and rehabilitation pur-
suant to the state's public trust duties).
302. See generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 5.2.A (discussing the
Court's activist role in developing the trust doctrine).
303. See generally supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text (discussing how the judici-




substantive principles of trust management are available to the
courts. For example, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court reveal several basic principles.0 4 One principle is that a
state's total abdication of public trust responsibilities is impermis-
sible. A second principle is that government action affecting trust
resources cannot substantially impair the public trust. Additional
criteria can be found in the decisions of other jurisdictions. A 1983
Idaho decision, for instance, sets forth a two-part test for deter-
mining the validity of a government grant of public trust prop-
erty.305 The test first focuses on the conveyed resources, asking
whether the government grant of the resources still furthers navi-
gation, commerce, or other public trust purposes. The test next ex-
amines the remaining public trust resources to determine whether
the grant substantially impairs the public interest in those
resources. 
30
Objective criteria for defining the appropriate standard and
method of judicial review also exist. For instance, in the Idaho de-
cision mentioned above, the court indicated that decisions by
unelected officials were subject to "closer scrutiny" than decisions
by the legislature.0 7 Alternatively, state courts could borrow from
administrative law principles to define the appropriate standard of
review. 08 Regardless of their choice, the courts could also use evi-
dentiary principles as a procedural tool for reviewing disputes in-
volving trust resources. To the extent that the disputes implicate
environmental values found in state constitutions, the courts could
promote the constitutional values by redefining the burden of
304. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. For further discussion of how the
courts can develop substantive principles of trust management, see 2 A. HowARD, supra note
21, at 1154-56.
305. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671
P.2d 1085 (1983). For a good discussion of the approach of other jurisdictions, see id. at 626-
31, 671 P.2d at 1089-94. Cf. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 905-06,
424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100-01 (1981) (setting forth a different test for evaluating legislative ac-
tion disposing of trust resources).
306. Kootenai, 105 Idaho at 626, 671 P.2d at 1089. In addition to the two-part substantive
test, the Idaho court imposed certain procedural requirements on those regulating public
trust resources. Before trust resources could be alienated or impaired, regulators had to
meet basic notice and hearing requirements. Id. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1091.
307. Id. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1091.
308. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing some of those principles).
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proof and by resolving doubts in favor of those values when they
conflict with nonconstitutional values.0 9
Although many of these criteria are not controlling precedent,
state courts look routinely to outside sources for guidance in other
areas of the law.3 10 To the extent that environmental quality is
now a constitutional value, a state judiciary arguably has an even
more compelling reason to look to outside guidance in the environ-
mental area. The constitutional stature of environmental preserva-
tion should have some effect on the conscientious lawmaker. 11 In
the context of the courts, the effect should include implementing
some of the ideas suggested above. Though the ideas may not re-
sult in a comprehensive solution, they at least enable the courts to
promote the environmental values of state constitutions even when
legislative direction is absent.
B. Lack of Clarity and Certainty
Model state officials also provided several good examples of
problems caused by the lack of clarity and certainty in judicial
principles. Once again, one example concerned the regulatory pow-
ers of local governments. In addition to its restrictive approach,
the Virginia judiciary also has failed to provide clear guidance to
local governments about the validity of many of their land use
measures. One official, for instance, pointed out that case law does
not clearly define the legal consequences of a locality's comprehen-
sive plan.3 12 To complicate matters further, state judges at the
lower court level sometimes conflict with one another in their ap-
proaches to resolving land use disputes. As one regulator ex-
plained, some judges take a liberal view of the police power and
tend to hold private landowners subject to all reasonable zoning
309. Accord Krier, supra note 117, at 37.
310. Indeed, in examining the public trust doctrine outside the context of article XI, the
Virginia Supreme Court has displayed a willingness to consider the decisions of other juris-
dictions. See, e.g., City of Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 100-02, 89 S.E. 81, 82-83 (1916)
(relying on decisions of New Jersey and New York).
311. For further discussion of this point, see supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
312. Of particular concern is the judiciary's failure to define the relationship between the
comprehensive plan and land use decisions. See generally L. BEViER & D. BRION, supra note
195, at 125-26 (discussing this concern under Virginia law); D. MANDELKER, supra note 21,




laws; others, in contrast, take the perspective of the private prop-
erty owner and start with the proposition that a property owner
can do virtually anything he wants with his land. A second exam-
ple of the judiciary's uncertain approach concerns its takings juris-
prudence. As one official observed, takings jurisprudence fails to
provide a clear or certain test for distinguishing between protected
property rights and legitimate exercises of the police power. Tak-
ings case law, whether of state or federal origin, is simply too un-
clear to be a useful predictor of the validity of many regulatory
measures.
3 13
As the earlier discussion of takings case law demonstrates, the
concerns expressed by model state officials about the vague nature
of judicial land use principles are valid in other jurisdictions as
well. Because of the ad hoc approach of the judicial process, com-
mon law principles are inherently uncertain. Courts must address
legal issues as they arise in individual disputes and thus cannot
plan the development of the common law. Nor can the courts pro-
vide comprehensive solutions that go beyond the scope of the dis-
pute before them. By their nature, then, judicial decisions have low
predictive value.3 14
The limited utility of the judicial decisionmaking process, how-
ever, is not necessarily a negative point. Incremental decisionmak-
ing, especially when used in new or complex areas of concern, has
its advantages. Because judicial decisions are limited in scope, they
tend to minimize the risk of an erroneous decision. The less com-
prehensive a legal solution is, the lower the expected loss of a poor
decision. Comprehensive decisionmaking, by contrast, magnifies
313. See supra notes 19-55 and accompanying text. Another example of unclear judicial
principles concerns Virginia's tidal resources. Although Virginia began in 1780 to adopt stat-
utory principles to define the boundary between private and public rights in tidal lands, the
Virginia Supreme Court has yet to provide a clear interpretation of those principles. See
generally L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, ch. 19 (discussing public and private
rights in Virginia's shorelands). This uncertainty understandably has created some miscon-
ceptions about tidal and coastal law among regulators. For instance, one official inaccurately
described the Virginia legislature as giving away the intertidal zone (land between the low
and high water marks) in 1819. See generally id. § 19.2 (discussing the effect of the 1819
boundary legislation).
314. See generally B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925) (discussing
how courts decide cases and other aspects of the judicial process).
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the effects of an incorrect choice. As the solution becomes broader
in scope, the effects of an erroneous decision increase."' 5
State courts, however, can improve the effectiveness of their de-
cisions. Whether they are part of statutory or common law, legal
rules should serve a predictive function. Unless parties can predict
with relative certainty and reasonable frequency the validity of
their actions under the law, they will either ignore or resist the law,
or they will retreat from their activities. Effective judicial decisions
not only should address the precise legal issue before them; they
also should provide some guidance for future disputes. Well-rea-
soned and well-explained opinions will provide useful insights into
how future disputes will be resolved. Overly concise, poorly rea-
soned, or ambiguous opinions, on the other hand, will have little, if
any, predictive value."1 6
IV. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE
A fourth type of problem within the legal system concerns the
administrative process and structure of environmental programs.
As the responses of model state officials suggest, that process and
structure can pose significant barriers to effective resource man-
agement and environmental regulation. Three basic aspects of the
administrative process raise serious concerns: (1) the implementa-
tion and enforcement phase; (2) administrative procedures; and (3)
the local rule component of the regulatory framework.
A. The Implementation and Enforcement Phase
The first area of concern is the implementation and enforcement
of environmental laws. The model state inquiry demonstrates that
315. For further discussion of the comprehensive versus incremental debate, see A. BON-
FIELD, supra note 7, § 1.1.2; Butler, supra note 143, at 451-58; Butler, supra note 9, at 785-
93. See generally Wellington, supra note 117 (discussing the risks and the values of judicial
review).
316. Judicial opinions obviously vary in their effectiveness from court to court. A cursory
examination of Virginia Supreme Court opinions indicates that they have become more con-
cise and conclusory over time. While earlier opinions tended to have lengthy theoretical and
historical discussions of relevant legal principles, later opinions offer little, if any, explana-
tion of the court's thought process. Compare, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va.
678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985) and Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d
866 (1982) with Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932)
and French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 136 (1854).
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the process can be vague, complex and ineffective. Agencies re-
sponsible for implementing environmental laws typically face the
difficult task of deciding how to balance the often competing val-
ues of environmental protection and economic development with
little guidance from lawmakers. 17 Further, even when an effective
balance is reached, enforcement efforts sometimes prove to be in-
adequate. 18 Regulatory agencies inconsistently apply environmen-
tal standards in issuing permits319 or fail to monitor compliance
with permit conditions after issuance.320 The Virginia experience
provides striking evidence of this point. Although the state's envi-
317. Virginia's constitutional and statutory provisions adopt such a balancing approach.
See, e.g., VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (1989); id. § 62.1-13.1 (1987); id.
§ 62.1-11 (Supp. 1989); cf. supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between the two goals).
318. A recent study of land use initiatives in Tidewater Virginia supports this point. The
study finds that, despite the existence of an appropriate legal and administrative frame-
work, efforts to control point source pollution in the Bay still suffer from compliance and
enforcement problems. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 171, at 3. The long history of pollu-
tion problems at the Avtex Fibers plant in Front Royal, Virginia, also provides a poignant
example of this point. Although the State Water Control Board (SWCB) has documented
over 2000 violations of pollution and worker safety regulations, Avtex did not cease opera-
tions until November 1989. CHESAPEAKE RivERs REPORT, supra note 229, at 4. In January
1989, the state obtained a consent decree from Avtex for violations of wastewater discharge
pollution limits. Final Consent Decree, Commonwealth v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., Ch. No.
N-7156-3 (Richmond, Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1989). The SWCB subsequently discovered viola-
tions not only of the consent decree, but also of other pollution standards. In November
1989, the SWCB revoked Avtex's permit to discharge wastewater into the Shenandoah River
and obtained a favorable court ruling imposing fines and penalties. Commonwealth v. Avtex
Fibers, Ch. No. N-8233 (Richmond, Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 1989); Final Order Issued to Avtex
Fibers Front Royal, Inc., Va. State Water Control Board (Nov. 9, 1989).
319. One example of such inconsistency exists in Virginia's sand dune protection pro-
gram. According to a 1987 study, "[Liack of consistency in applying permit guidelines and
the legislature's willingness to grant exemptions. . . have led to confusion and criticism" of
the Virginia program. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 171, at 19. The legislature recently
demonstrated this willingness when it amended the coastal dune statute to allow the con-
struction of protective bulkheads by more residents of Sandbridge Beach. See Act of Mar.
26, 1987, ch. 499, 1987 Va. Acts 731 (presently codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.28(B)
(Supp. 1989)); see also Act of Apr. 11, 1988, ch. 740, 1988 Va. Acts 983 (amending the Sand-
bridge provision). Because of the Sandbridge amendment, the federal government is reas-
sessing its approval of Virginia's Coastal Resources Management Program. See 2 VA. NAT.
REsOURCEs NEWSL., Fall 1989, No. 6, at 4.
320. Inadequate monitoring exists, for example, in Virginia's wetlands program. One
study recommended "[s]trengthen[ing] monitoring and enforcement of wetlands permits by
adding enforcement staff at the state and local level" and by making the appropriate deci-
sionmaking process subject to the Administrative Process Act. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra
note 171, at 18.
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ronmental laws have become more demanding, the ultimate result
of the permit process still seems to be virtually the same as that
reached under more lax laws; private development of environmen-
tally fragile areas occurs despite the tougher laws. 21 Finally, confu-
sion in implementing and enforcing environmental laws arises from
the overlapping jurisdictions of federal and state governments and
from the many discrepancies existing between federal and state
standards. According to one Virginia official, the discrepancies
sometimes render state standards meaningless.2 2
To an extent, the implementation and enforcement problems
identified by model state officials are inherent in all environmental
regulatory efforts. Because the effects of environmental degrada-
tion are often subtle, diffused and long term,323 precise definitions
of the scope and nature of regulatory efforts are difficult to make.
In addition, conservation efforts by definition involve a difficult
balancing task. In contrast to the more extreme preservation goal,
conservation measures attempt to promote environmental protec-
tion while accommodating economic and other potentially conflict-
ing values. The goal of conservation measures is not to protect nat-
ural resources from use, but rather to prevent exploitation through
planned management. Thus, whereas preservationists believe that
natural resources should be preserved with little, if any, regard for
321. Cf. supra Section IIA and notes 256-62 and accompanying text (discussing similar
problems in the legislative context). Some development requests admittedly have been de-
nied because of the laws. See, e.g., Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1989, at B-2, col. 4
(discussing the decision of the Westmoreland County Wetlands Board to deny a permit
request because of the project's anticipated harm to wetlands). Most requests, however,
seem to be granted if appropriate action is taken to reduce adverse environmental conse-
quences. Cf. id. (explaining how the same local wetlands board suggested that permit ap-
proval might occur after appropriate changes to the proposed development project are
made).
322. To illustrate his point, the official noted that Virginia agencies exempt from various
state environmental requirements may nevertheless be subject to federal requirements. One
area of environmental regulation that has had serious discrepancies in the past is wetlands
regulation. Recent revisions of EPA's state wetlands regulations have eased some of the
tensions caused by the discrepancies. For a discussion of these revisions, see infra note 347
and accompanying text.
In addition to tensions between state and federal authorities, model state officials also
identified political and jurisdictional disputes between state and local governments as barri-
ers to effective regulation. Accord ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 171, at 3.
323. For examples of the subtle and uncertain effects of environmental degradation, see
Butler, supra note 143, at 474-75.
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the resource needs of man, conservationists recognize the legiti-
macy of balancing environmental interests with other concerns. 24
Despite the inherent uncertainty of environmental regulation,
some of the implementation problems of state environmental pro-
grams nevertheless can be attributed to an ineffective administra-
tive process. Government regulation of barrier islands demon-
strates that ineffectiveness. Consider the regulatory process
governing a Virginia barrier island known as Cedar Island.s25 In
recent years, at least eight government bodies have exercised regu-
latory jurisdiction over Cedar Island.3 26 Because barrier islands
contain a number of fragile and environmentally significant re-
sources,3 27 the islands are governed by a complicated and some-
times confusing regulatory structure. State wetlands and coastal
dune statutes can apply, as well as state soil and water conserva-
tion laws, local zoning ordinances and numerous federal laws. s3 2
324. Preservationist views are best reflected in the wilderness movement. See generally R.
NASH, supra note 56, at 238-71 (discussing the debate over wilderness preservation). One of
the most significant victories of the wilderness movement occurred when the "forever wild"
covenant was added to the New York Constitution. Found in article XIV, § 1, the covenant
provides in pertinent part:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the for-
est preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands.
They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation,
public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. The provision also authorizes certain uses. Id. See generally P.
SCHAEFER, DEFENDING THE WILDERNSS (1989) (discussing the effects of the "forever wild"
covenant on the Adirondack Park). A comparison of the New York provision with the envi-
ronmental provision in the Virginia Constitution highlights the differences between the
preservationists and conservationists. Whereas the New York provision declares protected
forests to be forever wild, the Virginia provision defines the policy of the Commonwealth to
be the conservation, development and use of its natural resources, public lands and histori-
cal sites and buildings. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 with VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
325. See generally Note, supra note 66, at 401-04 (discussing the Cedar Island permit
process).
326. The government bodies included Accomack County's Board of Supervisors, Board of
Zoning Appeals, and Wetlands Board, as well as the state's Department of Conservation and
Historic Resources, Marine Resources Commission, Soil and Water Conservation Commis-
sion, and Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries, and the federal government's Army
Corps of Engineers. See id.
327. See L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 2.4, at 42-43; Note, supra note 66,
at 378-80.
328. See Note, supra note 66, at 389-401 (discussing the statutes and regulations affecting
development of Virginia's barrier islands). Today, Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation
Act also would apply. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100, -2101, -2109 (1989). See generally 4
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The result of all this legislative attention is that a large number of
state, federal and local agencies may play a role in regulating the
development of barrier islands.
Although the legislative and regulatory framework would appear
to provide adequate environmental protection for barrier islands,
the results of the permitting process for Cedar Island suggest oth-
erwise. Despite evidence of serious environmental consequences
and substantial risk of loss, federal and state regulators have au-
thorized development on Cedar Island .32  Because of their volatile
and unique nature, barrier islands are not adequately protected by
the same standards that regulate other wetlands and coastal
dunes;3 0 yet those standards governed the Cedar Island permitting
process. Nor does the local zoning ordinance now in effect for
Cedar Island provide sufficient protection. The ordinance effec-
tively grandfathers existing lots,331 and although this grandfather-
ing probably was needed to appease the ordinance's opponents, it
significantly undermines the ordinance's environmental goals.
The inadequate environmental protection accorded Cedar Island
may result in part from the unique resource problems presented by
barrier islands and from the inexperience of Virginia regulators in
handling such problems. Apparently recognizing the need for more
specialized standards, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
(VMRC) responded to the Cedar Island case by promulgating Bar-
rier Island Policy and Supplemental Guidelines. 32 Shortly after
their promulgation, the policy statement and guidelines were chal-
lenged as procedurally and substantively deficient. Of particular
concern are the charges that the guidelines were adopted without
adequate study and without a majority of commissioners pre-
sent.3 3 Perhaps because of these criticisms, the VMRC recently
announced its intention to review the barrier island policy.3 34
P. ROHAN, supra note 4, § 26.01 (discussing federal and state regulation of coastal re-
sources); W. WANT, supra note 5, ch. 13 (discussing state wetlands and coastal laws).
329. See generally Note, supra note 66, at 378-80 (discussing the ecological and physical
characteristics of barrier islands as well as the risks posed by development).
330. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
331. See Accomack County, Va., Amendment to Zoning Ordinance (Apr. 15, 1987).
332. See Note, supra note 66, at 399-400.
333. See id. at 400-01.
334. See CHESAPEAKE RivERS REPORT, supra note 229, at 6.
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As the Cedar Island case demonstrates, regulators have yet to
develop an effective program to protect Virginia's barrier islands.
Although some of the ineffectiveness may be due to the absence of
environmental laws specifically designed to govern barrier islands,
much of the ineffectiveness results from a complicated and un-
wieldy regulatory structure and from a vague state administrative
process. When large numbers of government bodies are involved in
regulating a resource, inefficiencies are bound to occur. In the con-
text of Virginia's barrier island regulatory program, the inefficien-
cies became apparent when the state's barrier island guidelines
were challenged shortly after their promulgation. Only a vague and
inefficient administrative process explains the adoption of stan-
dards as important as the barrier island guidelines at a meeting
apparently held without a majority of commissioners.3 35
One aspect of the environmental administrative process that is
particularly troubling is its enforcement structure. Even when leg-
islatures pass adequate environmental laws, ineffective environ-
mental regulation still occurs. Promising environmental laws that
have survived difficult political battles become meaningless in the
absence of effective regulatory enforcement. Because of weak en-
forcement efforts, environmental statutes can remain in effect for
years and fail to achieve any noticeable improvement in environ-
mental quality.336
The cause of an inadequate enforcement structure varies. Some-
times ineffective enforcement is due to an agency's failure to re-
spond appropriately to its delegated responsibilities. 37 To the ex-
tent that this explanation is accurate, the culpable agency must be
reminded of its statutory duties. Other times, however, ineffective
335. Political factors, of course, may influence whether a regulator chooses to attend a
crucial meeting. For a discussion of how comprehensive, flexible administrative procedure
legislation can help to minimize the negative effects of political forces on environmental
rulemaking, see infra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
336. Air pollution laws illustrate this point. A lengthy delay by the EPA in enforcing the
Clean Air Act has led one party to argue that it should be shielded from future sanctions.
The party has stressed its compliance with an unapproved state pollution plan. See United
States v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 537
(1989) (No. 89-369).
337. Some would argue that the regulations adopted by Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Local
Assistance Board illustrate this point. See Appeal Made to Strengthen Virginia Preserva-
tion Act, supra note 158, at 1-2.
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enforcement may not be the fault of any particular environmental
agency, but rather the result of legislative or judicial action. Politi-
cal considerations, for instance, may prompt a state legislature to
limit the enforcement capabilities of an environmental agency.
Statutory provisions limiting administrative sanctions or requiring
regulators to seek judicial remedies may reflect such motivation.338
Or, even if environmental legislation includes adequate enforce-
ment powers, courts may hesitate to impose full sanctions against
violators of environmental laws, especially when the violator pro-
vides significant economic benefits to the community.3 3 9 Regardless
of the reason for the limited enforcement efforts, the effects on en-
vironmental quality can be profound.340
One of the primary causes of the implementation and enforce-
ment problems is the substantive uncertainty of environmental
laws. 41 Although much of that uncertainty appears in legislative
and judicial rules of law,3 42 it also exists in administrative regula-
tions, guidelines and opinions. In the model state, for example, re-
cent attorney general opinions provide little, if any, clarification to
those seeking guidance in land use and other regulatory matters.3 43
Nor does the Virginia Administrative Process Act give clear signals
to those attempting to understand its procedural requirements.3 44
338. Cf., e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-50(I), 48-39-160, 48-39-170(C) (Law. Co-op. 1987)
(providing for judicial review of critical area decisions); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.15 to -
13.16:1, -13.18, -13.18:1 (1987) (providing for judicial review of wetlands decisions, prosecu-
tion of violators, issuance of stop work orders and injunctive relief); id. §§ 62.1-44.20 to -
44.30 (1987 & Supp. 1989) (setting forth enforcement and appeal procedure under Virginia's
State Water Control Law).
339. One Virginia official observed that state courts appear to be reluctant to impose stiff
penalties on violators of environmental laws. He suggested that this reluctance may result
because the courts subconsciously compare environmental violations to criminal matters.
340. Enforcement of state pollution laws against the Avtex Fibers plant in Front Royal,
Virginia, took years. Although the plant eventually shut down, it continued to violate pollu-
tion laws during the enforcement process. Indeed, at one point, Avtex was violating a con-
sent decree obtained by the State Water Control Board. See supra note 318.
341. Some other causes relevant to the second and third areas of criticism will be dis-
cussed later. See infra notes 355-57, 384-86, 401-05 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 175-86, 190-92, 312-14 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., 1986-1987 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 339 (discussing challenges to the program
regulating use of state-owned submerged land); 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 112 (discuss-
ing a proposed transferable development rights program).
344. A quick comparison of the administrative procedure statutes of Virginia and Idaho
reveals the complexity and vagueness of the Virginia version. For example, whereas Idaho's
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Though some of this uncertainty admittedly is inherent in the con-
cept of environmental protection, 45 some also is due to poor treat-
ment of legal issues. Development of more certain administrative
standards for environmental regulation should help to alleviate
some of the problems of implementation and enforcement.
Discrepancies between federal and state regulatory systems have
compounded the implementation problems caused by an ineffec-
tive state administrative process. At a minimum, the dual struc-
ture has created a legal quagmire for the regulated community; a
wide variety of administrative entities, standards and procedures
typically face those attempting to comply with environmental pro-
grams. While the problems caused by the dual regulatory structure
are not likely to disappear, the structure should not be as burden-
some as it currently is. Benefits to the states also can result from
the dual system. By focusing on the overlap in regulation, for ex-
ample, states can lower their environmental regulation costs. To
the extent that tougher federal standards exist, state governments
need not duplicate federal efforts. Additionally, even when federal
standards are not tougher and thus do not necessarily serve state
interests, state agencies can still lower their overall costs of envi-
ronmental regulation by adopting jurisdictional agreements with
federal agencies on enforcement activities. Such agreements could
coordinate regulatory efforts where overlap exists and therefore
avoid significant duplication of resources.
statute incorporates exceptions into the appropriate provisions that would otherwise apply,
Virginia's statute contains a complicated exemptions and exclusions section that does not
always identify the appropriate provisions being exempted. Compare IDAHO CODE § 67-
5201(7) (1989) (incorporating exclusions into the definition of "rule") and id. § 67-5203(b)-
(d) (setting forth three general exceptions to rulemaking provisions) with VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-6.14:4.1 (1989) (setting forth all exemptions and exclusions). In 1981 the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a model act and recommended
its enactment in all states. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1981).
Even if an interested party can understand Virginia's Administrative Process Act, she still
faces the monumental task of finding administrative regulations adopted pursuant to the
Act. Virginia does not have a code of administrative regulations.
345. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
346. The agreements could, for example, provide for the sharing of data, research and
expertise in programs in which overlap exists. Some legal obstacles to these agreements may
exist. For instance, agreements providing for the consolidation of permit hearings may vio-
late administrative law requirements. Such a problem apparently arose under Virginia law
when a statutory provision authorized a multiple permit process. See infra notes 364-66 and
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In recent months tensions between state and federal environ-
mental agencies have eased somewhat. Revisions to EPA's state
wetlands regulations demonstrate the new atmosphere of coopera-
tion developing between federal and state counterparts. Among
other improvements, the revisions increase the flexibility of states
and eliminate unnecessary requirements. 47 Similar cooperative ef-
forts exist in other regulatory programs.348
Another factor that contributes to the implementation problems
is the existence of misconceptions about the need for increased en-
vironmental regulation. Such misconceptions surfaced during the
model state investigation when, despite evidence to the contrary,
some government officials described Virginia as a state with fairly
tough environmental laws.349 As support, one official compared Vir-
accompanying text; cf. supra note 322 and infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how some federal/state tensions have been eased).
Apparently reacting to these legal obstacles, several local, state and federal agencies
adopted a joint permit application to govern activities in Virginia waters. Adopting agencies
include the Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission, the State Water Control Board and local wetlands boards. Parties
using the application generally need to complete only one application for those agencies.
The application, however, stresses that it does not eliminate the need to get separate per-
mits from each agency involved in the permit program. Some duplicative procedures are
avoided by using the joint application. In addition to joint monthly processing meetings, the
application also provides for joint state/federal public notice. Each agency, however, may
still hold its own public hearings and will consider the comments received in response to the
public notice in reaching its permit decision. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, INFORMA-
TION GUIDE & JOINT PERMIT APPLICATION FOR AcTIvITIEs IN WATERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA (NAO application form 1065/VMRC 30-300, revised May 10, 1985).
347. Williams, EPA Revises State Wetlands Regulations, 10 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL.,
Sept./Oct. 1988, No. 5, at 13, 13-14. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WET-
LANDS AND 401 CERTIFICATION (A-104F, Apr. 1989) (discussing the potential for state applica-
tion of the 401 certification process to wetlands); W. WANT, supra note 5, § 3.04 (discussing
state assumption of the EPA wetlands program). EPA's cooperative attitude already is hav-
ing a positive impact on some states. Virginia and North Carolina, for example, recently
received authorization to administer the permit process under the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System. See 3 VA. NAT. RESOURCES NEWSL., Winter 1989, No. 1, at 7.
348. The EPA, for instance, selected Virginia to be a lead state for the federal air toxic
pollution program. As a lead state, Virginia will coordinate information-gathering efforts
with other states in its region. See 3 VA. NAT. RESOURCES NEWSL., Spring 1989, No. 3, at 4.
Additionally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration approved Virginia's re-
quest to incorporate § 401 certification of applications for § 404 permits into the state's
Coastal Resources Management Program. 6 Va. Regs. Reg. 399 (Nov. 6, 1989).
349. Excellent evidence of this attitude can be found in the responses of some regulators
to a recent EPA study ranking Virginia as one of the worst states in emissions. See Camp-
bell, U.S. Rules 'Hamper' Pollution Cleanup, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 16, 1989, at
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ginia's programs to those of other southern states. Similar miscon-
ceptions undoubtedly exist in other states.
Several different factors could explain the misconceptions about
the need for increased environmental regulation. To an extent, the
misconceptions reflect false optimism about a state's environmen-
tal health. The false optimism may be due in part to the self-inter-
ests of current regulators, who understandably may fear change
and prefer the status quo to the uncertainty of new or expanded
programs. To protect their interests, regulators may overestimate
the strength and effectiveness of current programs. 5 ° In addition
to false optimism, the misconceptions also may reflect a reluctance
to interfere with private property rights. As explained earlier, a
private rights orientation has pervaded the legal and social fabric
of America. 5 1 Given that this private rights mentality has become
an important part of the common law property system, it would
not be surprising to find that the mentality affects environmental
regulators as well. Finally, the misconceptions could reflect an in-
accurate and incomplete process for assessing environmental qual-
ity. Even if one state does have a more demanding environmental
regulation program than another, that fact does not address the
adequacy of the more demanding state's program. To conduct an
accurate environmental assessment, regulators should focus on re-
cent studies of the health of their natural resources and on other
relevant scientific evidence. 2  In addition, if comparisons with
other programs are to be made, regulators should consider the pro-
grams of a large number of states. 53
B-1, col. 5; Ruberry, EPA Figures Rank Virginia 4th-Worst State in Emissions, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1989, at A-i, col. 2.
350. See Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1985); cf. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 67, at 486-87 (discussing
the effect of false optimism on the settlement process).
351. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
352. For some examples of those studies, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
353. An examination of the programs of some northern states, for example, should reveal
that Virginia's programs are, for the most part, weaker. Among other states, Maryland
clearly has tougher regulatory programs and is more likely to take the initiative in the envi-
ronmental area. Maryland's Chesapeake Bay laws and its wetlands program illustrate this
point. Compare MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801 to -1816, -1901 to -1909 (1990) with VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (1989) (Chesapeake Bay programs); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-101 to -603 (1990) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-3, -13.1 to -13.20 (1987 & Supp.
1989) (wetlands and subaqueous bed programs). See generally Note, supra note 149, at 749-
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Regardless of the cause of the implementation problems, states
must begin to address them. At the very least, the problems create
an atmosphere of hostility and resistance not conducive to effective
regulation. Once private property owners realize that implementa-
tion and enforcement efforts are resulting in disparate treatment
of those similarly situated, they will understandably begin to resist
future enforcement efforts. Inconsistent enforcement of environ-
mental laws creates feelings of frustration and unfairness, while in-
adequate implementation engenders false, but arguably reasonable,
expectations about the strength of private property rights . 54 Alle-
viating these feelings of hostility and injustice requires a consistent
and continuous implementation process.
B. Procedural Deficiencies
The second area of concern involves the administrative proce-
dures that environmental regulators use. The Virginia experience
demonstrates that the procedures can be inefficient and burden-
some. One model state official noted that a typical development
project can involve regulatory oversight by several state and local
agencies, each with its own special procedures, regulations and
guidelines.35 5 Another observed that procedural problems, as op-
posed to substantive environmental concerns, usually thwart devel-
opment projects. Still others expressed concern about the methods
used to select regulators. More particularly, they noted that the
provisions for determining the membership of some regulatory
bodies do not accurately reflect the different constituencies in the
regulated community. Further, the provisions can result in the se-
lection of decisionmakers who face a conflict between their profes-
sional interests and the public interest. 56 Finally, one official com-
55 (comparing the Virginia and Maryland Bay programs); Peirce, Wetlands Law Model for
Nation, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 21, 1989, at G-2, col. 4 (describing Maryland as the
first state to incorporate the "no net loss" principle into its wetlands laws).
354. A good example of such expectations and feelings has arisen in the context of the
Clean Air Act. For a discussion of that example, see supra note 336.
355. The Cedar Island case illustrates this point. See supra notes 325-35 and accompany-
ing text.
356. Virginia law, for example, provides that at least one member of the Marine Re-
sources Commission "shall be a person who, at the time of his appointment and for at least
five years prior thereto, has earned his livelihood from working on the waters of the Com-
monwealth." VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-4 (Supp. 1989). Although the legislature understandably
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plained that agency guidelines do not have the force of law when
they fail to qualify as regulations subject to the Virginia Adminis-
trative Process Act.3 57 Although the official was not advocating
greater procedural requirements, he nevertheless believed that
agency decisions and actions generally should carry significant le-
gal consequences.
Procedural deficiencies clearly do exist in the environmental reg-
ulatory systems of Virginia and other states.3 58 As explained in the
context of Virginia's barrier island regulatory program, the over-
lapping jurisdiction of numerous federal, state and local agencies
creates an inefficient and complex administrative process.3 59 Fur-
thermore, the numerous exceptions to state administrative proce-
dure acts tend to result in vague and inconsistent regulatory
processes.60 Some of this vagueness also is due to the existence of
prefers to have at least one commissioner with experience in the fisheries industry, that
experience can result in a conflict of interests when fishery regulations are being considered.
The State Air Pollution Control Board also has "traditionally enjoyed cordial, if not cozy,
relations with the industries it regulates." Ruberry, supra note 349, at A-8, col. 1. Indeed,
these relations have existed despite a statutory provision stating that "[n]o officer, employee
or representative of any industry, county, city or town which may become subject to the
regulations of the Board shall be appointed to the Board." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1302
(1989).
357. Under the Virginia Administrative Process Act, a "rule" or "regulation" is defined as
"any statement of general application, having the force of law, affecting the rights or con-
duct of any person, promulgated by an agency in accordance with the authority conferred on
it by applicable basic laws." VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4(F) (1989). Some state officials have
narrowly interpreted this definition, concluding that it does not apply to agency guidelines
that do not restrict or impede an agency's power to consider a permit application on its own
merits. This interpretation appears to be based on the phrase "force of law," which basically
adopts the federal administrative law distinction between "legislative" and "nonlegislative"
rules. See generally 1 C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121, § 3.52 (discussing that distinction). For
a broader definition of "rule," see MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(10) (1981).
See generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 3.3 (discussing the model act's definition of
"~rule").
Under Virginia law, even if agency action meets the definition of "regulation," it may
nevertheless be exempt from the Act's rulemaking procedures. Regulations prescribing in-
ternal practice or procedure, for example, are exempt. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(2)
(1989); see id. § 9-6.14:4.1(C) (setting forth other exemptions).
358. See generally 1 LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 5, § 6.03[2] (dis-
cussing state procedures and institutions affecting implementation of environmental laws).
For a thorough treatment of the state rulemaking process, see A. BONFIELD, supra note 7.
359. The law of wetlands regulation provides another excellent example of the problems
created by overlapping jurisdiction. See generally W. WANT, supra note 5, chs. 3, 4 (discuss-
ing the complexities of state and federal wetlands regulation).
360. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1 (1989).
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unpublicized informal procedures, statements of policy and inter-
pretive opinions. To the extent that these procedures, statements
and opinions do not concern an agency's internal management and
are used by the agency in the discharge of its functions, they
should be made available for public inspection. 61 Unpublicized ad-
ministrative procedures and standards create an unhealthy air of
secretiveness and often result in political manipulation of the regu-
latory process.36
Efforts to provide for coordinated procedures have encountered
legal obstacles in some jurisdictions.6 3 The Virginia General As-
sembly, for example, tried to improve coordination of environmen-
tal regulation by authorizing a unified multiple permit process. 64
Although the process can apply whenever "a project requires a
state permit or certificate from more than one state environmental
regulatory agency,"36 15 the process is not currently used. Appar-
ently, the regulated community does not perceive a need for a uni-
fied process. Perhaps more importantly, some regulators doubt the
legal validity of a unified decisionmaking process when separate
361. For an example of such a state requirement, see IDAHO CODE § 67-5202(2) (1989).
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act is more demanding. It exempts interpretive
rules from the notice and comment procedures, but still requires compliance with the
rulemaking provisions governing explanatory statements, format, agency records, filings, ef-
fective date of rules and petitions for adoption. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT
§§ 3-109(a), 3-110 to -117 (1981). Newly adopted interpretive rules also must meet the Act's
publication requirements. See id. § 2-101. See generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 6.9
(describing and justifying the interpretive rule provisions of the model act).
362. For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes 373-77 and accompanying
text.
363. Some of these legal obstacles involve state administrative provisions requiring each
agency's action to be based on its own record of relevant material. See Letter from James E.
Ryan, Jr., Va. Dep. Att'y Gen., to Gerald P. McCarthy, Administrator, Governor's Council
on the Environment (Mar. 25, 1977) (on file with the author) (discussing such a record re-
quirement in the context of permit decisions) (requirement now codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
9-6.14:12(E) (1989)); see also A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 6.12.1(a) (explaining and justify-
ing such a record requirement in the context of rulemaking). Other legal obstacles may be
motivated by arguments for procedural diversity advanced by some state administrative law
experts. See id. § 1.2.3 (1986) (discussing the longstanding debate over the desirability of
procedural uniformity versus procedural diversity).
364. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1206 (1989).
365. Id. § 10.1-1206(A). For a list of agencies considered to be "state environmental regu-
latory agencies" for purposes of the multiple permit provisions, see supra note 110.
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permit decisions are required by law."' In their view, avoiding
these legal problems would require procedures almost as cumber-
some as those normally applicable.
Interpretations of state administrative law that would prevent
procedural streamlining and even moderate attempts at uniformity
should be rejected by the appropriate legal entity.36 7 Scholars of
state administrative law have recognized that some procedural uni-
formity is sound from legal and policy perspectives.3 8 As long as
the unified procedures allow each responsible agency to carry out
its delegated responsibilities and do not attempt to govern all as-
pects of an agency's operation, the procedures should not violate
basic principles and policies of administrative law. Development of
a uniform set of administrative procedures helps to ensure fairness
and enables private parties to feel comfortable with the regulatory
process. If the procedures are properly drafted, they will not un-
duly hamper legitimate exercises of regulatory power; an effective
set of unified procedures should only act as a check upon improper
conduct, such as abuses of discretion 9 Additionally, a unified set
of procedures should result in more coordinated regulation and
thus less duplication of resources.
But even if state administrative law prevents effective use of a
unified permit process, steps can be taken to alleviate the proce-
dural deficiencies now existing. Where a sufficient legislative basis
exists, the agency responsible for carrying out the unified process
could continue to coordinate environmental regulation.7 Such co-
366. This doubt is based on an attorney general opinion letter, which lists several con-
cerns with the coordinated permit approach. Among other potential legal problems, the
opinion notes that the coordinated procedure "would be susceptible to legal challenge" if
the record upon which an agency permit decision is made "contains information which is
not relevant to the issues that it must resolve." Letter from James E. Ryan, Jr., Va. Dep.
Att'y Gen., supra note 363. Several state and local agencies appear to have circumvented
the opinion by adopting a joint permit application process. See supra note 346.
367. To the extent that these interpretations are based on explicit statutory language,
legislative action would be necessary. For recommended legislation'authorizing a multiple
permit process, see MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, §§ 2-401 to -403.
368. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2.3 (1986) (discussing the tension between the
need for uniformity and the need for diversity in state agency procedures and agreeing with
arguments for uniformity).
369. See id. § 1.2.3, at 24-25.
370. In the case of Virginia, for example, the responsible agency-the Council on the En-
vironment-could continue to act as a staff to the Secretary of Natural Resources and as a
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ordination should focus on the administrative procedures gov-
erning environmental rulemaking. Requiring a uniform format for
rules adopted by all agencies3"' or designating an agency to act as a
clearinghouse for each major environmental program3" are ways to
improve the existing administrative process. Additionally, where
such a legislative basis is absent or tenuous, the state should con-
sider passing appropriate legislation to enable one agency to unify
procedures and coordinate environmental regulation. Alternatively,
if the state legislature would prefer not to give such authority to
one agency, the legislature could choose to improve coordination
and eliminate procedural deficiencies by authorizing an inter-
agency task force to develop uniform procedures to guide environ-
mental agencies.
The adoption of more comprehensive but flexible administrative
procedures also would improve coordination and eliminate many
procedural deficiencies. 373 Regulators who tend to resist the impo-
sition of additional procedural requirements need to realize that
additional requirements do not necessarily entail notice and com-
ment procedures. Informal procedures often can be more effec-
tive. 4 Regulators also need to realize that in the rulemaking con-
text administrative procedures are not counterproductive or overly
restrictive. Although a state's administrative procedure act gener-
ally defines how certain state regulators must proceed, the statute
does not restrict their substantive powers. 5 Additionally, compre-
hensive but flexible administrative procedures would help to mini-
mize the negative effects of political pressures on the rulemaking
liaison with other environmental agencies. See generally supra notes 108-15 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the role of the COE).
371. The model act requires a uniform form, style and numbering system. MODEL STATE
ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT § 3-111(d) (1981). In addition, all rules must be filed in a central
place. Id. § 3-114(a). See generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, §§ 6.11.3, 6.14.1 (discussing
the style, form and filing requirements of the model act).
372. For example, some Virginia and federal agencies have informally designated the Vir-
ginia Marine Resources Commission as a clearinghouse for programs regulating activities in
state waters. See supra note 346 (discussing the joint permit application).
373. See generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.1.2 (explaining the different theories of
the administrative lawmaking process and arguing for the comprehensive rationality model).
374. Cf. I C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121, § 3.26 (arguing for procedural flexibility). See
generally A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 6.9.2(b), (c) (discussing the justifications for and
objections to relaxing the notice and comment requirements for interpretive rules).
375. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2.4 (1986).
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process. As long as a state administrative procedure act narrowly
defines the type of rule that is subject to its provisions, political
manipulation of the regulatory process will be possible. A compre-
hensive administrative procedure act that covers all types of
rulemaking activities would minimize the problem of political ma-
nipulation by requiring complete openness about the rulemaking
process.3 76 A flexible act that varies procedures according to
whether or not rulemaking activity is "legislative," in the sense of
having the force of law, would ensure that agencies do not have to
face lengthy notice and comment procedures for every rulemaking
activity.3
77
In addition to minimizing the problem of political manipulation,
compliance with effective administrative procedures can result in
other significant benefits.3 78 Procedural safeguards help to mini-
mize feelings of frustration and resentment that arise when private
parties have no opportunity to comment on proposed regulations
and agency decisions. The denial of an opportunity to be heard
tends to infuriate parties adversely affected by government action.
Parties who lose under a regulatory decision need to feel that the
procedures used to make the decision were fair. Procedurally
sound decisions are easier to accept and thus protect the agency
from challenge. Furthermore, administrative procedures provide an
376. Cf. id. § 1.1.2 (arguing for a comprehensive model of the administrative lawmaking
process). Not all political influences are negative. If, for example, a regulator reaches a deci-
sion based on the views of the general public, that regulator has been influenced by the
political will of the people. This type of political influence speaks to the essence of the
democratic process and seems to be an appropriate consideration in the rulemaking process,
See 1 C. KOCH, J., supra note 121, § 4.77; see also A. BONFMELD, supra note 7, § 5.2.3 (1986)
(discussing the need for politically responsible rules).
377. See generally A. BONFMLD, supra note 7, § 6.9.2 (discussing the interpretive rule
exemption to the notice and comment requirements); 1 C. KoCH, JR, supra note 121, §§ 3.1-
.27 (discussing the concept of agency rulemaking and the need for procedural flexibility).
378. The existence and extent of these benefits will depend on the type of administrative
procedure. If, for example, an agency is developing regulations or policy guidelines or is
engaged in other rulemaking activity, adherence to administrative procedures will yield sig-
nificant benefits. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.2.3, at 26-27 (1986). But if an agency is
using formal adjudication (as it would in making permit decisions), the administrative pro-
cess may be very burdensome and inefficient. See generally 1 C. KOCH, J., supra note 121,
§ 2.16 (discussing the advantages of rulemaking over adjudication). Even in the latter situa-
tion, though, fairness benefits can result. See infra text following note 378. For a discussion
of the differences between adjudication and rulemaking, see 1 C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121,
§ 2.3.
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efficient way to gather information on regulatory problems and
help to ensure that the decisionmaker considers all perspectives
before deciding how to proceed. Simply by giving appropriate no-
tice, state agencies can alert private parties to the need to submit
information and identify issues raised by a particular problem.379
Procedurally sound decisions thus can promote efficiency and fair-
ness concerns while lowering the risk of successful litigation.
The benefits of improved procedures demonstrate clearly that
state administrative procedures generally should apply, in varying
degrees, to more agency decisions. For example, an agency's infor-
mal procedures for discharging its duties should be subject to a
public inspection requirement.3 8 0  Additionally, although state
agencies still should be able to ignore administrative law require-
ments and adopt emergency guidelines for situations requiring im-
mediate attention,"'1 guidelines addressing long term problems
generally should be subject to administrative law.38 2 By combining
more comprehensive coverage with procedural flexibility, states
can ensure that procedural obstacles to effective environmental
regulation are minimized.
379. See generally I C. KOCH, JR., supra note 121, § 2.16 (discussing the efficiency and
fairness advantages of rulemaking).
380. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
381. The Virginia Marine Resources Commission, for example, should be able to adopt
guidelines to handle emergencies arising in Virginia's marine fisheries industry without hav-
ing to conduct lengthy proceedings. But in declaring that an emergency situation exists, the
Commission must be careful not to confuse long term problems with sudden emergencies.
For an example of such a situation, see L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON, supra note 13, § 4.4, at
94r95. Other jurisdictions also recognize an exception for emergency situations. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 67-5203(b) (1989).
382. Recently, the Virginia legislature recognized the need for more procedural safeguards
in one regulatory context. The General Assembly passed legislation that requires the Vir-
ginia Marine Resources Commission to comply with the Administrative Process Act in au-
thorizing "any general permit or guidelines" pursuant to title 62.1 (which deals with waters
of the state). Act of Apr. 8, 1987, ch. 652, 1987 Va. Acts 1099, 1101 (presently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(E) (1989)). In expanding the coverage of its administrative procedure
statute, the Virginia General Assembly should consider the arguments for procedural flexi-
bility that administrative law scholars have advanced. See, e.g., A. BONFIELD, supra note 7,
§ 6.9.2 (advocating more relaxed procedural requirements for interpretive rules); 1 C. KOCH,
JR., supra note 121, § 3.26 (making a case for procedural flexibility). Expansions in coverage
that require compliance with formal procedures may not necessarily be beneficial. See A.
BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 6.9.2(b).
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C. The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation
The third area of concern is the role of local governments in en-
vironmental regulation. During the model state investigation, a sig-
nificant number of Virginia officials described this role as ineffi-
cient and ineffective. As several officials explained, the local
government structure in Virginia is too fragmented to permit effec-
tive natural resource regulation. Virginia has a large number of lo-
cal governments, most of which are highly independent. In such a
setting, the local rule approach predictably results in a competitive
atmosphere and discourages regional cooperation. Nor does the lo-
cal government structure provide a scientifically effective basis for
resolving complex environmental matters. Problems of environ-
mental degradation and resource allocation rarely confine them-
selves to political boundaries, even at the state level.383
Model state officials identified bad management, limited re-
sources38 4 and the permissiveness of local enabling legislation as
primary causes of ineffective local rule. Because localities are not
always required to adopt management plans or zoning ordi-
nances,381 a wide variety of regulatory strategies exists among Vir-
383. The environmental problems of the Chesapeake Bay amply demonstrate this point.
For further discussion of some of those problems, see L. BUTLER & M. LMNGSTON, supra
note 13, §§ 3.2.A, 3.3.
Several states have recognized the ineffectiveness of the local rule approach in the context
of water resources. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.262(1) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 105.38-.39 (West Supp. 1990); see also A MODEL WATER CODE commentary at 72-73 (F.
Maloney, R. Ausness & J. Morris 1972) (advocating a centralized state approach). Virginia
recently recognized the need for state control over water resources in certain limited con-
texts. In its 1989 session, the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation establishing a
low flow permitting system. The legislation authorizes the State Water Control Board to
declare certain areas as surface water management areas. If such a declaration is made,
nonexempt water users in the area must obtain a permit to withdraw water. During periods
of low flow, permittees may be subject to conditions imposed to preserve the instream flow.
Surface Water Management Areas Act of 1989, ch. 721, 1989 Va. Acts 1697 (presently codi-
fied at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (Supp. 1989)). See generally Butler, supra note
143, at 446-48 (discussing the local control issue).
384. Model state officials described resources as being limited in every sense of the word,
including financing, expertise, human resources and technical assistance.
385. Although Virginia localities must adopt comprehensive plans, the content of those
plans may vary according to the needs and preferences of a particular locality. A local gov-
ernment's comprehensive plan may include, among other items, a plan for land use, trans-
portation, community facilities, historic preservation and redevelopment. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-446.1 (1989). Virginia's environmental laws also typically give localities flexibility in
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ginia's local governments. At one extreme, a few localities have de-
veloped comprehensive environmental and land use plans. These
local governments have exercised virtually all of the regulatory
powers the localities have, as well as some they arguably do not
have. At the other extreme, some localities have done little, if any,
resource management and environmental protection. These locali-
ties have not even identified critical environmental areas or
adopted basic zoning ordinances authorized by statute.
A few cynical officials perceived this failure to regulate as noth-
ing more than the absence of political courage. They believed that
local governments generally preferred to avoid tough regulatory is-
sues and often tried to convince the state government to deal with
issues that localities could handle by zoning. Thus, even when they
wanted to restrict particular uses, the localities often felt politi-
cally compelled to allow the uses and refrain from regulation." 6
The uncertain and limited powers of local governments provided
these localities with an excuse for not regulating.
Model state officials also pointed to the division of regulatory
authority between state and local governments as contributing to
the ineffectiveness of local rule in the resource and environmental
area. This division traditionally distinguishes between land use
matters-and environmental problems. Localities are allowed to deal
with certain land use matters, while environmental issues generally
are reserved for the state. 7 To the extent that land uses have an
impact on the environment, the division does not provide a sensi-
ble way to allocate regulatory responsibility because it does not al-
low local governments to deal effectively with the consequences of
those uses.
Nor can localities depend on the state government to represent
their interests in handling a problem outside the scope of their
deciding how and whether to act. See, e.g., id. § 62.1-13.5 (Supp. 1989) (setting forth a
wetlands zoning ordinance that localities may adopt); id. § 62.1-13.25 (setting forth a coastal
dune zoning ordinance that certain localities may adopt).
386. As an example, one Virginia regulator noted that many local governments hesitate to
regulate uses that would enhance the localities' economy. Some model state officials also
characterized local governments as creating an impossible situation for the state govern-
ment; state environmental agencies can regulate localities, but only if the regulations accom-
plish what the localities want.




powers. The interests of state and local governments often diverge.
An urban locality, for example, may prefer to promote the quality
of life within its limits by prohibiting certain land uses. The state,
on the other hand, may want to permit the uses because of their
significant economic benefits. A rural locality, conversely, may pre-
fer to promote economic interests, while the state may choose to
protect sensitive environmental resources still present in the rural
area. Because of the divergence of state and local interests, reliance
on the traditional distinction between land use and environmental
regulation can result in unbalanced and conflicting regulatory deci-
sions. Thus, even when localities are willing to regulate, their ef-
forts may be ineffective.
The concerns expressed by Virginia officials about the local rule
approach to environmental regulation apply to other states as well.
Like Virginia, many other states have used the distinction between
land use and environmental matters to allocate regulatory author-
ity for natural resources. 88 Like Virginia, other states have relied
on local governments to implement important aspects of resource
management programs.389 In those states as well, local govern-
ments generally have been ineffective in dealing with environmen-
tal and resource problems. Too many variations exist in the locali-
ties' treatment of land use matters for' their efforts to result in
adequate regional or statewide solutions. Although legislative def-
erence to local rule may be politically more acceptable than state-
mandated and state-controlled regulation, it tends to be environ-
mentally ineffective.3 90
388. See N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, §§ 5.02, 18.01-.02; cf. F. BossELMAN & D. CALLIES,
supra note 4, at 1-4 (discussing the historical development of local control over land use and
the effect on environmental regulation); Note, An Assessment of the Role of Local Govern-
ment in Environmental Regulation, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145 (1986) (discussing the
division of regulatory authority between federal, state and local governments). See generally
N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, §§ 18.01-.05 (discussing regional environmental land use
controls).
389. See MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, art. 7 commentary at 284-91; F. BOSSELMAN &
D. CALLns, supra note 4, at 1-4; Note, supra note 388, at 157-81.
390. See generally Delogu, supra note 202 (advocating the withdrawal of land use control
from local governments). But see Note, supra note 388 (arguing for increased local govern-
ment participation in environmental regulation). For an argument that state land regulation
of interstate resources is inadequate, see Note, supra note 149.
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Many of the concerns about the local rule approach suggest their
own solution. For example, mandatory, state-administered pro-
grams would minimize the role of local governments in the envi-
ronmental protection and resource management areas, and there-
fore eliminate some of the concerns. For some states, such a
solution may be too controversial and troubling to be a realistic
possibility. Political considerations underlying the local rule ap-
proach may simply override any adverse environmental conse-
quences arising from the approach."'
Regardless of a jurisdiction's views on local rule, some improve-
ments in the role of local government in environmental regulation
need to occur. Even in a system abrogating local control over re-
sources involved in environmental problems, local government par-
ticipation is necessary.3 92 One improvement concerns the philo-
sophical commitment of local governments to environmental
programs. For effective regulation of natural resources to occur, lo-
cal governments must develop a stronger and more uniform com-
mitment to environmental protection. Such a commitment can
arise only if localities develop a better understanding of the nature
of environmental problems and of the value of comprehensive
plans and other regulatory tools.3 93 A greater commitment also re-
quires more involvement by localities in the planning and informa-
tion-gathering stages of environmental regulation. At the outset,
localities with little or no prior history of environmental regulation
may prefer an incremental decisionmaking process. In the adminis-
trative area as well, such an approach can minimize the adverse
consequences of an erroneous decision.3 9 4 At the very least, the
decisionmaking process should include identification and mapping
391. One environmental ethics scholar has argued that the development of environmental
policy should occur through democratic decisionmaking. See H. ROLSTON III, supra note 85,
at 246-49.
392. Accord MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, § 7-101 commentary at 292-93; F. Bos-
SELMAN & D. CALLIS, supra note 4, at 27.
393. Localities, for example, need to realize that a good comprehensive plan can reduce
not only the risk of litigation, but also the magnitude of adverse environmental impact. See
generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 21, ch. 3 (discussing the comprehensive plan).
394. Cf. A. BONFIELD, supra note 7, § 1.1.2 (discussing the benefits of incremental admin-
istrative lawmaking, but advocating the comprehensive rationality model); supra note 315




of critical environmental areas-that is, areas of natural, scenic
and ecological value imperiled by development projects. 9 In addi-
tion, the process should include identification of buffer zones be-
tween developed areas and critical resources, as well as areas suita-
ble for parks, wildlife refuges, scenic drives and other recreational
uses, for navigational and related uses, and for commercial use.396
In identifying these areas, localities should distinguish among ar-
eas that have intense development, limited development and virtu-
ally no development.39 Established development patterns can pro-
vide a helpful basis for environmental planning.
In addition to a stronger philosophical commitment, states need
to improve the structure of local government, which is often too
fragmented and arbitrary to allow effective resource regulation. As
model state officials pointed out, the existence of a large number of
local governments discourages regional solutions. Further, because
of its historical development, the local government structure may
distinguish arbitrarily between different categories of local political
subdivisions in defining their powers. The regulatory powers of
counties and cities, for example, sometimes differ in ways that
have little relevance to the characteristics of the localities. Urban
395. This definition of a critical environmental area is based in part on legislation recom-
mended by a 1972 Virginia report. See CRMCAL AREAS REPORT, supra note 252, at 84. That
legislation proposes the establishment of a Critical Areas Review Board to control develop-
ment within critical environmental areas. Id. at 84-85. The recommended legislation defines
"development" as including the "construction or alteration of land which takes place on a
parcel or parcels of ten (10) or more acres," the "construction of any building or buildings
with a gross floor area of 40,000 square feet or more," "any construction requiring another
permit from a state or federal agency," and the "subdividing of land into three or more
parcels with two or more of the parcels being less than five (5) acres." Id. at 84. "Adverse
development" is defined as "any development which will significantly alter the visual char-
acter, the natural qualities, or the productive capacity of a critical environmental area and
that may be detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare." Id. at 85; cf. MD. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1807 (1990) (defining the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area from more of a
geographic perspective). For further discussion of critical area legislation, see supra notes
247-53 and accompanying text.
396. All of these elements are part of the minimum requirements that a Maryland locality
must meet in developing a critical area protection program. See MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 8-1808(c) (1990).
397. Maryland's Chesapeake Bay legislation basically uses this approach. See id. § 8-
1808.1.
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counties can be much larger in size and population than neighbor-
ing cities, yet have fewer regulatory powers.3 98
Even if a state legislature decides to continue the local rule ap-
proach, it should consider changing the local government structure
to eliminate or at least minimize the problems caused by its frag-
mented and arbitrary approach to land use matters. Among other
changes, a legislature could encourage regional cooperation by giv-
ing a locality standing to participate as an interested party in the
decisionmaking process of a neighboring locality whenever that lo-
cality's land use decisions could affect the resources and environ-
ment of the first locality."' 9 The legislature also could eliminate
some of the arbitrariness of the local government structure by giv-
ing the same basic land use powers to comparable localities. At
least in the environmental area, more uniform regulatory powers
are needed to permit regional cooperation and achieve desired
results.
40 0
398. In Virginia, for example, the police powers of counties generally are more limited
than cities' powers despite the existence of large populated urban counties and despite legis-
lation granting to counties the authority and powers exercised by cities and towns. For ex-
amples of demographic differences existing in Tidewater Virginia, see L. BUTLER & M. Liv-
INGSTON, supra note 13, § 4.1. The Virginia Supreme Court narrowly construed this
legislation to exclude certain types of powers. See Board of Supervisors v. Corbett, 206 Va.
167, 142 S.E.2d 504 (1965) (construing § 15.1-522); M. MASHAW, supra note 195, at 11. The
differences between the powers of Virginia cities and counties admittedly have diminished
over time. See id. at 3, 6-7. The 1971 Virginia Constitution played an important role in this
process by recognizing the similarities of the two categories of local governments. See id. at
3. Some differences still remain, however. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1980, ch. 47, 1980 Va. Acts
50, 50-51 (enacting § 15.1-467, which does not appear in the published Code) (allowing the
subdivision regulations of some municipalities to apply in some counties); id. at 51 (enacting
§ 15.1-468, which does not appear in the published Code) (authorizing some municipalities
to review the subdivision regulations of certain neighboring counties).
The regulatory powers of local governments in different regions of the state also differ in
ways that have little relevance to the characteristics of the localities. Recent impact fee
legislation demonstrates this point. See supra note 137; cf. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491(a),
-491.2 (1989) (taking a regional approach to the establishment of proffering systems).
399. A 1988 report discusses a similar suggestion in the context of instream uses of state
waters. See K. Paur, Developing an Instream Flow Policy for Virginia 6 (Sept. 1988) (un-
published manuscript prepared under fellowship from the Virginia Environmental
Endowment).
400. Many state legislatures have begun to realize this point, passing legislation encourag-
ing regional cooperation. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1239 to -1270 (1989) (authorizing
the formation of regional water and sewer authorities). See generally MODEL LAND CODE,
supra note 3, at 284-91 (discussing the states' gradual recapture of land use control); F.
BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 4, at 5-20 (describing innovative state land use pro-
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Another possible change would be to clarify the regulatory pow-
ers of local governments. As explained earlier, uncertainty sur-
rounds these powers because of the incomplete, vague nature of
enabling legislation and the courts' narrow interpretation of the
legislation. Lacking clear authority to regulate in many areas, lo-
calities often hesitate to adopt measures needed for effective envi-
ronmental protection and resource management. Further, the lo-
calities that do choose to adopt innovative or unconventional
measures typically face challenges in both the administrative and
judicial processes. Thus, for local governments to participate effec-
tively in the environmental regulation process, state legislatures
need to consider ways to reduce the uncertainty surrounding local
regulatory powers.401
Finally, efforts to improve the role of local governments in envi-
ronmental regulation should include reexamining the balance of
power between state and local governments.40 2 Among other issues,
the reexamination should focus on the traditional distinction be-
tween environmental and land use matters. As the Virginia experi-
ence demonstrates, the division of regulatory responsibility be-
tween state and local governments traditionally ignores the
relationship between land use and the environment and assumes
that resource and environmental problems confine themselves to
political boundaries. The reexamination should also consider the
political susceptibility of local governments. Quite understandably,
local governments tend to be more susceptible than state agencies
to political pressures exerted by property owners. 03 To the extent
that localities lack the political will to regulate, another level of
grams). For a discussion of the need for regional cooperation in the environmental area, see
supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
A number of factors could be considered in deciding whether localities are comparable,
including geographic size, population and rate of growth. To a limited extent, Virginia law
already makes these comparisons. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-977.19:1 to -977.25 (1989)
(providing immunity from annexation to certain counties and tier-cities meeting population
and density criteria). See generally M. MASHAW, supra note 195, ch. 3 (discussing the differ-
ent forms of county government in Virginia).
401. For further discussion of this problem, see supra Section 10B2.
402. For examples of how some states have already redefined the balance of power, see
MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, at 284-91; F. BossELMAN & D. CALLms, supra note 4, at 5-
20; and N. ROBINSON, supra note 74, §§ 18.01-.05.
403. See generally R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLMCS OF LAND-USE LAW
(1976) (discussing the impact of interest groups and political influence on land use regula-
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government that could more effectively remove the issue from the
political arena would be helpful. Yet, under a traditional local rule
approach, state environmental agencies may not be able to over-
ride local land use decisions, 04 and even when state agencies have
a decisionmaking role, the agencies often must wait to make per-
mit decisions until after the appropriate local government has
acted.40 5 Improving the balance of power between state and local
governments therefore will require making the balance more re-
sponsive to political and scientific realities.
A crucial part of the rebalancing process is the identification of
environmentally preferred options. Whether a state government
should respond to the balance of power problem by expanding its
role in the land use area is a question best left to the political pro-
cess.40 6 The allocation of regulatory responsibility between state
and local governments raises two levels of concern. The first relates
to the effectiveness of environmental regulation and the second in-
volves the political appropriateness of the balance of power be-
tween state and local governments. While the democratic process
appears to be the best way to resolve the second concern, identifi-
cation of environmentally preferred options will help to ensure an
informed political choice.
A number of environmentally preferred options are available to
a state legislature once it has made the political choice to regulate
a particular resource or adopt an environmental program. For ex-
ample, the legislature could ensure that the state/local balance of
power is effective from an environmental perspective by increasing
the supervisory and enforcement responsibilities of state officials.
Alternatively, the legislature could decide to leave implementation
and enforcement responsibilities with localities, but make their re-
tion); Delogu, supra note 202, at 278-90 (discussing the hidden agenda of local land use
control).
404. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (1989) (providing for judicial review of local zon-
ing decisions).
405. See, e.g., id. §§ 62.1-13.10, -13.11 (1987) (providing for administrative review of deci-
sions by local wetlands boards).
406. See generally H. ROLSTON III, supra note 85, at 246-49 (discussing the need for col-
lective choice in the development of environmental policy). Model state officials disagreed
about the proper balance of power between state and local governments. Some believed that
localities should play an even greater role in environmental and land use regulation, while
others maintained that more statewide initiatives were needed.
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sponsibilities mandatory rather than permissive. With this alterna-
tive a locality would have to implement a regulatory program en-
acted by the legislature, but would have some flexibility in carrying
out its terms. Although localities would have to meet minimum
standards, they could choose to exceed the standards. A third op-
tion would be to vary the balance of power between state and local
governments according to the nature of the environmental prob-
lem.40 7 Local governments could control resolution of fact-specific
questions that require local knowledge and input, such as the suit-
ability of different tracts of land for particular uses. State officials,
on the other hand, could have primary responsibility for issues of
regional or statewide import, such as the setting of quality stan-
dards to govern land uses affecting common resources. Under this
option, local rule would exist only when it would not frustrate the
legislature's environmental policy choices. All three options pro-
mote the effectiveness of environmental programs by indirectly re-
moving some of the political aspects of resource management from
the local government arena.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the regulatory failure of state environmen-
tal programs, focusing in particular on the effect of factors internal
to the state regulatory process. The results of the study are some-
what surprising. They suggest that internal barriers to effective en-
vironmental regulation exist at every level of state government,
from a state's court system tc its legislative and executive
branches, and its local government structure. Though the specific
nature of the barriers varies significantly, they all reflect one over-
riding theme: political acceptability at the price of regulatory effec-
tiveness. Whether the barrier is vague constitutional principles, in-
effective state environmental legislation, deficient judicial
perspectives or a problematic administrative process, political con-
siderations play a significant role in the regulatory failure of state
environmental programs.
407. The drafters of the Model Land Development Code preferred such a variable ap-
proach. MODEL LAND CODE, supra note 3, art. 7 commentary at 289-90 (advocating state
control of major environmental matters and local control of minor environmental matters).
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Not all political influences are negative or undesirable. Political
influences resulting in the formation of a public consensus, for ex-
ample, are precisely the type of influence envisioned by the con-
cept of democratic decisionmaking. But political influences that in-
hibit grassroots democracy or undermine policy choices already
made through the democratic process are inappropriate. Such im-
proper influences may exist when local government officials are un-
willing to jeopardize their political future by exercising delegated
powers or when reelection concerns dictate legislators' political
agenda. Similarly, inappropriate political influence may exist when
administrative agencies use unpublicized procedures and standards
to discharge their duties, creating the opportunity for political ma-
nipulation of the regulatory process. Effective environmental regu-
lation requires the recognition of the differences between these two
types of political influence. Given the nation's mounting environ-
mental problems and the expanding role of the states in environ-
mental regulation, it is more important than ever that the im-
proper influences that are so pervasive in state environmental
programs be eliminated or at least controlled.
Because the development of socially acceptable and therefore
ethically responsible environmental laws requires democratic deci-
sionmaking, some might argue that good and bad political influ-
ences cannot or perhaps should not be separated-that negative
political influences, like positive ones, are a natural part of the
democratic process. Besides providing a convenient excuse for reg-
ulatory inaction, this argument appears to ignore important as-
pects of the democratic process. Democratic decisionmaking is
not-and should not be-synonymous with legislative action. Al-
though the legislature should be primarily responsible for making
environmental policy choices, other legitimate means also are
available for developing and implementing environmental policy.
In many states, voters have made a fundamental policy choice by
adopting constitutional environmental provisions. Furthermore,
once the state legislature has made general policy choices for a par-
ticular environmental or resource problem, the democratic process
must, as a practical matter, allow the experts to define the hard
details of regulation. Among other tasks, the democratic process
must permit administrative agencies to develop the specifics of
statewide programs, local governments to implement site-specific
[Vol. 31:823
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programs, and courts to act as the final arbiter of questions of fair-
ness and as the final check on the legislative and executive
branches. Good political influences have already had their effect on
environmental policymaking. Now is the time to further the
choices made through the positive political process by recognizing
and overcoming improper political influences.
